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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is provided by Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(a)(i)(B). 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
All the issues in this matter concern whether the Executive Director of the 
Department of Environmental Quality (ED) erred in upholding the permitting decisions 
by the Director of the Utah Division of Air Quality (Director)1 authorizing the 
construction of the Heavy Black Waxy Crude Processing Project (Expansion) at the 
Holly Marketing and Refining (Holly) Woods Cross Refinery, Davis County (Refinery) 
and if the ED decided correctly: 
I. First Issue 
Whether the Director made a defensible dete1mination that the Expansion, which 
would be constructed in the Salt Lake non-attainment area for the 24-hour fine particulate 
matter (PM2.s) National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS), was not a "major 
modification" and therefore not subject to Utah Admin. Code r.307-403. 
Sub-Issue 1: If the Director's calculation of the "potential-to-emit" (PTE) PM2.s 
for a subset of the Refinery boilers and heaters based on a suspect "emission factor" 20-
25 times smaller than emission rates he had previously deemed the most reliable is 
legally erroneous, represents an inappropriate departure from prior practice, and lacks 
foundation in the administrative record (Record) . 
1 "Director" refers collectively to the Director of the Utah Division of Air Quality and 
Utah Division of Air Quality ("DAQ") . 
Sub-Issue 2: Whether the Director improperly authorized a credit of 2.19 tons per 
year (tpy) of PM2.s for the closure of the Propane Pit Flare (PPF) where the credit eclipsed 
the PM2.s emissions from Holly's remaining, much larger flares and from all the flares at 
three local refineries and when the Record contained no supporting calculations or 
monitoring data, but only inconsistencies. 
Sub-Issue 3: Did the Director's PTE determination for fluidized catalytic 
cracking unit 25 (FCCU25) based on a 0.3-lb PM,o/1000-lb coke-burned permit limit 
adequately represent the maximum capacity of the unit to emit PM2.s although the 
Director did not restrict FCCU25's coke-bum rate, failed to calculated PTE based on "the 
most pollutant-generating" crude Holly is authorized to process, relied on data from the 
existing FCCU which utilizes different control technology and processes a different 
feedstock, and neglected to consider that the new feedstock for FCCU25 would produce 
more coke. 
A. Standard of Review 
In reviewing the legal adequacy of the Director's compliance with his permitting 
responsibilities, this Court will apply Utah Code Ann. §63G-4-403(4), recognizing the 
agency has "substantial discretion to interpret its governing statutes and rules" and 
upholding "factual, technical, and scientific agency determinations that are supported by 
substantial evidence viewed in light of the record as a whole." Utah Code Ann. § 19-1-
301.5(14 )( c ); Murray v. Utah Labor Comm 'n, 2013 UT 38, i!l9, 308 P.3d 461 (agency 
finding of fact reviewed for substantial evidence). Specifically, this Court will assess 
whether the Director's PTE calculations and determination of the emission decreases 
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from the PPF closure are based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, adequately 
supported by the Record, "contrary to [his] prior practice" and unjustified and unfair or 
arbitrary and capricious. Utah Code Ann. §63G-4-403(4)(d), (4)(g), (4)(h)(iii)-(iv). 
The assessment of the Director' s compliance with Rules 307-401 and 307-403 
presents a mixed question of law and fact reviewed to determine if the "agency has 
erroneously ... applied the law." Provo City v. Utah Labor Com 'n, 2015 UT ~9, 345 P.3d 
1242; id. ~10 ("[T]he characteristic that distinguishes a mixed question from a question of 
fact is the existence of an articulable legal issue."); id. ~16 ("A court cannot resolve" this 
issue "without applying a legal definition ... to the facts of the case."). As a result, the 
appellate court will "review the administrative body's findings of fact under the 
substantial evidence standard," while it will "review the law applied to these facts for 
correctness." Provo City, ~17; see also Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Air Quality 
Board, 2009 UT 76, ~14, 226 P.3d 719 ("[M]ixed findings of fact and law, and the 
agency's interpretation of the operative provisions of statutory law it is empowered to 
administer are reviewed under an intermediate standard that considers whether the 
agency's determination was rational"); id., ~13 ("When reviewing an agency's 
interpretation oflaw, we review for correctness[.]"). 
Despite any discretion given to the Director's decision, his best available control 
technology (BACT) analysis must be supported by substantial evidence, Sierra Club, 
~13, and must further the goals of ensuring that the best control technology is adopted, 
id., ~45 ("[W]hile the Board has discretion to interpret its own regulations .. .it must do so 
with an eye to ... ensuring that the best available control technology is adopted."), and 
3 
protecting short-te1m ambient standards. Sierra Club, ~48. 
The ED' s November 17, 2014 Final Order is owed no deference. The ED 
necessarily limited her review to the same administrative record that is before this Court, 
Utah Code Ann. §19-1-301.5(8)(a), to which she applied the same standard ofreview that 
this Court will apply to agency factual dete1minations. Utah Code Ann. §§ 19-1-
301.5(14); 19-l-301.5(13)(b). Because this is an "on-the-record" case, there was no trial 
below, no witness testimony and no observation of facts "that cannot be adequately 
reflected in the record available to appellate courts[.]" Adoption of Baby B., 2012 UT 35, 
~42, 308 P.3d 382. 
Therefore, this Court is positioned to undertake an independent evaluation of the 
Director's permitting decision based on the administrative record and the standard of 
review articulated above. See Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 42 F.3d 1560, 1580 
(10th Cir.1994) ("In reviewing the agency's action," on the record, "we must render an 
independent decision using the same standard of review applicable to the District Court. 
Once appealed, the District Court's decision is accorded no particular deference."). This 
is particularly true because the Director's decision must be reviewed on the basis he 
articulated at the time he made his decision and any post-hoc rationalizations for the 
permitting decision are unpersuasive. Id. 1575. 
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B. Preservation 
This issue was preserved as follows: 1) Sub-Issue 1 (IR008584-95,2 IR008597-
98); 2) Sub-Issue 2 (IR008595-97, IR009062-63, IR009151); and, 3) Sub-Issue 3 
(IR008598-601, IR009077-78, IR009081, IR009151, IR009162) . 
II. Second Issue 
Whether, in authorizing the Expansion, the Director met his permitting obligations 
under Utah Admin. Code r.307-401-8 . 
Sub-Issue 1: If, after acknowledging that the flares would be a considerable 
source of air pollution, particularly of SO2 and NOx, during upset conditions at the 
Refinery, the Director complied with Utah Admin. Code r.301-401-8(l)(b)(vii), 8(1)(a) 
and 8(5) although he did not impose AO limits on flare emissions or otherwise ensure 
that the Expansion would not interfere with the maintenance or attainment of short-term 
NAAQS. 
Sub-Issue 2: Did the Director meet the requirements of Utah Admin. Code r.301-
401-8(1)(b)(vii), 8(1)(a) and 8(5) although he did not impose short-term limits on the 
Expansion emission units. 
Sub-Issue 3: If the Director's confusing references to the applicability of Subpart 
Jato the Expansion, particularly the flares, and his refusal to specify which of the 
particular terms and conditions of this complex provision apply to the Refinery, meet the 
requirements of Utah Admin. Code r.301-401-8(l)(b)(vi) . 
2 Utah Physicians attached and incorporated the Mark Hall Comments found at 
IR008579-602. IR009137. 
5 
Sub-Issue 4: Whether, given the evidence in the Record, with the South Flare 
shut down for reconstruction and all Refinery gases routed to the North Flare, the Record 
adequately supports the Director's contention that the apparent modification of the North 
Flare and increase in emissions from the unit did not trigger Subpart Ja or Utah Admin. 
Code r.307-401-8(1)(a). 
A. Standard of Review 
This Comt will assess Issue 2 under the same standard of review it will apply to 
Issue 1, with the exception that Utah Code Ann. §63G-4-403(4)(h)(iii) is not relevant to 
Issue 2. 
B. Preservation 
This issue was preserved as follows: 1) Sub-Issue 1 and 2 (IR009078-80, 
IR009089-91, IR009155-57, IR009158-60); 2) Sub-Issue 3 (IR009152-54); and, 3) Sub-
Issue 4 (IR009154). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Admin. Code r.307-401-8 (2012) 
Utah Admin. Code r.307-403-3, 4 & 10 (2012) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
Anyone living along the Wasatch Front has experienced our air pollution crisis, 
particularly wintertime "inversions" that settle on the Salt Lake Valley for extended 
periods, causing concentrations of fine particulate matter (PM2.s) to skyrocket and giving 
Utah the dubious distinction of having the nation's worst air quality. We have felt our 
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eyes and lungs bum, fretted over whether to let our children outside to play, agonized 
about parents and grandparents with heart problems - even taken them to the emergency 
room as their symptoms worsened - and watched those with asthma struggle to breathe. 
Monitors quantify this public health emergency. Since 2009, the greater Salt Lake 
area has been formally designated as not attaining the nation's 24-hour PM2.s NAAQS. 
The Salt Lake City non-attainment area includes Salt Lake, Davis, Weber, Tooele and 
Box Elder counties. IR008482.3 Because the state could not show that the area would 
attain the standard by 2015, the Salt Lake non-attainment area will be designated as a 
"serious" PM2.s non-attainment area as a matter oflaw by December 2015. 42 U.S.C. § 
7513(b)(l), (c)(l).4 
Our air pollution is serious. In 2013, air quality along the Wasatch Front exceeded 
the 24-hour PM2.s standard for at least 4 7 days - sometimes by 100%. This means that 
for more than a month, our community - including its most vulnerable populations, the 
young and the old - were subjected to levels of air pollution considerably higher than 
concentrations deemed unsafe and unhealthy at exposures lasting only 24 hours. E.g. 
IR00913 9-40. 
Salt Lake County is further designated as not meeting the 24-hour PM10 and the 
SO2 NAAQS and in recent years, air quality there has exceeded the 8-hour ozone 
3 http://www.epa.gov/pmdesignations/2006 standards/final/region8 .htm 
4 In the Interior West- made up of Utah ,Idaho, Montana, Colorado, New Mexico, 
Arizona, Nevada, Wyoming, Texas, Kansas, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska and 
Oklahoma - only Utah (with seven counties) and Arizona (with two counties) do not 
meet the 24-hour PM2.s NAAQS. www.epa.gov/pmdesignations/2006standards/state.htm. 
7 
NAAQS, while Davis County is a "maintenance" area for ozone. IR009225; IR008482; 
IR008566-67; IR009140. 
The health consequences of our dirty air are significant. The findings of 3,000 
published research papers underscore key concepts now accepted by the medical 
community worldwide. First, there is no safe level of exposure to particulate pollution 
and no threshold below which negative health effects disappear. People literally die from 
exposure. For every 10 µg/m3 increase in PM2.s concentrations, community mortality 
rates rise 14%. IR009140. Therefore, Utah Physicians estimates that 1,400 to 2,000 
premature deaths occur every year in Utah from PM2.s. IR009142. 
Air pollution has the same extensive, broad-based health consequences as cigarette 
smoke because the signature physiologic response is the same - low-grade arterial 
inflammation, narrowing of blood vessels and increased propensity for clot formation, 
resulting in immediate increases in blood pressure, followed within hours by higher rates 
of heart attacks and strokes. IR009140-41. 
The inflammation caused by PM2.s affects other organs. Particulate pollution 
penetrates every cell in the body, but is particularly well-documented in the brain. There, 
air pollution causes poor neurologic outcomes throughout the age spectrum, including 
loss of intelligence in children, higher rates of autism, and attention deficit disorders, as 
well as multiple sclerosis, Alzheimer' s, and accelerated cognitive decline in the elderly. 
IR009142. Virtually every lung disease is caused or exacerbated, and growth of lung 
function during childhood can be irreversibly stunted by air pollution exposure. 
IR009143. Cancers, including childhood leukemia, lung, breast, prostate, cervical, brain 
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and stomach cancer, occur at higher rates among people exposed to more air pollution, 
while cancer survival rates are reduced. IR009143. 
The blood vessel inflammation caused by air pollution also affects the placenta, 
arguably representing the most significant public health impact of air pollution. Women 
who breathe more air pollution have higher rates of adverse pregnancy outcomes, their 
newborn babies showing increased birth defects, genetic damage, and a life-long disease 
burden that includes higher rates of metabolic disorders, reactive airway disease, 
cardiovascular disease, cancer, Alzheimer's and all diseases consequent to immuno-
suppression. IR009143-44. The alteration of genetic material triggered by pollution can 
be seen within minutes, underscoring that short-term spikes in air pollution harm 
developing fetuses. IR009144. 
At the center of Utah's Wasatch Front are five refineries, including the Holly 
facility. These refineries contribute to our air pollution problem by directly emitting 
PM2.s, as well as the "precursor" pollutants that form fine particulate matter during our 
inversions - sulfur oxides (SOx), nitrous oxides (NOx) and volatile organic compounds 
(VOCs). These facilities represent a host of additional health risks. For example, when 
toxic substances are microscopically attached to fine particles, the health consequences 
are enhanced. Refinery particulate pollution is high in concentrations of attached 
hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) including heavy metals and polycyclic aromatic 
hydrocarbons (PAI-Is). IR009144. 
Children living near petrochemical industries have higher P AH levels than adults, 
contributing to more DNA damage and endangering a more vulnerable population. 
9 
Industrial-based pollution is more toxic to DNA than traffic-based pollution. Rates of 
leukemia are doubled in populations living in the vicinity of oil refineries. Benzene, a 
primary component of refinery emissions, is carcinogenic and harmful to a developing 
fetus, causing low birth weight, delayed bone formation, bone marrow damage and low 
white blood cell and platelet counts. Exposure to benzene near the national standard is 
associated with spe1m aneuploidy. Exposure to petrochemicals, specifically benzene, 
gasoline, and hydrogen sulfide, is significantly associated with increased frequency of 
spontaneous abortion. IR009144-45. 
Even infinitesimal levels of exposure to P AHs, which are "endocrine disruptors," 
may cause "endocrine or reproductive abnormalities, particularly if exposure occurs 
during a critical developmental window ... [L ]ow doses may even exert more potent 
effects than higher doses." As a result, there are no safe doses for P AHs. IR009145. 
In this context - a public health crisis affecting millions of Utahns - the Director 
issued a permit authorizing Holly to expand its facilities. At a time when the Clean Air 
Act requires the Director to reduce PM2.s, NOx, SO2 and VOC emissions dramatically 
and bring the Salt Lake Valley into compliance with the NAAQS as "expeditiously as 
practicable," 42 U.S.C. §7513(c), he approved project increases in the refinery' s annual 
emissions of PM2.s by 9.19 tons and PM,o by 9.54 tons, IR008566, annual emissions of 
the PM2.s and ozone precursors SO2, NOx and VOCs by 38, 83 and 32 tons respectively, 
and annual emissions of CO by 343 tons. IR008565. Annual refinery HAPs emissions 
will increase by 9.3 tons a year, IR002834, bringing the refine1y's total yearly emissions 
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of benzene to 1.46 tons, hexane to 5.41 tons, toluene to 1.21 tons, and xylene to 1598 
pounds. IR008493. 
Moreover, the Director determined that each year the refinery will release 
significant uncontrolled emissions of PM2.s precursors, including 240 tons of SO2, 8 tons 
ofNOx and 16 tons ofVOCs. IR008561. In the case of SO2, these emissions will eclipse 
the relevant permit limit on the en tire Holly facility - 110 tons of SO2 each year, 
IR009245 - by more than 200%. Although these emissions threaten Utah's ability to 
comply with the NAAQS, the Director failed to impose emission limits or monitoring and 
recordkeeping requirements on the flares in order to constrain these substantial predicted 
"upset" emissions of SO2, NOx or VOCs. E.g. IR009245-46; IR009249-50 . 
As a result, at a time when the Director must find every possible emission 
reduction from every polluting sector, the Director has failed to undertake the analysis 
and review of the permit applications and the assertions they contain mandated by law 
and necessary to protect public health. In essence, the Director's permitting decision is 
not sufficiently rigorous and is not supp01ted by the Record. The result is a permit that 
fails to give the citizens of Utah the legal protections to which they are entitled, does not 
require the control of emissions at the refinery to the extent the law demands, and fails to 
protect the public from air pollution . 
II. Proceedings Below 
Because it wanted to expand its refining capacity from 40,000 to 60,000 barrels a 
day (bpd) and to "accommodate ... the processing" of thick and dirty heavy black and 
yellow waxy crudes, Holly submitted a revised Notice oflntent (NOI) to the Director in 
11 
July 2012. IR002798-3590. The Director issued an Intent to Approve (ITA) the NOI on 
June 5, 2013, IR008449-79, along with a Source Plan Review analyzing the proposal. 
IR008480-8575. Utah Physicians filed two sets of comments on the Director's plan to 
authorize the expansion. IR004007-44; IR009046-9173. The Director responded to 
these and other comments. IR009174-9222. On November 18, 2013, the Director issued 
an approval order (AO) to Holly, authorizing the construction of the Expansion. 
IR009223-54. 
On December 18, 2013, pursuant to Utah Code §§19-1-301.5, Utah Physicians for 
a Healthy Environment and FRIENDS of Great Salt Lake ( collectively "Utah Physicians") 
filed a Request for Agency Action (Request) seeking administrative review of the AO. 
ADJ009257-9373. On December 20, 2013, Utah Physicians moved for a stay of the AO. 
ADJ009557-96. The matter was assigned to an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), 
ADJ009601 , who recommended denial of the stay in a March 25, 2014 proposed order, 
ADJ010798-820, Exhibit C, that was adopted by the ED on March 8, 2015. ADJOl 1035-
39, Exhibit D. 
On March 11, 2015, after briefing and argument, the ALJ issued another proposed 
order suggesting dismissal of Utah Physicians' Request. ADJO 1153 6-648, Exhibit E. On 
March 31, 2015, in a two page decision, the ED adopted the proposed order. 
ADJOl 1651-53, Exhibit F. Utah Physicians timely appealed both ED orders to this 
Court. 
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III. Statement of Facts 
A. NSR Permitting 
"The Clean Air Act. .. aims to 'protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air 
resources' by prescribing National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), which state 
and regional authorities are required to either maintain or progress toward." Sierra Club, 
2009 UT 76, ,ii. A key component of the Act that Congress deemed necessary to achieve 
and maintain the NAAQS and protect public health and the environment is the New 
Source Review (NSR) permitting program. Under NSR, before commencing 
construction or making modifications, stationary sources must obtain one or more of the 
following permits: a non-attainment NSR (NNSR) permit, 42 U.S.C. §§7501-15; 
prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) permit, id. §§7470-79; or a minor NSR 
permit. Id. §7410(a)(2)(C). The permits specify what air pollution control devices must 
be used, what emission limits must be met, and how the facility must be operated. EPA 
NSR Workshop Manual H.1.5 Overall, permit conditions establish limits on the types and 
amounts of air pollution allowed, operating requirements for pollution control devices or 
pollution prevention activities, and monitoring and recordkeeping requirements. Id. 
NSR serves two purposes: First, that the addition of new and modified industrial 
sources does not degrade air quality. EPA NSR Factsheet at 1, Exhibit G. In areas with 
unhealthy air - where NNSR applies - new emissions may not slow progress toward 
cleaner air, while in areas with clean air, PSD areas, new emissions may not worsen air 
5 http://www.epa.gov/nsr/ttnnsr01/gen/wkshpman.pdf, included on CD. 
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quality. Id. Second, the NSR program assures citizens that new or modified sources will 
be as clean as possible and advances in pollution control will be implemented as 
industries expand. Id. The NSR program accomplishes its goals by requiring sources to 
"obtain pe1mits limiting air emissions before they begin construction. For that reason, 
NSR is commonly referred to as the 'preconstruction air permitting program.'" Id. 
Utah's NSR permitting programs were approved by the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and incorporated into Utah's State Implementation Plan (SIP). 
EPA determined that Utah's permitting regimes complied the NNSR, PSD and minor 
NSRprogram requirements. 42 U.S.C. §7410. EPA approved and incorporated by 
reference into federal regulation Rule 307-401, 40 C.F.R. §52.2320(c)(28)(i)(B), and 
Rule 307-403, as necessary components of Utah's SIP. 40 C.F.R. §52.2320(c)(59)(i)(A). 
Rule 307-401 applies to all sources and all modifications, whether or not they are 
"major" and whether or not they are in non-attainment areas.6 Utah Admin. Code r.307-
401-3. Rule 307-403 applied to, inter alia, major modifications to major sources in non-
attainment areas. Id. r.307-403-2.7 
B. The Director's Non-Attainment NSR Determinations 
Because Utah has failed to show that it will attain the 24-hour PM2.s NAAQS by 
the statutory deadline, the greater Salt Lake area - already deemed a moderate non-
attainment area - will be designated a "serious" non-attainment area by December 2015. 
6 There are certain exemptions not relevant to the present matter to this requirement. 
7 
"In a non-attainment area" is a simplification. NNSR requirements apply only to 
particular pollutants depending on which NAAQS the non-attainment area is failing to 
meet. Id. r.307-403-2(1). 
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42 U.S.C. §7513(b)(l), (c)(l); IR009225. This delay brings urgency to the Director's 
obligation to reduce emissions of air pollutants in order to achieve the PM2.s standard as 
"expeditiously as practicable." 42 U.S.C. §7513( c ). To further this goal, the Clean Air 
Act constrains any project in a non-attainment area that constitutes a "major 
modification" - or that results in, inter alia, an increase in PM2.s emissions of 10 tons per 
year (tpy) or more. Utah Admin. Code r.307-101-2 ("major modification" is a change 
"that would result in a significant net emissions increase of any pollutant" and 
"significant" is a "net emissions increase or. .. potential of a source to emit" that "would 
equal or exceed" 10 tpy of PM2.s); id. r.307-403-2(1) (r.307-403 applies to "major 
modifications"). Congress reasoned that no project may interfere with prompt 
compliance with the NAAQS or delay relief from harmful levels of air pollution to which 
the citizens living in a non-attainment area are entitled . 
Rule 307-403 authorizes the Director to approve a major modification in a non-
attainment area, "if and only if' he determines: 1) LAER (lowest achievable emission 
rate) has been applied, Utah Admin. Code r.307-403-3(3)(a); 2) emission offsets, 
"enforceable by the time a ... modified source commences construction," have been 
secured, id. r.307-403-4(2) & 403-3(3)(c); and, 3) after public comment and based on an 
analysis of "alternative sites, sizes, production processes, and ... control techniques" for 
the modification, that the project's benefits "significantly outweigh the environmental 
and social costs[.]" Id. r.307-403-10. Because the application of Rule 307-403 depends 
upon his conclusion, the Director must accurately determine, before construction 
15 
commences, whether an emission increase is significant and if a project is a major 
modification. 
Because the refinery is located in the Salt Lake PM2.s non-attainment area, the 
Director calculated the PTE PM2.s of the Expansion's modified and constmcted units, 
including the FCCU25 and the NSPS boilers (Boilers#8-#1 l) and 11 heaters. IR002833. 
PTE is "the maximum capacity of a source to emit a pollutant(.]" Utah Admin. Code 
r.304-101-2. 
The Director approximated the PM2.s emissions rate of Boilers#8-# 11 and the 11 
"non-NSPS" heaters using a constant created for inventory purposes that had never been 
used to predict emissions forNSRpermitting. E.g. IR008483; IR008911-12; IR009043; 
IR007239-42. The inventory constant is 20 to 25 times smaller than the emission rate 
the Director applied to the other Refinery boilers and heaters, IR008549; IR008558, 20 to 
25 times less than the emission rate based on the manufacture's data and guarantees, 
IR008502; IR002902; IR002920; IR003053, 1120th to 1125th of the emission rate that 
represents BACT and the "lowest emission rate" in the nation, IR002902-3; IR002920, 
and 20 to 25 times smaller than EPA's published AP-42 emission factors, the emission 
factor Holly used in the NOi to calculate emissions from the "NSPS" boilers and heaters. 
IR002847; IR003043-46; IR003048-50. 
The Director authorized Holly to take "credit" for retiring the PPF. Based on a 
reckoning of "actual" emissions from the unit, IR008564; IR008369, the Director 
determined Holly could subtract 2.19 tpy PM2.s from the emission increases resulting 
from the Expansion. IR008564. 2.19 tpy is considerably greater than the annual PM2.s 
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emissions from the larger North and South flares , IR002852; IR003176; IR003 l 64, 
which are estimated to be zero in both upset and non-upset conditions, IR002865; 
IR002996; IR003029; IR003069, and is greater than the SIP-estimated PM2.s emissions of 
1.44 tpy from all the flares at Holly, Tesoro and Big West combined. IR008153. There 
are no calculations or monitoring data in the Record to the support the 2.19 tpy. 
IR003035. The AP-42 emission factor on which Holly bases its calculation of PM2.s flare 
emissions varies from 0-274 micrograms per liter (µg/L). AP-42, 13.5-4. The Record 
does not indicate how the company used the variable AP-42 emission factors to calculate 
actual PPF emissions. IR003035. The 2.19 tpy credit is based on an unexplained 
increase in emissions, IR003035, that occurred after the PPF was replaced and redesigned 
to reduce PM2.s emissions. IR008564. 
The Director calculated the PM2.s PTE for FCCU25 at 8.15 tpy, IR008367, or 97% 
of the Expansion's total PTE. IR008568. FCCU25 will process Utah black waxy crude, 
a substantial departure from the Canadian Select processed at the existing FCCU, 
IR007166; IR002839; IR007168, and will produce more carbon bum-off. IR008598-99; 
IR002937; 40 C.F.R. §60.l0la; id. §60.104a. To assess PTE, the Director relied on an 
AO limit of 0.3-lb PM10/l 000-lb coke burned, IR009243, without restricting or accurately 
estimating the maximum rate of coke bum-off. IR009242-43; IR008052 . 
After adding and subtracting, the Director determined that the Expansion would 
cause an 8.35 tpy increase in PM2.s emissions - slightly under the significance level of 10 
tpy. IR008568. Therefore he concluded the Expansion was not a major modification and 
not subject to Rule 307-403. 
17 
C. The Director's Minor Source NSR Permitting 
The Director must comply with Rule 307-401-8 whether the Expansion is a major 
or minor modification. The rule, by its own tenns, see Sierra Club, ~13 ("We review 
administrative rules in the same manner as statutes, focusing first on the plain language 
of the rule."), applies equally to minor or major modifications. Utah Adm in. Code r.307-
401 -3. 
Under Rule 307-401-8, the Director may issue an AO only ifhe determines that 
the "degree of pollution control for emissions .. .is at least BACT." Utah Admin. Code 
r.307-401-8(1)(a); id. r.307-401-8(5). BACT is an "emissions limitation . . . based on the 
maximum degree ofreduction for each air contaminant which . .. is achievable[.]" Id. 
r.307-401-2(1); Sierra Club ~48. The goals ofBACT emission limitations are: "(l) to 
achieve the lowest percent reduction, (2) to protect sh01i-term ambient standards, and (3) 
to be enforceable as a practical matter." Sierra Club, ~48 (citing NSR Manual, B.6-.9); 
NSR Manual B.56 ("BACT emission limits .. . must. .. demonstrate protection of short-term 
ambient standards (limits written in pounds/ hour) and be enforceable as a practical 
matter ( contain appropriate averaging times, compliance verification procedures and 
recordkeeping requirements)."). 
In addition to his obligation to protect sh01i-term NAAQS by imposing 
appropriate BACT emission limitations, the Director has an independent duty to ensure 
that emissions from any modification will not interfere with the attainment or 
maintenance of the NAAQS. Utah Admin. Code r.307-401-8(1)(b)(vii); id. r.307-401-
8(5). 
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EPA established short-term NAAQS because spikes in air pollution of a shmter 
duration are as haimful to public health as long-te1m exposure to lower levels of 
pollution. Short-te1m NAAQS include standards prohibiting concentrations of SO2 and 
NOx, from exceeding designated levels monitored over a one-hour period. 75 Fed. Reg . 
35520 (June 22, 2010); 75 Fed. Reg. 6474 (February 2, 2010). The 24-hour PM2.s and 
PM10 NAAQS, 78 Fed. Reg. 3086 (January 15, 2013), and the eight-hour ozone standard, 
73 Fed. Reg. 16436 (March 27, 2008), also protect against high levels of these air 
pollutants averaged over shorter periods of time. 
The Director applied BACT to various Expansion emission units, including 11 
process heaters, Boiler# ll, FCCU25, and the South Flare. IR008495-8518.8 The 
resulting SO2 and NOx emission limitations are typically expressed by daily and yearly 
(365-day rolling) averages and not as hourly limits. IR009245; IR009248. The 
limitations on FCCU25 SO2 and NOx are averaged over a rolling 7-day and 365-day 
period. IR009242-43. The SO2 limit on the FCCU25 scrubber is averaged on a daily and 
yearly basis. IR009245. The source-wide limitations on both SO2 and NOx are averaged 
daily or on a 365-day rolling basis. IR009245; IR009248. SO2 emissions from the South 
and North flares are not limited by the permit, IR009186-87; IR009241-51, and only 
annual "non-upset" NOx flare emissions are restricted by the AO. IR009249. NOx 
emissions from the heaters and boilers are determined on a three-hour basis, but 
compliance is gauged by a stack test performed once in three years. IR009249-50 . 
8 The Director is also required to derive and impose BACT on the North Flare. 
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Compliance with the PM10 emissions from the "NSPS" heaters and boilers are evaluated 
by a yearly stack test. IR009248. 
The Director admits that the two Holly flares will be a significant source of air 
pollution. Each year, emissions from each flare due to "upsets" will amount to 120 tons 
of SO2, 21 tons of CO, 4 tons ofNOx and 8 tons ofVOCs. IR008561; IR002865. The 
Director proposed to limit flare emissions by removing exemptions for flares from the 
emission caps for SO2 sources, IR008568, PMJO sources, IR008569, and NOx sources. 
IR008569. The final AO contains "no limits on the flares." IR009186-87. The AO does 
not require a calculation of flare SO2, CO, VOCs or PM10 emissions in order to determine 
whether the sources covered by emission caps are complying with the relevant emission 
limitations. IR009245-48. For NOx, the AO limits only annual "non-upset" emissions by 
including only "non-upset" flare throughput rates in the calculation of emissions. 
IR009249. The AO does not limit any "upset" flare emissions for any pollutants. 
IR009241-51. "[F]lares are in place as control device for upset conditions." IR009186. 
Holly modeled the impact of the Expansion on NAAQS, IR002993-96, and 
showed an increase in NO2 concentrations equal to 95% of the one-hour NAAQS. 
IR00003596. Holly's modeling did not include any "upset emissions" from the flares, 
IR009214, did not determine maximum sho1t-te1m emissions and instead used as inputs 
average annual emissions that masked any spikes in air pollution. IR002993-96. The 
Director acknowledged that the Refinery experiences significant variability in day to day 
emission and production levels. IR009187. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Families living along the Wasatch Front are held hostage by air pollution. During 
frequent wintertime inversions, they are told to stay indoors and not to exercise. They 
cough, get headaches and struggle to breathe. The fine particles, individually invisible 
but concentrated enough to block the sun, enter the body, causing inflammation and 
increased blood pressure, heait attacks and stroke. PM2.s damages lungs, retards lung 
function and penetrates and impairs the brain. Developing fetuses are prone to genetic 
damage and lifelong diseases as they are exposed to the air pollution their mothers 
breathe . 
By 2015, the year the law promised them relief, the citizens of Utah were still 
trapped in unhealthy air. The State's plan to reduce emissions was not adequate and the 
date of compliance with the NAAQS was pushed off until 2020. In December 2015, Salt 
Lake, Davis, Weber, Box Elder and Tooele counties will be re-designated a "serious" 
non-attainment area and the State will have to develop a new plan with stricter measures 
to secure the necessary emission reductions. Utahns will face at least five more years of 
unhealthy air. In the meantime, they are entitled to all the protections the Clean Air Act 
provides and all the steps toward healthy air the law guarantees. 
When a major source like the Refinery proposes a project that will increase 
emission of PM2.s in the Salt Lake serious nonattainment area, much is at stake - the 
expeditious compliance with the NAAQS and the corresponding health benefits that legal 
promise entails. The Director must determine if the project is a major modification and 
therefore if Rule 307-403 applies. The purpose of this assessment is clear. In an area 
2 1 
already plagued by unhealthy levels of air pollution, where emissions must be reduced as 
expeditiously as possible, air pollution increases are not permissible. 
Although an accurate calculation of projected PM2.s increases is fundamental to 
implementation of the NSR program, the Director did not make a defensible 
determination. First, to deem the Expansion a minor modification, the Director used an 
emission rate 20 to 25 times smaller than the emission rates derived from several sources 
the Director has deemed reliable and referenced again and again for his NSR permitting. 
Second, the Director approved an emission reduction for the retirement of a flare that 
Holly claims, without showing its monitoring data, assumptions or calculations, emitted 
more PM2s each year than both of Holly's other, larger flares combined and more than all 
the flares at the Holly, Tesoro and Big West refineries put together. Third, the Director 
determined the PTE for FCCU25, the largest source of PM2.s emission increases, from a 
rate of 0.3-lb PM10/l000-lb coke-burned, without restricting or accurately estimating the 
maximum hourly rate at which coke may be burned in the unit. This means that the 
FCCU25 PM,o emissions are not subject to a hard ceiling and the Director' s calculation 
of PTE without a limit on coke-bum rate will necessarily be inaccurate. 
The next line of defense safeguarding Wasatch Front air quality is Rule 307-401, 
which covers minor modifications. Again, the Director misapplied the law, failing to 
assure that the Expansion would not impede the attainment or maintenance of the 
NAAQS. The Director acknowledged that during upset conditions, Holly' s flares would 
be a significant source of air pollution - for example, emitting double the Refinery-wide 
SO2 emission cap - but did not restrict these emissions. The Director decided not to 
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impose short-term limits on the Refinery to protect the short-term NAAQS, claiming that 
modeling showed such restrictions were unnecessary. Actually, Holly modeled neither 
upset flare emissions nor maximum short-term emission rates, and instead relied on 
average annual rates, underestimating impacts to short-te1m NAAQS. Still the 
company's analysis showed that the Expansion threatened the one-hour N02 NAAQS. 
The Director also neglected his permitting obligations by failing to clarify the application 
ofNSPS Subpart Jato the Expansion and refusing to specify the exact conditions of this 
complex rule that apply to the Refinery. 
As explained below, although the Director has discretion to carry out the Clean 
Air Act, the people of Utah have a right to every emission reduction the law requires. 
Unless and until the Director carries out his NSR obligations with the requisite rigor and 
basis, Utahns are not receiving the relief to which they are entitled . 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Director's Calculation of Increases in PM2.s Emissions from the Expansion Is 
Fatally Flawed. 
Because the law requires it and because PM2.s air pollution from the Expansion 
will be added to our already seriously unhealthy air, it is critical that the increase in 
emissions be calculated accurately and supported by the Record. As EPA states, PTE "is 
of primary importance in establishing whether a ... modified source is major." EPA NSR 
Manual A.4. Despite the importance of the undertaking, the Director's calculation 
reflects an erroneous application of the law, is not supported by the Record, is "contrary 
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to [his] prior practice," and unjustified and unfair as well as arbitrary and capricious. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(d), (4)(g), (4)(h)(iii)-(iv). 
A. The Director's Departure from Prior Practice and Inconsistent Reliance on the 
NEI Constant is Unlawful. 
Abruptly diverging from prior practice, reversing positions in the middle of 
permitting, embracing inconsistent methods in a single AO and deviating from a previous 
AO determination, the Director improperly adopted a National Emission Inventory (NEI) 
constant of 0.00042 lb/MMBtu - a number designed for calculating a national inventory 
of air pollution- to estimate PM2.s PTE for an arbitrary subset of Holly's boilers and 
heaters. E.g. IR008558-9; IR008419.9 The Director's application of the NEI constant to 
some, but not all, heaters and boilers, represents a radical departure from the 
manufacturer's own specifications, EPA's AP-42 emission factors, Holly's BACT 
analysis and the Director's 2010 AO and BACT. The NEI constant represents an 
emission rate 1/20th-1/25th of the manufacture's guarantee and the standard AP-42 
emission factor, is 20-25 times lower than what Holly called the "lowest emission limits" 
in the nation and results in an estimate of total PM2.s emissions 29 times smaller than NOI 
calculation. Therefore the Record does not support the adoption of this outlying emission 
rate and confirms that the resulting PTE does not reflect the maximum capacity of the 
heaters and boilers to emit PM2.s. 
9 0.43 lb PM2.s/MMscf equals 0.00042 lb/MMBtu. 
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1. The Director Deviated from His Prior Practice and Arrived at an Emission Rate 
Out-of-Sync with Sources He Deemed Reliable . 
Neither Utah, the other 49 states, nor EPA has ever used a NEI constant to 
calculate PTE for NSR. E.g. IR00891 l-12; IR009043; IR007239-42. The Director' s own 
forms and guidance establish what the "NSR Section" - the Director's permitting branch 
- has long considered appropriate methods for calculating emissions, directing applicants 
to use manufacturer specifications or AP-42 emission factors. 10 DAQ NSR Form 19, 
Natural Gas Boilers and Liquid Heaters commands: "Supply calculations for all criteria 
pollutants[.] Use AP-42 or Manufacturers ' data to complete your calculations." Exhibit 
Hat 3; Form 2 - Process Information at 2 (same). DAQ's Emission Calculation Sheets -
Boiler Emissions Natural Gas states: "Emission factors are from EPA AP-42[.] Most 
newer boilers have smaller emission rates, if you have manufacturer's emission rates you 
should use them. Please include the manufacturer's literature as a reference for why you 
are using different factors." Exhibit I at 2; Boiler Emissions Fuel Oil (same). The DAQ 
AP-42 Guide confirms: "EPA's AP-42 is the recommended source of air pollutant 
emission factors for both criteria and toxic emissions." 11 Similarly, the recent Emission 
Estimation Protocol for Petroleum Refineries confirms that for combustion sources, if 
"direct emission monitoring or site-specific emission factors are not available . .. default 
emission factors may be the only way to estimate emissions" and "emission factors in 
10 An emissions factor is supposed to be a representative value that relates the quantity of 
a pollutant emitted with an associated activity . 
11 www.deq.utah.gov/ProgramsServices/programs/air/emissionsinventories/ 
ap42guide.htm 
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AP-42 are the recommended default emission factors, and AP-42 should be consulted to 
obtain the appropriate emission factors for criteria pollutants such as SO2, NOx, PM, and 
CO." IR008715; DAQ's NOI Guide at i., v. & 2 (linking to "AP-42: EPA's Air Pollutant 
Emission factors"). 12 
Consistent with this longstanding approach, the Director and Holly identified 
PM10/PM2.s emission rates ranging from 0.010 lb/MMBtu to 0.0075 lb/MMBtu for the 
Refinery Boilers#8-11 and various process heaters based on the sources the Director's 
own materials deem reliable - manufacturer's data and EPA's AP-42 emission factors -
and consistent with BACT and the "lowest emission rates" across the country. 
The Director and Holly acknowledge that the manufacturer's guaranteed 
PM10/PM2.s emission rate for Boilers#8-#l 1 is 0.010 lb/MMBtu. IR008502 
("[M]anufacturer's data indicates a guaranteed emission factor of 0.010 lb/MMBtu"); 
IR003053 ("PM10/PM2s emissions based on manufacturer supplied emission rate of 0.010 
lb/MMBtu" for Boiler#l 1); IR002920 (same). Holly concludes that a 0.010 lb/MMBtu 
emission rate for Boiler# 11 represents BACT, IR002920, an emission limitation based on 
"best available control technology," Utah Admin. Code r.307-401-2(1) (BACT 
definition), and states that 0.0075 lb/MMBtu is the "lowest [boiler] emission rate[] 
identified in the past four years." IR002920; IR002829 ("Emission estimates ... based on 
12 
"In some cases" source-specific stack tests may be used as emission factors. NOI 
Guide at 2; IR008013 (EPA AP-42 Guide stating "source-specific tests or continuous 
emission monitors can determine" emissions better than emission factors and giving as 
alternative "emissions information from equipment vendors, particularly emissions 
performance guarantees or actual data from similar equipment"). 
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manufacturer data, EPA . .. AP-42, fuel type, and anticipated operating hours."); IR00284 7 
(same); IR003045 (using AP-42 to calculate boiler emissions); IR003049. Holly and the 
Director also decide that EPA' s AP-42 emission factor for natural gas boilers - 0.0075 
lb/MMBtu - is the most appropriate emission rate for all the other Refinery boilers . 
IR008549 (applying emission rate of 7 .65 lb/MMscf); IR008558. 
For the process heaters, reliable sources also zero in on an emission rate -0.0075 
lb/MMBtu. In the NOI, Holly calculates PM10/PM2.s emissions from its "new" NSPS 
heaters using AP-42 emission factor 0.0075 lb/MMBtu.13 E.g. IR003045-46; IR003048-
50. Holly concludes that the PM10/PM2.s emission factor that best represents BACT is the 
rate based on manufacturer data - 0.0075 lb/MMBtu. IR002902. Holly "lists the lowest 
emission rates identified in the past several years" for process heaters - all of which 
hover around 0.0075 lb/MMBtu. IR002902-3. In the NOI, Holly applies AP-42 to 
calculate process heaters/furnace PM2.s emissions. E.g. IR002847; IR003045-46; 
IR003048-50. Holly and the Director also decide that EPA's AP-42 emission factor for 
natural gas boilers - 0.0075 lb/MMBtu - is the most appropriate emission rate for all 
other Refinery heaters. IR008549; IR008558. 
Finally, the Director determined in a previous permitting decision-the 2010 AO -
that Boilers#9-#10 -which have been constructed- have a PM10/PM2.s emission rate of 
0.005 lb/MMBtu. IR008193 (5 lb/MMscf).14 At the time, he also determined that this 
emission rate reflects BACT. Utah Admin. Code r.307-401-8(1)(a) . 
13 Sometimes expressed as 0.008 lb/MMBtu. 
14 lb/MMscf is converted to lb/MMBtu by dividing by 1020. AP-42, Table 1.4-2. 
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Thus, before departing from the position that manufacturer data and AP-42 were 
the best way to calculate PTE, the Director and Holly both concluded that a 
representative emission rate for the NSPS boilers and heaters, based on information long 
deemed reliable, was between 0.010 lb!MMBtu and 0.005 lb/MMBtu. Holly put 
complete confidence in manufacturer data to derive the appropriate emission rate - and 
backed this up with a survey of the "lowest emission rates" in the country to settle on a 
boiler emission rate of 0.010 lb/MMBtu and a heater rate of 0.0075 lb/MMBtu. The 
Director applied the emission rate of 0.005 lb/MMBtu to the existing Boilers#9-10 based 
on his determination of BACT. The rates from all these credible sources are similar in 
magnitude, further underscoring their reliability. 
Then, in sudden disregard for sources he deemed most dependable, manufacturer 
guarantees and AP-42, and contrary to his 2010 AO determination and Holly' s BACT, 
the Director departed from his previous position to capitulate to the 0.00042 lb/MMBtu 
inventory constant - a mere 4% or 1125th of the manufacture-specified value for boilers 
and 5% or 1120th of the guarantee for heaters. IR008502; IR002902; IR002920; 
IR003053 . The inventory constant is also 20-25 times lower than what Holly deemed the 
"best available" and "lowest" emission rate in the U.S, IR002902-3 ; IR002920, and 20-
25 times less than EPA's AP-42, the emission factor Holly relied on in the NOI to 
calculate emissions from the "NSPS" boilers and heaters, IR002847; IR003045-46; 
IR003048-50, and the basis for the emission rates applied to the remaining boiler and 
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heaters. The Director also bypassed his own 2010 AO dete1mination ofBACT emission 
rates for Boilers#9-10 and refused to require stack testing of this existing equipment, 
calculating a PTE for existing boilers 8% or 1113th of his 2010 AO determination. 
IR008193. 
The consequences of this new math are significant. Relying on manufacturer data 
and BACT, the Director's PM10/PM2.s PTE for the NSPS boilers and heaters is 19.81 
tpy- alone almost twice the 10 tpy threshold that makes the Expansion a major 
modification. Using the NEI constant, that number is 0.69 tpy - 3.5% or I /29th - of the 
total representing the rates from manufacturer's data, AP-42, BACT and the 2010 AO . 
Unit 
Boiler#l 1 
27Hl 
24Hl 
25Hl 
20H3 
Boilers#9-# 10 
Total 
15 IR002842. 
16 IR008410. 
. 
Original PM10/PM2.5 Emissions 
(tpy) IR002834 
3.91 
3.25 
1.97 
1.48 
1.38 
7.8215 
19.81 
·r -· - :: 
.,,.. 
... - _· ·- ·- ·- .f 
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"New" PM2.5 Emissions 
(tpy) IR008367 
0.16 
0.18 
0.11 
0.08 
0.08 
0.0816 
0.69 
---,- ·-
_p.•1- ~ 
·' 
These numbers evidence an arbitrnry departure from established practice, 
particularly when there is no basis in the Record to embrace an emission rate so out-of-
sync with the rates derived from a host credible sources - manufacturer's data, AP-42, 
BACT and permit limits from other sources that reflect the lowest emission rates in the 
nation. While the manufacturer's data, EPA's AP-42 emission factors, Holly's BACT 
analysis and the 2010 AO all arrive at emission rates of a similar magnitude, the NEI 
constant is a complete outlier, deviating radically from the emission rates both Holly and 
the Director embraced at one time, and have continued to apply to the "non-NSPS" 
boilers and heaters. Because the so-called NSPS boilers and heaters are not necessarily 
"new," there is nothing to distinguish them from the non-NSPS boilers and heaters that 
the Director believes have an emission rate considerably higher than the NEI constant. 
IR008558 ("Holly Refinery and DAQ are less confident this older equipment can verify 
these lower NEI emission factors."). Indeed, there is nothing in the Record to explain 
why the PM2.s emission rates for one set of boilers and heaters at the refinery would be 
20-25 times lower than the PM2.s emission rates for another set. 
Thus, the Director's adoption of the NEI constant is subject to remand. The 
Director's action is "contrary to [his] prior practice" and he has not "justifie[ d]" the 
departure "by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the 
inconsistency." Utah Code Ann. §63G-4-403( 4)(h)(iii). The Director's unlawful reliance 
on future stack tests to support a calculation that must accurately reflect PTE before 
construction commences subverts r.307-403 and the protections it provides. Given that 
the NEI constant is so much smaller than the rates derived from sources the Director 
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deems credible, he has failed to derive a legally defensible PTE that represents "the 
maximum capacity of a source to emit a pollutant[.]" Utah Admin. Code r.304-101-2. 
2. The Director Did Not Provide a Fair or Reasonable Basis for His Inconsistency or 
Deviation from Prior Practice.17 
The Director attempts to justify his abandonment of manufacturer' s specifications, 
the 2010 AO, BACT and AP-42, but this effort fails. He contends that "NEI emission 
factors can be used for estimating PTE emissions as long as Holly ... can demonstrate 
compliance with these emissions factors through stack testing[.]" IR009216; IR008558-
59; IR009215-19; IR008545. However, these stack tests will not occur until well after 
the Expansion is complete. IR008545; IR009248. As a result, the Director subverts Rule 
307-403's "preconstruction" permitting process. In particular, emission offsets must be 
"enforceable by the time a . . . modified source commences construction," Utah Admin. 
Code r.307-403-4(2), and the Director must analyze "alternative sites, sizes, production 
processes, and environmental control techniques" to determine if purported benefits of 
the Expansion "significantly outweigh the environmental and social costs imposed as a 
result of [the] ... modification" Id. r.307-403-10. For example, the purpose of "analysis 
of alternatives," which considers, inter alia, siting the Expansion outside of the non-
attainment area, and the requirement that offsets be enforceable at the commencement of 
construction, would be frustrated if the Director tried to comply with them after the 
Expansion is constructed and operating. 
17 The ED's findings are found at ADJOl 1622-23. Pertinent Record evidence includes 
England reports, IR007238-58; IR008024-44, the Director's RTC, IR009215-18, and the 
SPR. IR008558-59. 
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The Director also contends that should stack tests "indicate that the equipment 
cannot meet the 0.00051 lb/MMBtu for PM10," Holly "would be required to either install 
additional control equipment to comply with this limit, or submit an application to 
reevaluate the project. . . for Major NSR applicability." IR009216; IR009215-19. This 
explanation lacks merit. Under r.307-403, post-construction application of "Major NSR" 
is too late. Holly's own BACT analysis concludes that there is no further way to reduce 
PM2.s emissions from the heaters or boilers. IR002902 ("the only control technology" -
which was adopted - "is ... good combustion practices and use of low sulfur. . . fuel"); 
IR002919; IR008502. Therefore there is no "additional control equipment" to install. 
Finally, in determining whether the NEI constant actually represents boilers and 
heaters PM2.s emissions, the most the Director can say is "EPA believes that the current 
AP-42 factors for condensable emissions are too high based on some limited data from a 
pilot-scale dilution sampling method[.]" IR008558; IR009215-19. This lukewarm 
statement - which cannot overcome the vast deviation from the relevant manufacturer's 
data, 2010 AO, BACT and AP-42 - is not supported by the Record. 
First, EPA experts did not advocate using NEI data as the basis for an emission 
factor, noting the lack of "detailed supporting information," explaining that even if the 
NEI numbers were more reliable, they would still have to be averaged with other data, 
expressing concern that the sampled population would not be representative and pointing 
to recent NSPS boiler standards as a better estimate of emissions. IR008911-12; 
IR009043 (explaining an emission factor would not be valid without an underlying test 
report). The Record further explains why EPA lacks faith in the NEI constants, listing 
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the significant unce1tainty associated with the "England" factors and acknowledging that 
the EPA had not reported any of the details that supposedly suppmt the agency's NEI 
numbers, such as the statistical significance, associated unce1tainty or number oftests 
that purport to back them up. IR007248 . 
Second, England, Holly's own expert and author of a report on a "dilution" 
sampling method that was the basis for the NEI constant, IR00891 l, acknowledged that 
his emission estimates were not ready for use, cautioning that they: 1) "should not be 
considered representative of all units within the same source category," 2) "should be 
used with considerable caution;" 3) "do not necessarily represent results from a random 
sample of an entire source category;" and, 4) "may best be used in conjunction with test 
results from other units within the same source category ... to develop more robust, 
reliable emission factors." IR008998-99; IR009000-01; IR007248 (showing considerable 
uncertainty for the dilution method). 18 
Third, while the Director calls these selected boilers and heaters "new," nothing in 
the Record suggests that they are. IR008558. Actually, this equipment is subject to 
NSPS, id., and therefore could be constructed or modified. 40 C.F.R. § 60.1. For 
example, the mothballed FCCU25 comes "from an idled New Mexico refinery," 
IR002821, but has been called "new" and is subject to NSPS Subpart Ja. IR002868 . 
F omth, the Director's reliance on an unapproved PM2.s "emissions factor" based 
on severely limited "NEI" data violates federal and state law. See 42 U.S.C. §7430 
18 At IR008022-44, the author of these statements attempts to rehabilitate his study and 
discount his previous warnings. 
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(requiring EPA approval of emissions factors not established by EPA); IR008020 
(because "AP-42 emission factors may have effects on most aspects of air pollution 
control. .. these factors are always made available for public review and comment before 
publication."). And, unlike AP-42, they have never been vetted or subject to public 
notice and comment. Thus, the Director has failed to show that his departure from 
previous practice is reasonable and fair. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(h)(iii). 
B. The Director Failed to Provide a Defensible Calculation of Emission Decreases 
from Closure of the Propane Pit Flare. 
In assessing whether the Expansion is a major modification, the Director also 
authorized Holly to claim a credit for closing the PPF and therefore to subtract 2.19 tpy 
from the Expansion's PM2.s emission increases. IR008564; IR008369. 19 However, the 
absence of support and significant inconsistencies that sun-ound this number mean that 
the Director's reliance on the 2.19 tpy PM2.s credit cannot be sustained. 
First, 2.19 tpy of PM2.s represents an enormous level of emissions coming from a 
hydrocarbon flaring device like the PPF, particularly in comparison to the South and 
North flares, which are also hydrocarbon flaring devices, IR004473, and considerably 
larger than the PPF. IR002852 (South Flare non-upset flow 17,000 scf/h); IR003176 
(PPF 280 scf/h); IR003164 (North Flare 21 ,960 scf/h). Holly estimates that under both 
upset and non-upset conditions, PM10/PM2.s emissions from the South and North flares 
are zero (0.0). IR002865; IR002996; IR003029; IR003069. The draft PM2.s non-
attainment State Implementation Plan (SIP) calculates the "actual" 2008 PM2.s emissions 
19 The ED's findings are found at ADJOl 1639-40. 
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for all Holly, Tesoro and Big West refinery flares combined as 1.44 tpy. IROO8153 . 
Therefore, the "actual" emissions from the PPF eclipse the emissions from the North and 
South flares and are even greater than the State's estimate of all the PM2.s emissions from 
all the flares at the three local refineries, including Holly. This casts doubt on the 
reliability of the 2.19 tpy PM2.s emission credit and the Director's claim that the credit 
reflects actual emissions.20 
Second, according to the Director, the 2.19 tpy credit is accurate because Holly 
used AP-42 emission factors to determine "actual" PM2.s emissions from the PPF based 
on continuously monitored throughput for 2008-2009. IROO8564; IROO9218; 
ADJOl 11O1; ADJOl 12O4 (DAQ relied on calculations "based on monitored throughput 
data of propane to the flare and AP-42 emission factors."). While AP-42, 13.5, gives a 
vast range of emission factors, spanning from Oto 274 µg/L depending on whether the 
flares are not smoking or are smoking heavily, AP-42, 13.5-4, Exhibit J, the PPF "actual" 
PM2.s emissions were the same for the years 2009 to 2011. This suggests the unlikely 
scenario that the PPF was smoking at a consistent yearly average, somewhere between 0-
2 7 4 µg/L, for three years in a row. 
Third, the AP-42 emission factors calculate soot, not PM2.s. Id. Yet, nothing in 
the Record explains how the emission factor for soot was used to calculate PM2.s . 
Without a foundation in the Record, the Director is not free to assume that all flare soot is 
20 The 2.19 tpy credit is exaggerated. Using AP-42 emission factors, Utah Physicians 
back-calculated the propane the PPF would have had to bum to generate 2.19 tpy PM2.s. 
The answer was more than 8 million dollars' wo11h of propane each year, with constant 
flaring, visible night and day. IROO8596-97. 
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PM2.s. Also, AP-42 factors for flares are based on gas that is 7% propane, AP-42, 13.5-5, 
but the Director does not explain how "actual" emissions were derived from emission 
factors applied to gas that is presumably 100% propane. 
Fourth, the Director claims that new PPF installed in 2009 added "air assist (to 
control smoke production)." IR008564; AP-42, 13.5-3 ("Soot is eliminated by adding 
steam or air"). He also maintains that "emission estimates" for the new PPF "compared 
to the flare prior to replacement did not change because reported emissions (prior to and 
after replacement) were based on AP-42 ... emission factors [and] bringing the flare into 
compliance did not adjust emissions." IR008564; IR007270-71; IR009182. However, 
according to the Record, PM2.s emissions from the PPF actually increased in 2009 (from 
1.78 tpy in 2008), when the Consent Decree required replacement of the PPF, IR007270, 
and remained exactly the same-2.6 tpy - for 2009, 2010 and 201 I. IR003035. Again, it 
is difficult to explain how "actual" emissions based on real monitoring data and variable 
emission factors could remain static and the Record does not do so. 
Fifth, Holly explains that under the Consent Decree it agreed to "[e]liminate the 
routing of continuous or intermittent, routinely-generated refinery fuel gases to" the PPF. 
IR004385; IR007951 (Consent Decree "requirement" for PPF to "eliminate all routinely-
generated gas"), but see IR009182. The Consent Decree also imposes on Holly the 
obligation to "implement good air pollution control practices to minimize emissions from 
its Flaring Devices as required by 40 C.F.R. §60.1 l(d)." IR004384. When pressed, Holly 
defended the PPF's high and undocumented PM2.s emissions, claiming "[t]hat the 
propane pit flare may have been flaring continuously to equate with the ... baseline is of 
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no consequence - it is likely that given the obvious inefficiencies ... the flare was flaring 
continuously to manage the amount of gas released from the pit." ADJOl 1204. 
Therefore, Holly admits that the claimed 2.19 tpy PM2.s credit likely runs afoul of the 
Consent Decree and federal requirement that Holly minimize emissions. 
These substantial discrepancies, at a minimum, underscore that the Record must 
include a sound basis for the 2.19 tpy credit. But there is none. E.g. IR003035. Despite 
the importance of an accurate determination of net PM2.s emissions and therefore any 
credit attributable to the closure of the PPF, the Record is devoid of any specific emission 
factors, conversions, equations, calculations, assumptions or monitoring data to 
substantiate Holly's claimed PPF emissions. IR003035; DAQ NOI Guide ("Give 
calculations of the emission estimates .... Include equations, all relevant emission factors, 
and references. Explain all assumptions ... made in your calculations."). Although the 
Director insists that the PPF PM2.s emissions were based on "actual throughput data," 
IR009218, neither he nor Holly provides those data. IR003035. As a result, for lack of 
foundation, the 2.19 tons of PM2.s credit is not supported by the Record and the Director' s 
reliance on it to conclude the Expansion is a minor modification is invalid . 
37 
C. The Director's Estimate of the FCCU25 PM2.s Emissions Does Not Reflect the 
"Maximum Capacity of the Source to Emit" PM2.s. 
When Holly decided "to switch its crude oil feedstock source from ... Select 
Canadian Crude to Utah Black Wax Crude (BWC)," IR007166, it proposed to bring a 
mothballed fluidized catalytic cracking unit (FCCU25) from New Mexico, IR002821, to 
process BWC in the Salt Lake non-attainment area. IR002816; IR002810. This "central" 
change, constituted a "revision in the planned nature of the crude oil feed to the refinery." 
IR002839. "Given the differences between these feedstock sources," Holly sought 
authorization to install new equipment and modify existing equipment so that it could 
now refine BWC. IR007168. 
For example, because it will process BWC, FCCUC25 will not be equipped with a 
hydrotreater to control emissions as the BWC "heavy residual bottoms fraction" makes 
hydrotreatment "infeasible." IR002937. In keeping with this assessment, Universal Oil 
Products (UOP), world leader in FCCU technology, concluded that BWC has a relatively 
high tendency to produce coke in a FCCU. IR008598-99;21 IR004250 ("Coke is a high 
carbon residue that is the final product of thermal decomposition in the condensation 
process in cracking."). Feedstock with a higher "coke-bum rate" will produce more coke 
in an FCCU, resulting in a proportional increase in PM2.s emissions. Id.; 40 C.F.R. 
§60.l0la; id. §60.104a. 
21 The Director discounted this information, but did not endeavor to derive the degree to 
which BWC would produce coke in FCCU25, IR009219, while acknowledging "different 
feedstocks can result in slightly different emission profiles[.]" IR009194. 
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Because PM2.s emissions from FCCU25 comprise 97% of the Expansion's total 
PTE, an accurate calculation of the emission increases from this unit is crucial. However, 
the Director's calculation is legally and factually flawed. PTE must reflect "the 
maximum capacity of a source to emit a pollutant[.)" Utah Admin. Code r.304-101-2. A 
limitation on the capacity of the source to emit will be considered in a PTE calculation 
only if the limit is "federally" and "practically enforceable." Id.; EPA NSR Manual A.4-
A.5. Where limitations are not enforceable, PTE is based on a unit's full capacity and 
year-round operation. Id. A.9; r.304-101-2. 
Here, the Director relied on an AO limit of 0.3-lb PM10/l000-lb coke burned, 
IR009243, and Holly's "engineering calculation" of a "maximum" coke-bum rate of 
6200-lbs/hr, IR003047, to arrive at a PTE PM2.s of 8.15 tpy. IR008367. However, the 
8.15 tpy does not reflect the maximum capacity ofFCCU25 to emit PM2.s because there 
is no federally and practically enforceable limitation that restricts the coke-bum rate or 
the amount of coke/hr that Holly may burn. The AO does not put a 6200-lbs of coke-
burn/hr or similar limit on FCCU25. IR009242-43. The AO does not require Holly to 
track the coke burned in FCCU25. IR009242-43. The AO does not even require a reality 
check or any verification that FCCU25 will meet the 6200-lbs/hr rate that is the basis of 
the PTE calculation.22 IR009242-43. For these reasons alone, the 8.15 tpy does not meet 
22 As established above, r.307-403 does not permit verifications of PTE after construction 
but rather demands accurate PTE calculations before construction. 
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the definition of PTE. After all, nothing in the AO constrains Holly from exceeding the 
6200-lb/hr coke-bum rate.23 
Given that FCCU25 will process BWC and its heavy residual bottoms, it is almost 
certain that the 6200-lb/hr coke-bum rate will be surpassed. Because PTE represents the 
maximum capacity of a source to pollute, the Director' s PTE must estimate emissions 
during the worst-case scenario, when the FCCU25 is emitting the maximum PM2.s it is 
capable of releasing while still complying with applicable federally and practically 
enforceable permit limitations. Here, where there are no restrictions on the feedstock that 
FCCU25 may process, PTE must be calculated for "the most pollutant-generating" crude 
Holly is authorized to put into the unit - the crude that will generate the most coke. As 
EPA instructs: 
Where raw materials or fuel vary in their pollutant-generating capacity, the most 
pollutant-generating substance must be used in the potential-to-emit calculations 
unless such materials are restricted by federally enforceable operational or usage 
limits. Historic usage rates alone are not sufficient to establish potential-to-emit. 
NSR Manual c.2 (Appendix). 
Said another way, there is nothing in the Record to suggest that the 6200-lb/hr 
coke-bum estimate reflects emissions from FCC25 for "the most pollutant-generating" 
feedstock Holly is authorized process.24 Indeed, the Director is remiss. Although r.307-
401-5(2)(a) requires Holly to describe "the nature ... and quantities of raw materials" it 
23 The ED' s findings are found at ADJO 11610-11. Relevant to the inquiry are IR009219; 
IR009192; IR009208; IR008052; IR009229. 
24 By acknowledging "different feedstocks can result in slightly different emission 
profiles," IR009194, the Director is obligated to determine PTE for the feedstock that 
will generate the most PM2.s. 
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proposes to process and although he cannot make a defensible permitting decision 
without it, the Director does not attempt to dete1mine the impact that the "revision in the 
planned nature of the crude oil feed to the refinery," IR002839, "the differences between 
the[] feedstock sources," IR007168, will have on the PTE ofFCCU25. Rather, he rejects 
the notion that he must determine the maximum capacity of FCCU25 to emit pollutants 
by considering, inter alia, emissions from its "most pollutant-generating" feedstock. 
IR009194 ("While it is true that different feedstocks can result in slightly different 
emission profiles, attempting to address every possible specific chemical profile would be 
impossible."). As a result, the PTE is legally insufficient and lacks a basis in the Record . 
The Director defends his PTE by claiming that the capacity ofFCCU25 -which he 
lists as an "annual average capacity of 8,500 bpd," IR009229, functions as a limitation on 
PTE. IR009192; IR009208. However, the Record makes no link between the 8,500 bpd 
capacity and a coke-burn rate of 6200-lb/hr. After all, the 8.15 tpy PTE is accurate only if 
it is based on the maximum capacity of FCCU25 to emit PM2.s and therefore only if 
FCCU25 never exceeds the 6200lb/hr coke-burn rate. And yet, the Director does not 
explain why the unit's annual average barrel-per-day capacity will prevent FCCU25 from 
exceeding the 6200-lb/hr rate. In contrast, the formula for calculating coke-bum rate is 
based on a host of factors that have nothing to do with capacity. 40 C.F.R §60.104a. As 
the UOP analysis and 40 C.F.R §60.104a show and as the Director admits, IR009194, the 
composition of the feedstock has a direct influence on coke-burn rate. IR008599-600. PTE 
must also reflect the maximum capacity of a source to emit pollutants, so reference to 
"annual average" is not helpful. Instead, the Director must provide the "maximum 
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capacity" of FCCU25 and then explain how that capacity would prevent FCCU25 from 
exceeding the estimated 6200-lb/hr coke-bum rate. 
Finally, any reliance the Director placed on Holly's "calculation supp01ting the 
coke-bum estimate," IR009219, is misplaced. First, the calculation is based on the 2013 
operation of the existing FCCU4, IR008052, likely processing Select Crude and not on an 
estimate of FCCU25 processing "the most pollutant-generating" feedstock. Second, 
FCCU4 has a hydrotreater, IR008052, and FCCU25 does not. IR002937. Holly admits 
that "hydrotreating .. .lowers coke load," but makes no attempt to adjust or substantiate an 
adjustment to its calculation to reflect that FCCU25 has no hydrotreater. IR008052.25 
Third, a defensible PTE may not be based on "[h]istoric usage rates alone[.]" NSR Manual 
c.2. Rather, PTE must represent the maximum capacity of FCCU25 to emit PM2.s as it 
processes "the most pollutant-generating" feedstock. Because Holly's estimate of the 
coke-burn rate depends upon historic operations at a FCCU with a hydrotreater that was 
not processing the BWC that is incompatible with a hydrotreater, these past data points are 
not sufficient to establish potential-to-emit. 
II. In Approving the Expansion, the Director Did Not Meet the Requirements of Rule 
307-401-8. 
Congress created the minor source NSR program to ensure that, inter alia, 
emissions from a minor modification to a major source, whether in an attainment or a 
non-attainment area, would not interfere with the achievement or maintenance of the 
25 Holly implies that the hydrotreater might reduce coke load by 10%, but the company 
lacks conviction and provides no basis for the suggestion. IR008052. 
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NAAQS. 42 U.S.C. §7410(a)(2)(C) (requiring a program "to provide for the enforcement 
of the measures .. . and regulation of the modification ... of any stationary source ... as 
necessary to assure that national ambient air quality standards are achieved"). As defined 
by the Clean Air Act and reflected in r.307-401-8, the purpose of Utah's minor source 
NSR is to protect the national air quality standards, including short-term NAAQS. Rule 
307-401-8 also imposes BACT on minor modifications. As an extension of Utah's minor 
source NSR program, the resulting BACT emission limitation must further the goal of 
preventing a project's emissions from impeding progress toward attaining the NAAQS or 
threatening compliance with the standards. Thus, whether he is permitting a minor or 
major modification or deriving a BACT emission limit, the Director must restrict 
emissions and apply the measures necessary to assure that NAAQS, including the short-
term standards, are achieved. 42 U.S.C. §7410(a)(2)(C) . 
A. While Acknowledging the Flares Are a Considerable Source of Air Pollution, 
Including S02 and NOx, the Director Fails to Protect Short-Term NAAQS from 
Flare Emissions. 
The two Holly flares are a significant source of air pollution. Each is predicted to 
release an annual total of 120 tons of SO2, 21 tons of CO, 4 tons ofNOx and 8 tons of 
VOCs during various upset events. IR008561; IR002865. During these episodes, the two 
units have the potential to emit 240 tons of SO2 and 8 tons ofNOx, and to overwhelm 
corresponding daily source-wide emission limitations imposed on the Refinery's 
operations. SO2 and NOx are PM2.s precursors subject to a 1-hour NAAQS. Annual 
upset SO2 emissions from the flares are more than double the SO2 PTE for the entire 
refinery and are twice the 110.3 tpy SO2 emissions cap on the entire plant. IR009225; 
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IROO9245. The yearly S02 emissions from the flares alone will exceed the refinery's S02 
PTE and S02 emissions cap by more than 200 percent. 
1. The AO Does Not Limit Flare Emissions. 
The Director proposed to limit flare emissions by removing exemptions for flares 
from the emission caps for S02 sources, IROO8568, PM10 sources, IROO8569,26 and NOx 
sources. IROO8569. However, he admits that the final AO contains "no limits on the 
flares." IROO9186-87. The AO does not require a calculation of flare S02, CO, VOCs or 
PM10 emissions in order to determine whether the sources covered by emission caps are 
complying with the relevant emission limitations. IROO9245-48. For NOx, the AO puts a 
source-wide limit on flare emissions by calculating annual "non-upset" emissions based 
on "non-upset" flare throughput rates. IROO9249.27 Although "the flares are in place as 
control devices for upset conditions," IROO9186, the AO does not limit any "upset" flare 
emissions for any pollutants. IROO9241-51. 
2. The Director Failed Rule 307-401-8 by Neglecting to Protect Short-Term NAAQS 
from Unregulated Flare Emissions. 
The Record confirms that the AO does not restrict the vast majority of the flare 
emissions, including the predicted annual emissions of 240 tons of S02, 42 tons of CO, 8 
tons ofNOx and 16 tons ofVOCs the Director defines as upset emissions. IROO8561; 
IROO2865. Because they will spike during upset conditions at the Refinery, these 
uncontrolled emissions will have a considerable effect on short-term concentrations of 
26 IROO9247-48. But upset and non-upset PM10 emissions from flares are estimated to be 
zero. IR0O2865; IROO2996. 
27 The AO includes a 20% opacity limit on the flares. IROO9241. 
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SO2 and NOx, easily outstripping the daily Refinery-wide SO2 limit of 0.31 tons, 
IR009245, and the daily facility-wide 2.09-ton NOx emission limitation. IR009248. 
As a result, the Director cannot claim that he has met his obligation to protect 
short-term NAAQS and comply with Rule 307-401-8(1)(b)(vii). As the Director is also 
required to undertake BACT analysis for the flares, he has not fulfilled the added duty to 
derive BACT emission limitations or controls that likewise protect short-term NAAQS. 
Despite the magnitude of the unregulated flare emissions, there is nothing in the Record 
to demonstrate how the AO will protect the short-term NAAQS. Although the Record 
confirms that the unregulated flare emissions will be a substantial source of short-term 
emissions and will reach levels considerably higher than the "controlled" Refinery 
emissions, IR008561, IR002865, the Director did not impose AO limits or derive BACT 
controls that adequately resolve these "upset" emissions. IR009 l 86-87; IR00924 l-5 l. 
He did not take steps to ensure that the Expansion will not interfere with the attainment or 
maintenance of the one-hour SO2 and NOx NAAQS and so violated Rule 307-401-
8(1)(b)(vii). Id. 
3. Holly's Modeling Does Not Reflect Maximum Short-Term Emission Rates. 
The Director claims that Holly conducted air quality modeling demonstrating "no 
violation of short-term NAAQS would occur[.]" IR009187; IR009190.28 The Director 
admits that Holly's modeling did not include any "upset emissions" from the flares. 
28 The ED's findings are found at ADJOl 1583-85. Record evidence includes IR009109-
91; IR009186-87; IR009209; IR009186-87; IR001153-54; IR003591-97; IR002993-96; 
IR009214; IR003017. 
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IR009214. Translating the emission rate values for the flares from grams/second to 
tons/year confirms that these rates do not include predicted upset emissions. For 
example, the short-term and annual NOx emission rate of 0.1675 g/s for the South Flare, 
IR002996; IR002999, converts to 5.82 tpy, which is the estimated non-upset annual 
emission rate of South Flare, IR003069, and does not include the additional upset NOx 
emissions of 4.0 tpy. IR008561; IR002865. Similarly, the modeled SO2 emission rate -
0.0030 g/s, IR002996 - translates to 0.1043 tpy, which is the estimate of the South 
Flare's annual SO2 non-upset emissions, IR003069, and does not include the predicted 
120 tpy of SO2 the South Flare will release during upset conditions. IR00856 l; 
IR002865. 
By omitting the considerable upset flare emissions from its "short-term" modeling, 
Holly failed to show that its emissions will not cause or contribute to a violation of short-
term NAAQS. Modeling flare upset emissions may not be required by law. IR009214-
15. The Director may not claim, however, that Holly's modeling demonstrates protection 
of the shmt-term NAAQS unless that modeling considers the impact of the significant 
flare emissions that he predicts will occur during upset conditions. 
The ED further states that "Holly's emission modeling analysis contemplated ... 
maximum emissions ... on a lb/hr basis, thereby ensuring that any short-term spikes in 
emissions were accounted for . .. and would not cause exceedances." ADJOI 1584 (citing 
IR002993-96). Examination of the inputs Holly used for its short-term modeling, 
IR002993-96, shows that the ED is incorrect. The emission rates Holly modeled do not 
represent "maximum emissions" or "sh01t-term spikes" at all. The inputs for Holly's 
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short-term model represent annual PTE or annual AO emission limits in tons per year 
spread evenly over the approximately 31.5 million seconds there are in a year. By using 
these values, Holly assumes that there will be no variation in emissions and that 
emissions from any given unit will hold steady over every second of the year. 
Comparing Holly's "PTE Emission Rates - Short-Term" model, IR002994-96, 
with its "PTE, NO2 Annual Emission Rates" model, IR002997-99, provides the first 
evidence that Holly's short-term modeling does not represent maximum emission rates. 
In both models, for each emission "source," the inputs in the columns labeled "NOx g/s" 
are identical. The two models rely on the same NOx emission rates. There is no 
difference between the NOx values used for the short-term and annual models. In reality, 
maximum short-term emission rates, which represent spikes in emission rates, are 
substantially higher than annual emissions averaged over 365 days. Holly's short-term 
model merely reflects annual emission rates, which smooth out any variability, and not 
the sharp increases in emissions that occur on a short-term basis. 
The second clue is that, when converted to tons per year, the inputs for the short-
term model equate to annual emission limits or estimates of annual emissions (PTE). For 
example, the purported short-term SO2 emission rate for the FCCU25 and FCCU4 
scrubbers - 0.5091g/s, IR002994-95 - equals 17.7 tpy, which is the AO annual emission 
limit on these units. IR009245. The modeled short-term SO2 and NOx emission rates for 
the South Flare, IR002996, translated to tons per year, equal the estimate of the South 
Flare's annual non-upset SO2 and NOx emissions. IR003069. This again shows that the 
inputs for the short-term model reflect annual emission rates held constant over the year, 
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thereby masking any spikes in emissions. The short-term model does not represent the 
maximum emission rates that result from the operations of the facility over the short-
term. 
Thus, Holly's short-term model does not consider emission spikes or variability in 
emissions. As a result, the model cannot demonstrate that, despite the emission increases 
authorized by the AO, the short-term NAAQS will be maintained. This is pa1iicularly 
true because Holly's faulty modeling shows that the Expansion presents a real threat to 
the short-term NAAQS. Without including upset flare emissions and with modeling 
maximum short-term emissions, Holly concludes that 95% of the NO2 NAAQS will be 
consumed as a result of the project - leaving a very small margin before the standard will 
be exceeded. IR003596. According to the model, the total predicted concentration of 
NO2 as a result of the Expansion is 178 µg/m3, just under the one-hour NO2 NAAQS of 
188 µg/m3. Id. Modeling of either the considerable upset flare emissions or maximum 
short-term emissions would almost certainly confirm an impermissible violation of the 
NAAQS. 
Nor may Holly assume that there is no variability in the emissions from any of the 
Refinery units or that maximum sh01i-term emissions can be estimated by equating them 
to annual emissions. The Director has acknowledged that emissions from the refineries, 
including Holly, are highly variable, explaining that "[a]fter reviewing several years' ... 
of operational records . .. for emission estimates/calculations and production levels," the 
Director "agreed with refinery officials that there was significant variability from day to 
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day and from year to year. Therefore, the refineries were allowed maximum never-to-be 
exceeded daily limits of PM10, SO2, NOx based on the apparent variability." IR009187.29 
The Director's own modeling guidance also prohibits Holly from making such an 
assumption, stating that the basis of a modeling analysis of maximum short-term 
concentrations30 must be sh011-term emission rates based on short-term limits specified in 
the AO: 
Modeled emission rates should be representative of the averaging period(s) for 
which impacts are being determined. The emission rate used in the modeling 
analyses to establish maximum short-term concentrations (24 hours or less) should 
be representative of the pending AO's permitted maximum allowable emission 
level for that time period[. ]31 
IR007802; NSR Manual C.45 (for NAAQS compliance demonstrations, "the emissions 
rate for the proposed ... modification must reflect the maximum allowable operating 
conditions as expressed by the federally enforceable emissions limit, operating level, and 
operating factor for each applicable pollutant and averaging time."). 
Thus, the Director admits that refinery emissions are variable. He may not argue, 
therefore, that Holly need not model maximum short-term emission rates to determine 
potential exceedances of the NAAQS. His own guidance underscores that, particularly 
where variability exists, compliance with the one-hour NAAQS must be based on 
maximum one-hour emission rates determined by federally enforceable permit limits . 
29 This statement predates the designation of the one-hour SO2 and NOx NAAQS. 
30 These are the concentrations that would be compared to the short-term NAAQS. 
31 The Record cannot show that Holly "routinely operates at a significantly lower 
emission rate." There are no federally enforceable sh011-term operating limits on the 
Refinery. Holly's modeling did not address upset emissions from the flares which 
indicate that the Refinery operates at a higher emission rate during these frequent upsets. 
49 
4. Rule 307-107 Does Not Regulate Upset Flare Emissions. 
The Director maintains that "the flares are in place as control device for upset 
conditions," IR009186, and "[fJlare emissions during malfunction/upset conditions are 
regulated through R307-107 (ITA Condition I[].3)." IR009211; IR009186-87; IR009227 
(Holly "shall comply with UAC R307-107" which addresses "breakdowns"). However, 
Rule 307-107 does not apply to upset emissions from the Holly flares. Therefore, the 
Director is mistaken to maintain that Rule 307-107 "regulates" flares or protects short-
term NAAQS from upset flare emissions. 
Rule 307-107, Utah's "Breakdown Rule," provides that emissions from "upsets" 
or "malfunctions" are not be exempt from determining compliance with AO terms and 
conditions. A source must report to the Director any "breakdown," including information 
on the quantity of emissions released as a consequence of the "incident." Utah Admin. 
Code r.307-101-2(1). The rule revolves around the meaning of"breakdown," which 
means "any malfunction ... start-up [or] shutdown, which will result in ... emissions in 
excess of those allowed by approval order or Title R307." Id. r.307-101-2. Under Rule 
307-107, a source need only report a "breakdown" and a "breakdown" occurs only when 
an incident results in excess emissions or emissions in excess of the terms and conditions 
ofanAO. Id. 
As the Director acknowledges, at the Refinery, there are no limitations on upset 
flare emissions, IR009186-87, and no AO emission limits apply when the flares are 
operating under "upset" conditions. IR009245-50. Therefore, the Breakdown Rule will 
never apply to the Refinery flares because there can be no "excess emissions" and 
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therefore no "breakdown" when the flares are operating under upset conditions. Any 
emissions from the flares would not be in excess of those allowed by the AO, because the 
AO allows unlimited "upset" emissions from the flares. Without excess emissions, there 
is no breakdown, no reporting requirement and Rule 307-107 does not apply. Because 
Rule 307-107 does not serve to prohibit or limit upset flare emissions, it does not 
"regulate" them and does not protect short-term NAAQS from upset flare emissions. 
B. The Director Fails to Protect Short-Term NAAQS from Refinery Emissions . 
For the same reasons that he has failed to protect short-term NAAQS from the 
upset flare emissions, the Director has neglected his duty to ensure that the Refinery 
emissions do not impede attainment or maintenance of the NAAQS. The Director has 
not imposed short-term emission limits on the Refinery emission limits. His oversight is 
particularly telling because there are no hourly source-wide short-term emission limits, 
which the Director deemed necessary to protect the NAAQS: "Protection of the 
NAAQS . . .is not achieved on an emission unit-by-emission unit basis ... but rather on a 
source-by-source basis." IR009186.32 The source-wide emission limitations on SO2 and 
NOx are expressed in tons per day and a 365-day rolling average, not with hourly 
averaging times. IR009245; IR009248. Combined with upset flare emissions, Refinery 
emissions that are not subject to short-term limits will exceed the NAAQS. 
32 Of course, many emission units make up a single source. 
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C. The AO is Invalid Because it Is Mired in ·confusion and Conflicting Statements 
and Does Not Specify Applicable Subpart Ja Terms and Conditions. 
New Source Performance Standard (NSPS) Subpart Ja applies to Refinery flares 
that have been constructed, reconstructed or modified since June 24, 2008. 40 C.F.R. 
§60.lO0a(b). Under r.307-401-8(5), the Director may not issue an AO unless and until he 
determines that the source will comply with, inter alia, the NSPS. Utah Admin. Code 
r.307-401-S(l)(b)(vi); r.307-210. In addition, citizens are guaranteed the right to 
comment on a proposed AO and have their comments addressed by the Director, r.307-
401-7, and to enforce an AO' s terms and conditions in court. 42 U.S.C. §7604. 
Despite these decrees, it remains unclear if and how Subpart Ja applies to the 
Refinery and its South and North flares. For example, the Director's list of "applicable 
programs" does not specify that Subpart Ja applies to the flares. IR008483-89. While the 
Director claims that ITA section III states that NSPS Subpart Ja does pertain to both the 
North and South flares, IR009183,33 that section references Subpart Ja "for Petroleum 
Refineries for Which Construction, Reconstruction, or Modification Commenced After 
May 14, 2007." IR008477. The date that triggers the application of Subpart Ja for flares 
is June 24, 2008. 40 C.F.R. §60.l00a(b).34 
The Director also claims "the North Flare is not being modified as part of' the 
Expansion and so is "outside the scope of this permit action," IR009183, suggesting he 
33 There are statements in the Record suggesting that Subpart Ja applies to Refinery 
emission units, including the flares . E.g. IR0085 l 7; IR009246; IR002866-67; IR002868-
69. These statement are not clear or specific and do not explain what the Director 
considers to be "new." 
34 But see IR009186-87. 
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has not made a dete1mination whether Subpait Ja applies to this flare. The Director 
suggests that he will impose on each "new fuel gas combustion device" - without 
defining the terms - the Subpait Ja sh01t-term 162 ppmv I-hS limit for the fuel gas, 
IR008572, but does not include that limit in the AO. IR009241. He instead lists a daily 
60 ppmv H2S concentration averaged over 365 days. IR009246.35 The Director also 
refuses to include in the AO the particular Subpart Ja terms and conditions applicable to 
the refinery, disagreeing with a comment contending that he must do so. IR009212. The 
AO reflects this approach, for example, by failing to list the exact provisions of Subpart 
Ja applicable to the flares, such as the a short-term 162 ppmv I-hS limit for the fuel gas . 
Particularly given the significant confusion around the applicability of the 
provision, the Director's decision to leave Subpait Ja terms and conditions out of the AO 
is untenable. Utah Physicians challenges any practitioner to decipher Subpart Ja and 
determine with any assurance how it applies to the Refinery and flares. The rule includes 
ten extensive sections, replete with equations, definitions, technical terms, cross 
references, options and alternatives. 40 C.F.R. §60.100a-109a. Unless the Director 
specifies the applicable provisions, terms and conditions in the AO, it is impossible for 
citizens to know - much less comment on - what the Director means if he maintains that 
Subpart Ja applies to the Refinery, whether he has met his r.307-401-8(5), 8(l)(b)(vi) and 
r. 307-210 obligations or even if Holly and the Director agree on the application of the 
provision to the source. The Director's approach effectively prohibits the public from 
35 The AO should include both the Subpatt J a short-term limit and this long-term limit. 
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exercising the Clean Air Act's citizen suit provision as it is almost impossible to enforce 
a permit as vague as the AO in the context of confusion that surrounds the proper 
application of Subpart Jato the Refinery. 
D. The Record Does Not Support the Director's Determination that the North Flare 
Has Not been Modified by the Expansion or Is Exempt from BACT. 
The Director insists that "the North Flare is not being modified as part of" the 
Expansion and thus that any application of Subpait Jato the flare is outside the present 
permitting process. IR009183. The Record does not support this position. Actually, 
Subpait Ja applies to any flare that has been modified since June 24, 2008. 40 C.F .R. § 
60.lO0a(b). "Modification" is defined as including "any new piping ... physically 
connected to the flare for venting or emergency relief' or an alteration "to increase the 
flow capacity of the flare." 40 C.F.R. § 60.lO0a(c). Here, the Director acknowledges that 
the South Flare "will be reconstructed and reconfigured as part of the heavy crude 
processing project." IR002825. In 2013, Holly clarified that "the decommissioned south 
flare will be replaced with a new flare" and "currently, all gases are routed to the north 
flare." IR007168. In 2008, during various shut-down events, the average flowrate to the 
South Flare was 40,080 scf/h, while the average flowrate of the North Flare was 21,960 
scf/h. IR001261 -67. To route all South Flare gases to the smaller North Flare - as the 
reconstruction of the South Flare had entailed - requires an alteration to increase the flow 
capacity of the North Flare, and likely new piping, thereby triggering Subpart Ja. 40 
C.F.R. § 60.l00a(c) 
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For the same reasons, the modification to the North Flare means that the Director 
must apply BACT. Utah Admin. Code r.307-401-8(1)(a). BACT is "an emissions 
limitation ... based on the maximum degree of reduction for each air contaminant which 
would be emitted from any proposed ... modification[.]" Id. r.307-401-2(1). A 
modification is "any planned change in a source which results in a potential increase of 
emission." Utah Admin. Code r.307-101-2. As a result of the Expansion, both the 
refinery and the N011h Flare will be "changed" and will experience a potential increase in 
emissions. IR007168; IR009225. Therefore, BACT applies to the North Flare.36 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the legal deficiencies identified above, Utah Physicians asks that the AO 
be revoked, vacated and remanded with instrnctions that the Director undertake a 
defensible calculation of the emission increases and decreases to determine whether the 
Expansion is a major modification subject to Rule 307-403. Revocation and remand is 
also warranted because the Director has failed to assure that the Refinery will not impede 
36 The Director's statements that the North Flare has not been modified and therefore is 
not subject to BACT, IR009189; IR007999; IR008516-17, are not compelling. He does 
not explain how the larger flare could be shut down and all its gases rerouted to the 
smaller flare without the N011h Flare undergoing a physical change or change in 
operations resulting in an emission increase. 
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attainment or maintenance of the short-term NAAQS and has not properly applied 
Subpart Jato the Expansion. 
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of September, 2016. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS 
AO-Approval Order 
BACT - Best Available Control Technology 
CO - Carbon monoxide 
EPA - U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
FCCU - Fluidized Catalytic Cracking Unit 
H2S - Hydrogen Sulfide 
HAPs - Hazardous Air Pollutants 
IT A - Intent to Approve 
NAAQS - National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
NOi - Notice oflntent 
NSPS -New Source Performance Standards 
NSR - New Source Review 
NO2 - Nitrogen Dioxide 
NOx - Nitrous Oxides 
NNSR- Non-attainment New Source Review 
P AHs - Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons 
PM10 - Coarse Particulate Matter (10 Micrometers in Diameter or Smaller) 
PM2.s - Fine Particulate Matter (2.5 Micrometers in Diameter or Smaller) 
PSD - Prevention of Significant Deterioration 
PTE - Potential to Emit 
SO2 - Sulfur dioxide 
SOx - Sulfur Oxides 
SPR - Source Plan Review 
SSM - Startup, Shutdown and Malfunction 
UAP A - Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
VOCs - Volatile Organic Compounds 
UNITS 
bpd - barrels per day 
lb/hr - pounds per hour 
lb/MMBtu - pounds per million British thermal units 
ppmv - parts per million by volume 
scf - standard cubic feet 
tpd - tons per day 
tpy - tons per year 
µg/m3 - micrograms/cubic meter 
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Determinative Law 
R307-401-8. Approval Order. 
(1) The director will issue an approval order if the following conditions have been 
met: 
(a) The degree of pollution control for emissions, to include fugitive emissions 
and fugitive dust, is at least best available control technology. When determining 
best available control technology for a new or modified source in an ozone 
nonattainment or maintenance area that will emit volatile organic compounds or 
nitrogen oxides, best available control technology shall be at least as stringent as 
any Control Technique Guidance document that has been published by EPA that 
is applicable to the source. 
(b) The proposed installation will meet the applicable requirements of: 
(i) R:307-403, Permits: New and Modified Sources in Nonattainment Areas 
and Maintenance Areas; 
(ii) R:307-405, Permits: Major Sources in Attainment or Unclassified Areas 
(PSD); 
(iii) R:307-406, Visibility; 
(iv) R307-410, Emissions Impact Analysis; 
(v) R:307-420, Permits: Ozone Offset Requirements in Davis and Salt Lake 
Counties; 
(vi) R:307-210, National Standards of Performance for New Stationary 
Sources; 
(vii) National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards; 
(viii) R:307-214, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; 
(ix) R:307-110, Utah State Implementation Plan; and 
(x) all other provisions of R:307. 
(2) The approval order will require that all pollution control equipment be 
adequately and properly maintained. 
(3) Receipt of an approval order does not relieve any owner or operator of the 
responsibility to comply with the provisions of R307 or the State 
Implementation Plan. 
(4) To accommodate staged construction of a large source, the director may 
issue an order authorizing construction of an initial stage prior to receipt of 
detailed plans for the entire proposal provided that, through a review of general 
plans, engineering reports and other information the proposal is determined 
feasible by the director under the intent of R307. Subsequent detailed plans will 
then be processed as prescribed in this paragraph. For staged construction 
projects the previous determination under R307-401-8(1) and (2) will be 
reviewed and modified as appropriate at the earliest reasonable time prior to 
commencement of construction of each independent phase of the proposed 
source or modification. 
(5) If the director determines that a proposed stationary source, modification 
or relocation does not meet the conditions established in (1) above, the director 
will not issue an approval order. 
R307-403-3. Review of Major Sources of Air Quality Impact. 
Every major new source or major modification must be reviewed by the director 
to determine if a source will cause or contribute to a violation of the NAAQS. 
The determination of whether a source will cause or contribute to a violation of 
the NAAQS will be made by the director as of the new source's projected start-
up date. He will make an analysis of the proposed new source's operation data 
using the best information and analytical techniques available. 
**** 
(3) If the director finds that the emissions from a proposed source in a 
nonattainment area would contribute to an existing violation of a national 
ambient air quality standard at the time of the source's proposed start-up date, 
approval shall be granted if and only if: 
(a) the new source meets an emission limitation which is the Lowest 
Achievable Emission Rate (LAER) for such source and 
(b) the applicant has certified that all existing major sources in the State, 
owned or controlled by the owner or operator (or by any entity controlling, 
controlled by or under common control with such owner or operator) of the 
proposed source, are in compliance with all applicable rules in R307, including 
the Utah Implementation Plan requirements or are in compliance with an 
approved schedule and timetable for compliance under the Utah 
Implementation Plan, R307, or an enforcement order, and that the source is 
complying with all requirements and limitations as expeditiously as practicable. 
(c) emission offsets to the extent provided in R307-403-4, 5 and 6 are 
sufficient such that there will be reasonable further progress toward attainment 
of the applicable NAAQS. 
• 
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(d) the emission offsets provide a positive net air quality benefit in the affected 
area of nonattainment . 
(e) there is an approved implementation plan in effect for the pollutant to be 
emitted by the proposed source. 
(4) A source which is locating outside a nonattainment area or the Salt Lake 
City and Ogden maintenance areas for carbon monoxide and which causes the 
significant increments in (1) above to be exceeded in the nonattainment or 
maintenance area is subject to the requirements of (3) above. 
R307-403-4. Offsets: General Requirements. 
(1) Emission offsets must be obtained from the same source or other sources 
in the same nonattainment area except that the owner or operator of a source 
may obtain emission offsets in another nonattainment area if: 
(a) the other area has an equal or higher nonattainment classification than the 
area in which the source is located; and 
(b) emissions from such other area contribute to a violation of the national 
ambient air quality standard in the nonattainment area in which the source is 
located or which is impacted by the source. 
(2) Any emission offsets shall be enforceable by the time a new or modified 
source commences construction, and, by the time a new or modified source 
commences operation, any emission offsets shall be in effect and enforceable 
and shall assure that the total tonnage of increased emissions of the air 
pollutant from the new or modified source shall be offset by an equal or greater 
reduction, as applicable, in the actual emissions of such air pollutant from the 
same or other sources in the area. 
(3) Emission reductions otherwise required by the federal Clean Air Act or 
R307, including the State Implementation Plan shall not be creditable as 
emission reductions for purposes of any offset requirement. Incidental emission 
reductions which are not otherwise required by federal or state law shall be 
creditable as emission reductions if such emission reductions meet the 
requirements of (1) and (2) above . 
(4) Sources shall be allowed to offset, by alternative or innovative means, 
emission increases from rocket engine and motor firing, and cleaning related to 
such firing, at an existing or modified major source that tests rocket engines or 
motors under the conditions outlined in 42 U.S.C. 7503(e) (Section 173(e)(1) 
through Section 173(e)(4) of the federal Clean Air Act as amended in 1990) . 
R307-403-10. Analysis of Alternatives. 
The owner or operator of a major new source or major modification to be 
located in a nonattainment area or which would impact a nonattainment area 
must, in addition to the requirements in R307-403, submit with the notice of 
intent an adequate analysis of alternative sites, sizes, production processes, and 
environmental control techniques for such proposed source which 
demonstrates the benefits of the proposed source significantly outweigh the 
environmental and social costs imposed as a result of its location, construction, 
or modification. The director shall review the analysis. The analysis and the 
director's comments shall be subject to public comment as required by R307-
401-7. The preceding shall also apply in Salt Lake and Davis Counties for new 
major sources or modifications which are considered major for precursors of 
ozone, including volatile organic compounds and nitrogen oxides. 
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BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 
In the Matter of: 
Approval Order No. DAQE-AN101230041-13 
Holly Refining & Marketing Company -
Woods Cross, LLC 
Heavy Crude Processing Project 
Project No.N10123-0041 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND PROPOSED ORDER 
REGARDING PETITIONERS' 
MOTION REQUESTING STAY OF 
APPROVAL ORDER 
Administrative Law Judge Bret F. Randall 
March 25, 2014 
This matter is before me pursuant to appointment by the Executive Director of the Utah 
Depa11ment of Environmental Quality dated January 9, 2014. The appointment charges me to 
conduct a permit review adjudicative proceeding in this matter in accordance with Utah Code 
Ann., § 19-1-301.5 and Utah Admin. Code R305-7. 
Procedural Background 
On November 18, 2013, the Director of the Utah Division of Air Quality ("Director") 
issued approval order DAQE-AN 101230041-13 (Project Number N 10123-0041) (the "AO" or 
"Permit") to Holly Refining and Marketing Company, Woods Cross LLC (" Holly"), authorizing 
the construction of the Heavy Black Waxy Crude Processing Project ("Expansion Project"). 
On December 18, 201 3, Utah Physicians for a Healthy Environment and FRIENDS of 
Great Salt Lake (collectively "Utah Physicians") filed a Request for Agency Action seeking 
administrative review of the AO, pursuant to Utah Code§§ 19-1-301.5 and 63G-4-201(1)(b), (3) 
and Utah Admin. Code R305-7-203. 
On December 24, 2013, Utah Physicians filed a motion and supporting memorandum 
requesting a stay of the AO, pursuant to Utah Admin. Code R305-7-217 and Utah Code Ann.§ 
19-1-301.5. However, because Utah Physicians had not been granted party status and no ALJ 
ADJ010798 
had yet been appointed to this matter, the ti me for responding to the motion to stay did not begin 
to run at that time. 
On January 16, 2014, I entered an Order on Petition to Intervene, provisionally granting 
intervention to Utah Physicians for a Healthy Environment and Friends of Great Salt Lake 
(collectively, "Petitioners"). On the same date, I entered a Notice of Further Proceedings. 
Petitioners fi led a Corrected Motion and Memorandum Requesting Stay on January 2 1, 
20 14 ("Stay Motion"). I deemed that the date of the filing of the corrected motion for stay 
triggered a new response period for Respondents. The Stay Motion is the subject of the present 
Proposed Order. 
Pursuant to the Utah Code, whenever a motion to stay is fi led in a permit review 
adjudicative proceeding, "the administrative law judge shall: (i) consider a party's motion to 
stay a permit during a permit review adjudicative proceeding; and (ii) submit a proposed 
determination on the stay to the executive director." Section 19- l-301.5(1 5)(c), Utah Code Ann. 
Following briefing on the Stay Motion, I granted Respondents' motion for oral argument, 
with oral argument being held on March 6, 201 4. All parties appeared and participated in oral 
argument, which was of record through a court reporter. 
Having heard argument on the Stay Motion, and being fully advised in the premises, and 
pursuant to Section 19-1-301.5( 15)( c ), Utah Code Ann., this tribunal enters the following 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and proposed determination that the 
Executive Director of the Utah Depa1tment of Environmental Quality ("DEQ") deny Petitioners' 
Stay Motion for the reasons set forth herein. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
Regulatory Background 
I. Air pollution is harmful to human health and to the environment. [JR at 009140-
48; 1Rat009139-45; 1R at009144-45; 1Rat009 145-47.] 
2. In enacting the Utah Air Conservation Act, the Utah Legislature declared: " It is 
the policy of this state and the purpose of [the Utah Air Conservation Act] to achieve and 
maintain levels of air quality ,,vh ich will protect human health and safety, and to the greatest 
degree practicable, prevent injury to plant and animal life and property, foster the comfort and 
convenience of the people, promote the econom ic and socia l development of this state, and 
fac ilitate the enjoyment of the natural attractions of this state." Section 19-2-1 0 I (2), Utah Code 
Ann. 
3. The Utah Legislature further declared that the "purpose" of the Utah Air 
Conservation Act is to "(a) provide for a coordinated statewide program of ai r pollution 
prevention, abatement, and control; (b) provide for an appropriate distribution of responsibilities 
among the state and local units of government; (c) fac il itate cooperation across jurisdictional 
lines in dea ling with problems of air pollution not confined within single jurisdictions; and (d) 
provide a framework within which air qual ity may be protected and consideration given to the 
pub I ic interest at al I levels of planning and development within the state." Section 19-2-1 0 I ( 4 ), 
Utah Code Ann. 
4. Similarly, in enacting the Clean Air Act, the Congress found, among other things: 
(2) that the growth in the amount and complexity of air po llution brought about by 
urbanization, industrial development, and the increasing use of motor vehicles, 
has resulted in mounting dangers to the public health and welfare, including 
3 
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injury to agricu ltural crops and livestock, damage to and the deterioration of 
property, and hazards to air and ground transportation; [and] 
(3) that a ir pollution prevention (that is, the reduction or elimination, through any 
measures, of the amount of pollutants produced or created at the source) and air 
pollution control at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local 
governments ... . 
42 U.S.C. § 7401(a). 
5. Congress also stated that the "primary goal" of the Clean Air Act is to "encourage 
or otherwise promote reasonable Federal, State, and local governmental actions ... for pollution 
prevention." 42 U.S.C. § 7401(c). 
Permit Chronology 
6. In May of 2012, Holly Refining & Marketing Company - Woods Cross, LLC 
("Ho lly") submitted a notice of intent ("NOl'') to DAQ requesting an approval order to expand 
its Woods Cross refinery and modernize certa in equipment in a way that allowed Holly to 
process an additional 20,000 barrels per day of black ..yax crude from the Uintah Basin in eastern 
Utah ("May NOi"). [May NOi at IR000049-00I 108.] 
7. In response to DAQ's request to provide additional information, Holly re-
submitted its NOi in July of 2012 ("July NOi"). [July NOi at 1R002798-003590.] 
8. Following its technical and legal evaluation of the July NOi and related evidence, 
DAQ released for public comment an Intent to Approve ("First ITA"), dated November 28, 
2012. The First !TA included a draft Approval Order. [First ITA at IR00 1967-00 I 996.] 
9. During the initial 60-day public comment period, DAQ received comments from 
Western Resource Advocates on behalf of Utah Physicians for a Healthy Environment ("UPHE") 
and Friends of Great Salt Lake (" Friends") [IR004007-004035], Blaine Rawson on behalf of 
Mark J. Hall [IR004202-0042 l 7], Alexander Sagady on behalf of UPHE [IR009046-009 l 35], 
4 
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the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") [IR004001-004005], and Holly [IR003757-
003910]. 
10. In April 2013, Holly submitted a new netting analysis in a revised NOi. [Revised 
NOi at IR007335-007395.] 
1 I. In addition to certain other changes, the Revised NOI estimated PM2.5 emissions 
from Holly's gas-fired heaters and boilers based on the EPA's National Emission Inventory 
(''NEI") data. [Id.] 
12 . Following its technical and legal evaluation of the Revised NOI and related 
evidence, DAQ released, on June 5, 2013, for a second public comment period an Intent to 
Approve document ("Second IT A") and a Source Plan Review ("SPR"). [Second IT A at 
IR007498-007499, SPR at IR008480-008575.] 
13. On July 25, 2013, DAQ received comments on the draft approval order from 
Western Resource Advocates on behalf UPHE [IR007842-007997], Blaine Rawson on behalf of 
Mark J. Hall [IR008579-008602], A lexander Sagady on behalf of Petitioners [IR009046-
009135], the EPA [IR007840-00784 I], and Holly [IR0076 I 3-007836]. 
14. Following its review and evaluation of the foregoing information and comments, 
on November 6, 2013, DAQ requested additional information from Holly that DAQ believed 
was necessary in order to full y consider the pending comments and evidence. Holly responded 
to DAQ' s request for additional information on November 7, 2013. [IR008021 , IR008022-
0052.] 
15. After considering the supplemental information provided by Holly, on November 
18, 2013, DAQ issued Holly a new approval order authorizing the construction of the 
Modernization Proj ect ("Holly AO"). [Holly AO at IR009223-009254.] 
5 
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16. Concurrently therewith, DAQ issued a Response to Comments Memorandum 
("Response Memorandum") that addressed the comments made during the public comment 
periods, explained DAQ's response to those comments, and, where appropriate, described how 
the comments had been incorporated into the Holly AO. [Response Memorandum at 1R009174-
009222.] 
17. On December 18, 2013, Petitioners ti led their Request for Agency Action. On 
January 22, 2014, Petitioners tiled their Amended Motion and Memorandum Requesting a Stay 
of the Approval Order. Oral argument was held on the Stay Motion on March 6, 2014. 
DAO's Permit Review 
18. In their Stay Motion, Petitioners challenge three po1i ions of the Holly AO: (I ) the 
use of the NE] emission factors to estimate PM2.5 emissions from Holly's new gas-fired heaters 
and boilers; (2) the calculated coke burn rate for Holly's proposed Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit 
("FCC Unit 25"), and (3) the calculated reduction of PM2.5 emissions from the removal of 
Holly's existing propane pit flare. [Stay Motion, p. 15-37.] 
19. DAQ determined that use of the NEI emission factors to calculate PM25 
emissions from the new heaters and boilers was appropriate because ( I) there was substantial 
evidence in the record supporting the accuracy of these emission factors to estimate PM 
emissions from gas-fired heaters and boilers, as explained in the two reports from Glenn England 
[See Glen England Reports at IR007238-007258, IR008024-008044; see also Response 
Memorandum at IR009215-009216]; (2) DAQ had imposed a stack testing requirement in the 
Holly AO to verify that the emission factors were an accurate representation of actual emissions 
[Response Memorandum at IR008 I 29-008131] ; and (3) DAQ imposed a limit derived from the 
NEI factors into the final Holly AO that is binding on Holly during all operations of the Woods 
6 
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Cross refinery [Holly AO, Section 11.8.7.a.2 at IR009248; see also Response Memorandum at 
lR009217] . 
20. DAQ determined that regardless of whether there were other alternative emission 
factor calculations for heaters and boilers that yielded higher estimates, Holly would be subject 
to an enforceable PM 10 emission limit of 0.0005 I lb/MM Btu, derived from the NEI emission 
factors. [See Response Memorandum IR008 I 30.] DAQ reasoned that any failure by Holly to 
comply with that emission limit would result in compliance violations, which would ensure that 
Holly would not contribute a significant increase of PM as a resu lt of the expansion. [Id.] 
21. DAQ determined that 40 C.F.R. § 60.14 did not require the use of the older AP-42 
emission factors, as Petitioners argued, to calculate Holly' s PM2.s emissions from the heaters and 
boilers because that regulation only applies to determining applicabi lity of the New Source 
Performance Standards, "which [is] separate from the New Source Review regulations that are 
relevant to this permitting process." [Response Memorandum at IR008130.] Moreover "EPA 
guidance states that sources other than the AP-42 emission factors may be used in determining 
emissions for PSD/NSR emissions ... including ' [e]mission factors from technical literature."' 
[Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting EPA New Source Review Workshop Manual, 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Nonattainment Area Permitting, draft dated October 
1990 at A.22).] 
22. With respect to the PM2_5 emission reduction of 2. 19 tons per year ("tpy") from 
the decommissioning of Holly's propane pit flare, which Petitioners claimed was inaccurately 
high, the Revised NOI reflects that Holly and DAQ calculated this emission reduction using the 
actual emission inventory data on file at DAQ for the years 2008 and 2009. [Revised NOI at 
IR007339; Response Memorandum at IR0092 18 ("flare emissions came from the UDAQ 
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inventory record for reported actual emissions from 2008-2009 based on 259 MMBtu/hr and 
actual throughput data").] 
23. As to the coke burn rate for Holly's proposed FCC Unit 25, which Petitioners 
claimed was inaccurately low, the emission calculations Holly provided to DAQ indicate that the 
rate was calculated based on actual emission data from the current FCC Unit 4, a larger unit than 
the proposed FCC Unit 25, and thus was a conservatively high estimate of expected emissions 
from the FCC Unit 25. [IR008052; see also Holly AO at IR009227-009229 (The FCC Unit 4 
processes 8,880 barrels per day ("bpd") while the proposed FCC Unit 25 can only process 8,500 
bpd.] 
24. Regardless of the coke burn rate, DAQ concluded that the FCC Unit 25 is subject 
to a specific PM 10 limit of 0J0lb/ 1000 lb. of coke burned, which is limited by the 8,500 bpd 
operating capacity, and is also subject to the overall PM JO emission cap of 4 7 .5 tpy and 0.13 tons 
per day ("tpd") for combustion sources. [Response Memorandum at IR0092 I 9.] " If these 
limitations are not met, the refinery will be out of compliance until it remedies the problem with 
additional control equipment or redesign of the system until it meets these limits." [Id.] 
25. DAQ rejected Petitioners' calculation of coke burn based on the Universal Oil 
Products yield estimates because they "provided no documents or primary data to support or 
detail [] which estimate, if any, was used to derive the suggested range of coke burn estimates." 
[Response Memorandum at IR0092 I 9.] "Based on UDAQ's technical experience and 
expertise," DAQ determined that "the 6200 lb/hr value is a fair and reasonable estimate of the 
quantity of coke burn in FCC Unit 25." [Id.] 
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Impacts of Modernization Project Construction 
26 . The Conrad Jenson Declaration submitted with Holly's opposition to the Stay 
Motion ("Jenson Declaration") is the most recent evidence of Holly's present construction 
schedule. In light of the procedural history recited above, the earlier construction timetable 
estimates are deemed to be updated by the facts as set forth in the Jenson Declaration, which are 
credited and treated as true for the purposes of this proposed order. 
27. According to the Jenson Declaration, Holly's first phase of construction will not 
be fully installed and operational until the fall of 2015. [Exhibit A to Holly's Opposition to 
Petitioners Motion Requesting Stay of Approval Order~ 9.] 
28. " [D]uring the construction of Phase I, there will not be any increase in emissions 
until completion of Phase l in the fall of2015." [Id. ~ 10.] 
29. As confirmed by the pa1ties during oral argument, this permit review adjudicative 
proceeding is expected to be fully briefed by July 9, 2014. [See Corrected Stipulated Order 
Regarding Response to Request for Agency Action and Subsequent Deadlines, dated February 
19, 2014.] Oral argument likely will be scheduled before the end of July 2014 and a 
recommended order will likely be prepared for the Executive Director as soon as possible after 
oral argument, certainly by the end of September 2014. [ See Stay Motion Hearing Transcript at 
p. 14-1 6.] During thi s time, it is undisputed that there will be no increase in emissions from the 
Holly refinery due to the Modernization Project, and no emissions for at least a year beyond the 
proposed adjud icative proceeding timeline. [Jenson Declaration~ 1 O.] 
30. Holly has already incurred approximately $48,000,000 in costs for preliminary 
activ ities in preparation for construction. [Id. ~ 6.] 
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31. Holly commenced construction on the Expansion Project after receiving the Holly 
AO. [Id.~ 7.] e 
32. The overall costs of the Modernization Project are anticipated to be approximately 
$700 to $800 million, with approximately $300 million allocated to Phase I and the remaining 
approximate $400 to $500 million allocated to Phase II. These estimated costs represent 
design/engineering, materials, and construction costs. [Id. ~ 1 I.] 
33. If the Holly AO is stayed and construction stopped, it is undisputed that Holly 
would experience significant demobilization and remobilization costs. According to the Jenson 
Declaration, the demobilization costs include hourly pay rates for the remaining contract workers 
who will need to secure construction equipment and the construction site safely during the stay 
period. It also includes costs of equipment storage. Remobilization costs would include similar 
expenses for restarting work that had been stopped. If construction is stayed, Holly's main 
contractor would charge a minimum of $625,000 per month for such delays. These figures do 
not account for lost profits or additional harm of further delay on the overall project schedule. 
[Id.~ 13.] 
34. Delays in the Project are directly correlated with lost revenue that Holly would 
have generated if it were able to process the increased number of barrels of crude on schedule. 
For every month Holly is unable to process additional crude, it anticipates a loss of 
approximately $10,000,000. [Id.~ 15.] 
35. During Phase I and Phase II of construction, Holly anticipates up to 500 people at 
any given time on site fulfilling construction jobs related to the project. [Id. ~ 17.] 
36. After Phase I of the Modernization Project is completed, Holly anticipates a 25% 
increase in permanent jobs at the Woods Cross refinery. After completion of Phase II, Holly 
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anticipates another 25% increase in permanent jobs. This is a 50% overall increase in permanent 
jobs at the refinery. [Id. ~ 18.] 
37. Overall, the Modernization Project will create a public benefit through job 
creation, increased state and local taxes, and capital infusion and investment in Davis County, as 
well as benefits from increased crude production within the state of Utah. These benefits wi ll be 
delayed or may be lost if Ho lly is forced to stop construction on the Project. [Id. ~ 19.] 
38. The Modernization Project may also result in a number of calculated emission 
reductions at the Holly refinery, including a reduction in NOx by 21.53 tpy, a reduction in SO2 by 
150.69 tpy, and a reduction in VOC by 17.02 tpy. [IR007575.] DAQ has determined that these 
pollutants are precursors to PM2.s and major contributors to wintertime inversions in the Salt 
Lake Valley. [Utah State Implementation Plan, § IX.A, dated December 4, 2013, § 1.6.] 
According to the recent Utah State Implementation Plan for PM2.5, reductions in these pollutants 
would have the secondary effect of reducing wintertime PM2.s levels. [Id. ] 
39 . Based on the evidence, these emission reductions are the result of voluntary 
pollution control strategies that Holly has proposed for the Modernization Project and that are 
incorporated in the Holly AO. [See SPR at IR008564, JR008568-008569; see also IR007335.] 
These reductions fall into five different categories: 
a. Holly will install a new wet gas scrubber as part of the new FCC Unit 25 and 
will route its existing gas streams that presently are emitted after treatment in 
an existing sulfur recovery unit ("SRU") through that wet gas scrubber, 
reducing overall SO2 emissions [See JulyNOI IR002812, 002821 , 002823-
002824.]; 
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40. 
b. Holly will remove both its propane pit fl are and the frozen earth propane pit 
storage facil ity, which wi ll reduce NOx and YOC emissions, respectively [See 
July NOl at IR002828, 003035]; 
c. Holly will replace fo ur gas-driven compressor engines wi th electric engines, 
which will reduce NOx emissions [See Revised NOi at IR007335]; 
d. Holly will add selective catalytic reduction technology to three current heaters 
and boilers, further reducing NOx emissions [See Source Plan Review at 
IR00855 I; Holly AO at IR009248]; and 
e. Holly will be subj ect to overall, refinery-wide emissions limitation reductions 
for PM 10, NOx, and SO2. [See Holly AO at IR009225.] 
Based on the evidence of record, if the Holly AO is stayed or remanded, these 
emission control strateg ies will e ither be delayed or wi ll not be imp lemented because they are 
approved and authorized by the Holly AO. [See SPR at IR008564, IR008568-008569; see also 
IR007335.] 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I. This is a permit review adjudicative proceeding pursuant to Utah Code § 19-1-
301.5 and Utah Admin. Code R305-7. 
2. The Stay Motion is governed by Section 19-1-301.5( 15), Utah Code Ann., 
providing: 
(a) The fi ling of a request for agency action does not stay a permit or delay the 
effective date of a permit. 
(b) A permit may not be stayed or delayed unless a stay is granted under this 
Subsection (15). 
(c) The administrative law judge shall: 
12 
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(i) consider a party's motion to stay a permit during a permit review 
adjudicative proceeding; and 
(i i) submit a proposed determination on the stay to the executive director. 
(d) The administrative law judge may not recommend to the executive director a 
stay of a permit, or a portion of a permit, unless: 
3. 
(i) al l parties agree to the stay; or 
(ii) the party seeking the stay demonstrates that: 
(A) the party seeking the stay will suffer irreparable harm unless 
the stay is issued; 
(B) the threatened injury to the party seeking the stay outweighs 
whatever damage the proposed stay is likely to cause the party restrained 
or enjoined; 
(C) the stay, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest; 
and 
(D) there is a substantial likelihood that the party seeking the stay 
will prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, or the case presents 
serious issues on the merits, which should be the subject of fu1ther 
adjudication . 
In order to prevai l on the Stay Motion, Petitioners must satisfy all four of the 
statutory elements li sted above. Fai lure to satisfy even one element is fata l to the Stay Motion. 
See Utah Med. Prods. Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 23 1 (Utah 1998). 
4. Petitioners' burden to satisfy the four factors listed above is more stringent under 
Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5 than under the analogous state ( or federa l) procedural stay 
standards. Utah Code Section 19-1-301 .5 represents statutory language enacted by the Utah 
Legislature. By contrast, the law governing interlocutory relief in state and federal courts is 
primarily judge-made common law, guided by procedural rules. In Utah, the rules of civ il 
procedure do not rise to the level of statutory law but are promulgated and regulated by the Utah 
Supreme Court. Section 78A-3- I 03, Utah Code Ann. The express statutory language provides 
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governing stays in permit review adjudicative proceedings states that the ALJ "mav not" 
recommend a stay of a permit "unless" the moving party establishes all four statutory elements. 
By contrast, Rule 65A of the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure begins with a neutral presumption 
and simply provides that a court "may issue" an injunction upon a showing of four elements. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e) ("A restraining order or preliminary injunction may issue only upon a 
showing that .... "). This permissive language is consistent with the touchstone of interlocutory 
relief in state and federal courts: the broad discretion afforded state and federal judges. See 
Southwest Stainless, LP v. Sappington, 582 F.3d 1176, 11 91 (10th Cir. 2009) ("The district 
COU1t's discretion in [granting an injunction] is necessarily broad .... "); Purkey v. Roberts, 2012 
UT App 241,121 , 285 P.3d 1242 ("Ultimately, the decision of whether to issue an injunction 
remains within the discretion of the trial cou1t."). It is also worth noting that the federal coU1ts 
of appeals have articulated differing versions of the discretionary, balancing tests applicable to 
interlocutory orders. However, these legal tests relate to a trial judge's discretion and are 
therefore not directly applicable here in light of the clear and unambiguous requirement in the 
Utah Code that the moving party prove the application of all four statutory standards. 
5. Based on the foregoing and without limiting the potential discretion of the 
Executive Director in granting preliminary injunctive relief in permit review adjudicative 
proceedings, it is clear that the Utah Legislature employed mandatory language that is not found 
in the analogous federal and state procedural rules and case law. As a result, the state and federal 
cases governing stays and injunctive relief, while important to consider, also apply less stringent 
legal standards than the Utah Legislature has directed be appl ied to the Stay Motion. Analysis of 
the following factors is therefore undertaken in light of the more stringent statutory standard 
establ ished by the Utah Legislature. 
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Irreparable Harm 
6. Irreparable harm being the sine qua non of interlocutory relief, the moving party 
has a particularly heavy burden to prove it. Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite 
C01p., 356 F.3d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that the irreparable harm factor is the "single 
most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction") (internal quotations and 
citation omitted); accord, Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421,427 (Utah 1983); see also New 
York v. NRC, 550 F.2d 745, 753 (2d Cir. 1977). Irreparable harm must be non-speculative and 
imminent: there must be evidence supporting a conclusion that irreparable harm will, in fact, 
occur if the relief is not granted. See Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Medical Corp., 952 F .2d 
802 ( 4th Cir. 1991 ) . 
7. In the context of a permit review adjudicative proceeding, the irreparable harm 
must necessarily relate to the period of time between the date of the motion for stay and the final 
determination on the merits. This conclusion is particularly important in the instant proceeding, 
where no evidentiary hearing or trial is provided. In an analogous situation, Judge Posner wrote: 
"When persons harmed by administrative action bring a suit for injunction in a federal district 
court, it is not because they want, or are entitled to, a trial." Cronin v. United States Dep 't of 
Agriculture, 919 F.2d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1990). Rather, he continued, such persons are entitled 
to judicial review of the agency action, applying the standard touchstones of administrative law. 
Id. After considering the legal standards that might be applied to that case, involving a Forest 
Service decision to a llow for the cutting of timber on federal land, Judge Posner concluded: 
"But all this assumes that the decision whether to grant or deny the preliminary injunction is 
preliminary to a fu ll hearing on the plaintiffs claim. If it is not[, then] the two stages are 
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collapsed into one because there will never be a fu ller hearing . ... " Id. at 445. See also 
Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 175 F.3d 227, 235 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that a 
petitioner must show that "the harm .. . [is] so imminent as to be irreparable if a court waits until 
the end of trial to resolve the harm."). Stated differently, "if a trial on the merits can be 
conducted before the injury wou ld occur there is no need for interlocutory relief." 11 A Charles 
Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2948.1, at 129 
(3d ed.20 13). Such is certainly the case in these proceedings: the decision on the merits will be 
rendered prior to the time that the Expansion Project begins operation. 
8. Petitioners have fa iled to carry their burden of proof that they will suffer 
irreparable harm if the Permit is not stayed prior to the time that the rev iew on the merits is 
completed in this matter. The record supports the find ing that hearing and determination on the 
merits in thi s case will be completed by the end of the summer of 2014, long before the 
Expansion Project is operational, being the fa ll of 20 15 at the earliest. [Jenson Declaration ~ 1 O.] 
If Petitioners are successful on their claims on the merits, then the proper remedy would be to 
remand to the Director to reconsider the Permit. In that event, the Petitioner would not have the 
Permit necessary to operate the Expansion Project as required by the Utah Air Conservation Act 
and the Clean Air Act ("CAA"). The requested injunctive relief would therefore be self-
enforcing and no claimed irreparable harm could result.1 If Petitioners' claims fai l on the merits, 
then injunctive relief would not be warranted in any event. 
1 This conclusion is an important consideration here because the case law cited by Petitioners supporting the Stay 
Motion is distinguishable from the case at bar. Here, success on the merits would itselfresult in a self-enforcing 
injunction, inasmuch as the Permit is required in order for Holly to operate the Expansion Project in the first 
instance. Thus, this matter is distinguishable from Davis v. Mineta, 302 F3d 1104 (I 0th Cir. 2002), where 
construction of the highway project in question without proper wetland fill permits under the Clean Water Act may 
have caused irreparable ham,. 
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9. Petitioners have failed to carry their burden of proof that "bureaucratic 
momentum" will result in irreparable harm prior to the time that hearing on the merits is 
completed. There is no evidence to support any such conclusion. Moreover, the instant permit 
review adjudicative proceeding is easily distingui shable from the cases cited by Petitioners, 
suppo1ting their "bureaucratic momentum" argument for irreparable harm. Here, the provisions 
of the CAA impose substantive requirements on Holly with in the permitting process or upon a 
remand. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 503 (I st Cir. 1989) (ho lding that where a 
statute substantively "require[s}the agency to change direction," such as the Clean Water Act at 
issue in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982), or the Alaska National Interest 
Lands Conservation Act in Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987), 
"bureaucratic commitment to a project" does not constitute irreparable harm). Indeed, the one 
case to address the "bureaucratic commitment" theory in the context of the CAA permitting 
process expressly rejected the argument. Sierra Club v. Larsen, 769 F. Supp. 420 (D. Mass. 
1991 ), aff'd 2 F.3d 462 ( I st Cir. 1993). The National Environmental Protection Act ("NEPA") 
case law upon which Petitioners rely for their "bureaucratic momentum" argument is simply 
inapplicable in this case. See Marsh, 872 F.2d at 503; 15 U.S.C. § 793(c)(1) ("No action taken 
under the CAA shall be deemed a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment within the meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act."). Stated 
differently, under the CAA, Holly is required to have, maintain, and follow a lega l and valid 
permit in order to operate the Expansion Project. This scenario is easily distinguishable from a 
NEPA situation, where the law requires, and only requires, that full consideration of the 
environmental impacts of all applicable options be undertaken and completed before the 'federal 
action" can be initiated. More specifically, the principle in Sierra Club that a violation ofNEPA 
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constitutes an irreparable injury rests on NEPA 's purpose to foster informed decision-making. 
Sierra Club, 872 F.2d at 500. In the context of NEPA, irreparable harm to the environment, 
almost by definition, occurs because uninformed decisionmakers commit themselves to a course 
of action that rarely can be undone given "a chain of bureaucratic commitment that will become 
progressively harder to undo the longer it continues." Id. Such considerations are not applicable 
here, where the substantive requirements of the CAA will continue to have prospective 
application. 
10. Petitioners' failure to carry their burden of proof as to irreparable harm is 
dispositive to the Stay Motion. However, analysis of the remaining factors is warranted. 
Likelihood of Success on the Merits 
11. Petitioners raise three issues in their Stay Motion regarding the merits: (l) the 
assertion that DAQ erred in allowing the use of the NE] emission factors to calculate PM2_5 
emissions from Holly's gas-fired heaters and boilers; (2) the assertion that Holly overestimated 
the PM25 emission reductions that will be realized through the decommiss ioning of the propane 
pit flare; and (3) the assertion that DAQ underestimated the coke burn rate from the FCC Unit 
25, which Petitioners argue will result in higher PM2_5 emissions. [Stay Motion pp. 15-37.] 
12. The merits have not yet been fully briefed and argued by the parties. 
13. DAQ is granted substantial discretion to interpret its governing statutes and rules. 
See Utah Code§ 19-1-301.5(14)(c) (expressly "recognizing that [DAQ] has been granted 
substantial discretion to interpret its governing statutes and rules"). Moreover, Section 19-l -
301 .5 instructs that DAQ's factual, technical and scientific determinations should be upheld if 
they are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Utah Code§ 19-l-301.5(14)(c). 
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14. Solely for purposes of this Recommended Order, I conclude that Petitioners have 
failed to carry their burden of showing that they are I ikely to succeed on the merits, or that the 
case presents serious issues on the merits, which should be the subject of further adjudication. 
Carrying this burden here requires a showing that DAQ abused its discretion or lacked 
substantial evidence to support its factual, technical and scientific determinations in connection 
with the Permit. 
15. In reaching Conclusion No. 14, I rely in large part on the independent 
determination of EPA that the Permit is acceptable, notwithstanding Petitioners' objections. See 
EPA Comment Letters [IR004001-004005; 1R007840-007841 ]. In Alaska Dep 't of Envtl. 
Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 124 S. Ct. 983 (2004), the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
EPA is entitled to review the reasonableness of state permitting authorities' BACT 
determinations under the PSD program and has authority to issue stop construction orders if it 
reasonably believes that a BACT designation is erroneous or unreasonable. The CAA also 
provides EPA with concurrent enforcement authority that is directly applicable to the present 
proceeding. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7477, 7413(a)(5)(A) (describing the enforcement options available to 
the EPA when it finds that a state is not complying with any requirement of the CAA with 
respect to construction of a new source or modification of an existing source). See Jennifer A . 
Davis Foster, Note, EPA Oversight in Determining Best Available Control Technology: The 
Supreme Court Determines the Proper Scope of Enforcement, 69 Missouri L. Rev., Issue 4, at 1 
(Fall 2004). Based on the foregoing, it is clear that ifin EPA's independentjudgment, any ofthe 
objections and issues Petitioners have raised on the merits were deserving of further evaluation, 
comment, or reconsideration, EPA had an independent duty and authority to pursue such issues. 
EPA declined to do so even after being given the oppo,tunity in connection with the Permit. 
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16. In this permit review adjudicative proceeding, we have a somewhat unusual 
situation in administrative law where not one but two regulatory agencies with significant 
technical expertise and concurrent (and somewhat overlapping) legal jurisdiction have been 
involved in the procedural and substantive process that led to the issuance of the Permit. This 
situation provides a second layer of regulatory oversight to ensure that the applicable procedural 
and substantive requirements of the CAA, as adopted and enforced through the Utah Air 
Conservation Act in the spirit of "cooperative federal ism," have been met. Solely for purposes 
of the Stay Motion, therefore, I conclude that EPA's independent review and acceptance of the 
Permit demonstrates that Petitioners do not have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits 
or that the case presents serious issues on the merits, which should be the subject of further 
adjudication 
17. Petitioners' failure to carry their burden of proof as to success on the merits 
should, standing alone, be dispositive of the Stay Motion. 
Public Interest 
18. Air pollution is harmful to humans and ecological receptors. Thus, it is self-
ev ident that the public interest is served by reduction and elimination of air pollution. Under our 
system, however, a source's compliance with the requirements set fo11h in the CAA, as 
implemented through the Utah Air Conservation Act and related rules and regulations, satisfies, 
as a matter of law, the public policy of protection of human health and the environment from 
exposures to air pollution. 
19. Petitioners have failed to make a showing of cognizable harm that will occur 
during the pendency of these proceedings unless the Holly AO is stayed. As a result, they have 
failed to show that the public interest favors a stay. 
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20. To the extent that a violation of the CAA and other applicable law may have 
occurred in connection with the Permit, the instant proceedings will be concluded prior to the 
time that the Expansion Project begins operation. And in the event that Petitioners are successful 
on the merits, injunctive relief, in a sense, would be self-executing since a valid permit is 
required to operate the Expansion Project in the first instance. Hence, I find that the public 
interest is adequately protected by compliance with the existing permitting requirements set forth 
in the Utah Air Conservation Act and the CAA. 
21. The record also shows that the Holly AO will result in substantial emission 
reductions in SO2, NOx, and VOCs, which are precursors to PM pollution along the Wasatch 
Front. The Holly AO will also lower refinery-wide emissions limits for PM I 0, NOx, and SO2. 
Staying the Holly AO will delay implementation of pollution control technologies that will result 
in these emission reductions, harming the public interest. 
22. Finally, the public interest also extends to the economic activity, including jobs 
the Modernization Project design and construction will generate. This undisputed factor weighs 
against the Stay Motion. 
23. Petitioners' failure to establish that the Stay Motion is in the public interest should 
be dispositive of the Stay Motion . 
Balance of Harms 
24. Petitioners have failed to carry their burden to show that the balance of harms tips 
in their favor. 
25. The increased emissions about which Petitioners complain will not occur until 
after construction is completed in 20 15, long after determination on the merits is completed. By 
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contrast, a stay would result in the immediate cessation of design and construction activities for 
the Expansion Project, resulting in the undisputed harms that are of record. 
26. Finally, if Petitioners are successful on the merits, injunctive relief would be self-
executing as discussed above. The balance of the harms, therefore, does not tip in Petitioners' 
favor. 
27. Petitioners' failure to carry their burden to demonstrate that the balance of harms 
tips in their favor should be dispositive of the Stay Motion. 
PROPOSED ORDER 
Based on the forgoing, I recommend that the Executive Director deny the Stay Motion. 
DA TED this 25th day of March, 2014. 
BRET F. RANDALL 
Administrative Law Judge 
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BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
OF THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 
In the Matter of: 
Approval Order No. 
DAQE-AN101230041-13 
Holly Refining & Marketing Company-
Woods Cross, LLC 
Heavy Crude Processing Project 
Project Number: N10123-0041 
ORDER ADOPTING ALJ'S PROPOSED 
ORDER 
and 
DENYINGPETffiONERS'REQUEST 
FORSTAY 
Amanda Smith 
Executive Director 
Department of Environmental Quality 
May 8, 2014 
This matter is before me based on the Administrative Law Judge's proposed 
detennination on a motion for stay in this matter. For the reasons set forth herein, I hereby adopt 
the March 25, 2014 Proposed Order regarding Petitioners' Motion Requesting Stay of Approval 
Order. 
Findings of Fact 
1. On November 18, 2013, the Director of the Utah Division of Air Quality issued 
Approval Order DAQE-AN101230041-13 (Project Number Nl0123-0041) (hereafter "AO") to 
Holly Refining and Marketing.Company, for the construction of the Heavy Black Waxy Crude 
Processing Project. 
2. On December 18, 2013, Petitioners Utah Physicians for a Health Environment and 
Friends of the Great Salt Lake (hereinafter "Utah Physicians") filed a Request for Agency Action 
(RFAA) seeking a review of the AO pursuant to Utah Code §§19-1-301.5 and 63G-4-201(l)(b) 
and Utah Admin. Code R305-7-203 . 
ADJ011035 
3. On January 9, 2014, I appointed Bret F. Randall as the Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann., § 19-1-301.5(5). I charged the ALJ to conduct 
a permit review adjudicative proceeding in accordance with Utah Code Ann., § 19-1-301.5 and 
Utah Admin. Code R305-7. 
4. On December 21, 2013, Utah Physicians filed a motion and supporting memorandum 
requesting a stay of the AO pending a full hearing on the merits pursuant to Utah Code Ann., 
§19-1-301.5(15) and Utah Admin. Code R305-7-217. Petitioners filed a Corrected Motion and 
Memorandum Requesting Stay on January 21, 2014. 
5. Following extensive briefing on the motion to stay by the Parties, the ALJ heard oral 
argument on March 6, 2014. The hearing was transcribed by a court reporter. 
6. On March 25, 2014, pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §19-1-301.5(15)(c), the ALJ 
issued proposed findings of fact (including references to the initial administrative record) 
conclusions oflaw and a proposed order recommending that the Executive Director deny the 
petitioners' motion to stay. 
7. The ALJ's findings of fact (including references to the initial administrative record) 
address the: regulatory background; permit chronology; DAQ's permit review; and impacts of 
modernization project construction. The ALJ's conclusions of law address each of the four 
statutory elements required for a stay. The required statutory elements were briefed and argued 
by the parties at the March 6, 2014 hearing. 
8. On April 8, 2014, Utah Physicians submitted comments on the ALJ' s proposed order. 
The following memoranda were subsequently filed on April 15, 2014 in response to Utah 
Physicians' comments: Holly's Response to Utah Physicians' Comments on ALJ's 
Recommended Order Re: Petitioners' Request for a Stay of Approval Order; and the Utah 
2 
ADJ011036 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Division of Air Quality's Response to Utah Physicians' Comments on ALJ's Recommended 
Order Regarding Stay of Approval Order. 
9. The points raised by Holly and DAQ in response to Utah Physicians' comments 
confirm that the comments repeat points previously briefed and argued at the time of the hearing 
on the stay. The ALJ has addressed each of those points in his proposed order. 
Conclusions of Law 
10. Whenever a motion to stay is filed in a perm.it review adjudicative proceeding, the 
ALJ shall: (i) consider a party's motion to stay a perm.it review adjudicative proceeding; and (ii) 
submit a proposed determination on the stay to the Executive Director. Utah Code Ann., §19-1-
301.5(15)(c) . 
11. Utah Code Ann., §191-301.S(lS)(d) provides that the ALJ may not recommend to 
the executive director a stay of a permit, or a portion of a permit, unless: (i) all parties agree to 
the stay; or (ii) the party seeking the stay demonstrates that: 
(A) the party seeking the stay will suffer irreparable harm unless the stay is issued; 
(B) the threatened injury to the party seeking the stay outweighs whatever damage the 
proposed stay is likely to cause the party restrained or enjoined; 
(C) the stay, if issued would not be adverse to the public interest; and 
(D) there is a substantial likelihood that the party seeking the stay will prevail on the 
merits of the underlying claim, or the case presents serious issues on the merits, which 
should be the subject of further adjudication. 
The Parties did not stipulate to a stay and the Petitioners must, therefore, demonstrate 
compliance with all of the four statutory elements . 
12. The ALJ's findings offact and conclusions oflaw address each of the elements 
necessary for a stay and establish that based on the record then before the ALJ, the Petitioners 
have failed to carry their burden of proof on the statutory elements required for a stay . 
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·Order 
I have reviewed the proposed :findings of fact, conclusions oflaw and proposed 
determination. I have also reviewed the comments and responses to comments submitted by the 
parties regarding the ALJ's proposed determination. Based on the ALJ's review and evaluation, I 
am persuaded that the petitioners have failed to meet the statutory elements required for a stay. I 
therefore adopt the ALJ's fiildings offact, conclusions oflaw and proposed order, and I deny the 
Petitioners' motion for stay. 
Dated this 8th day of May, 2014 
4 
~ 
Amanda Smith, Executive Director 
Department of Environmental Quality 
195 North 1950 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-4810 
amandasmith@utah.gov 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 8th day of May, 2014, the foregoing ORDER ADOPTING ALJ'S 
PROPOSED ORDER and DENYING PETITIONERS' REQUEST FOR STAY 
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Charles R. Dubuc 
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schristiansen@parrbrown.com 
Cheylynn Hayman, Holly Refining 
chayman@parrbrown.com 
Megan Houdeshel, Holly Refining 
mhoudeshel@parrbrown.com 
Christian C. Stephens 
Veronique Jarrell-King 
ASSISTANT UTAH ATTORNEYS GENERAL 
cstephens@utah.gov 
. vjarrellking@utah.gov 
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BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE 
UT AH DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AL QUALITY 
In the Matter of: 
Approval Order No. DAQE-AN I0l 230041-1 3 
Holly Refining & Marketing Company -
Woods Cross, LLC 
Heavy Crude Processing Project 
Project No. N l 0 123-004 I 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDED 
ORDER ON THE MERITS 
Administrative Law Judge Bret F. Randall 
March I I, 2015 
This matter is before me pursuant to appointment by the Executive Director of the Utah 
Department of Environmental Quality dated January 9, 2014. The appointment charges me to 
conduct a permit review adjudicative proceeding in this matter in accordance with Utah Code 
Ann., § 19-1-301.5 and Utah Admin. Code R305-7. Following are my Findings of Fact,1 
Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order on the Merits . 
1 While the Utah Code directs me to provide " findings of fact," I note that my review of th is matter is in an appellate 
capacity. There was no trial, no witnesses were called, no testimony was heard, and no evidence was presented to 
me as a trier of fact. Thus, the legislature's requirement that the ALJ provide " findings of fact'' and a proposed 
dispositive action should not be read to suggest that I have weighed evidence, except in an appellate-like role, 
applying the standards of review as discussed below. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This matter came before me for oral argument on September 17, 2014 at 9:30 am . 
Present at the argument was Joro Walker and Rob Dubuc on behalf of Petitioners; Christian 
Stephens for Respondent Division of Air Quality; and Steve Christiansen, David Reymann, 
Cheylynn Hayman, and Megan Houdeshel for Respondent Holly. Having reviewed the briefing 
in this matter and heard oral argument, I propose that Petitioners' Request for Agency Action 
and all claims asserted therein be rejected. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
I. In May of 2012, Holly Refining & Marketing Company- Woods Cross, LLC 
("Holly") submitted a notice of intent ("May NOi") to the Utah Division of Environmental 
Quality ("UDAQ") requesting an approval order to expand its Woods Cross refinery ("Holly 
Refinery") and modernize certain equipment in a way that would allow Holly to process an 
additional 20,000 barrels per day of black wax crude from the Uintah Basin in eastern Utah 
("Modernization Project"). [May NOi, IR000049-001108] . 
2. In July of 2012, Holly re-submitted its May NOi with revisions in response to 
UDAQ's request for additional information ("July NOI"). [July NOI, IR002798-003590]. 
3 . On November 28, 2012, UDAQ released for public comment an Intent to 
Approve document ("Fi rst IT A") containing a draft approval order. [First ITA, IROO I 967-
001996]. 
4 . During the initial 60-day public comment period, UDAQ received comments 
from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") [JR004001-004005]; Western 
Resource Advocates on behalf of Utah Physicians for a Healthy Environment and Friends of 
Great Salt Lake (collectively "Petitioners") [IR004007-004035]; Blaine Rawson on behalf of 
5 
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Mark J. Hal I [1R004202-0042 I 7]; Alexander Sagady on behalf of Petitioners [IR009046-
009135]; and Holly [JR003757-00391 OJ. 
5. Jn February and March of 2013, Holly provided a detailed response to EPA 
relating to the EPA's comments referenced above, which objected (among other things) to 
Holly's original netting analysis. [JR008245-008259]. 
6. In March 2013, Holly submitted a new netting analysis pa11ly in response to a 
specific request made by UDAQ in February of 20 I 3 and partly in response to EPA's comments 
referenced above [IR008 J 98-008259] . 
7. In April 2013, Holly formally submitted a revised NOJ ("Revised NOi") to 
UDAQ that also included the new netting analysis. [Revised NOi at IR007335-007395]. 
8. In addition to certain other changes, the Revised NOl estimated PM2_5 emissions 
from Holly's gas-fired heaters and boilers based on the EPA 's National Emission Inventory 
(' 'NEI") data. [Id.] 
9. On June 5, 2013, UDAQ released for a second public comment period an Intent to 
Approve document ("Second IT A") and a Source Plan Review. [Second IT A, IR00008449-
008479; SPR, 1R008480-008575] . 
I 0. On July 25, 2013, UDAQ received comments on the draft approval order in the 
Second ITA from EPA ("EPA's Second Comment Letter") [JR007840-007841] ; Western 
Resource Advocates on behalf Petitioners ("Petitioners' Second Comment Letter") [IR007842-
007997]; Blaine Rawson on behalf of Mark J. Hall ("Rawson' s Second Comment Letter") 
[IR008579-008602]; Alexander Sagady on behalf of Petitioners ("Sagady's Second Comment 
Letter") [1R009046-009135]; and Holly ("Holly's Second Comment Letter") [IR007613-
007836]. 
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11 . On November 6, 20 13, UDAQ requested additional information from Holly 
pertaining to certain comments raising questions about the Second !TA and Holly responded to 
this request for supplemental information on November 7, 2013. [IR008021 , IR008022-0052]. 
12. On November 18, 20 13, UDAQ issued a Response to Comments Memorandum 
("Response to Comments Memo") addressing all of the comments made during the second 
public comment period, explained UDAQ' s response to those comments, and, where appropriate, 
described how the comments had been incorporated into the Holly AO. [Response to Comments 
Memo, IR009174-009222]. 
13. UDAQ, having considered and answered all of the comments received during the 
public comment period, issued Holly a new approva l order authorizing the construction of the 
Modernization Project ("Hol ly AO"), on November 18, 20 13. [Holly AO, IR009223-009254] . 
14. On December 18, 2013, Petitioners fi led their Request for Agency Action 
contesting UDAQ's issuance of the Holly AO ("RAA''). 
15 . In January 9, 201 4, the Executive Director of UDAQ appointed me as the 
administrative law judge ("ALJ") to conduct a permit review adjudicative proceeding in this 
matter in accordance with Utah Code Section 19-1-30 1.5 and Utah Admin. Code R305-7. 
16 . On January 16, 20 14, I issued a Notice of Further Proceedings, in which, among 
other things, ordered that the party with the burden of proof on any issue would be held to a 
stringent marshaling requirement ("Marshaling Requirement"). 
17 . On January 22, 20 14, Petitioners filed an Amended Motion and Memorandum 
Requesting a Stay of the Approval Order ("Motion for Stay"). Oral argument was held on the 
Motion for Stay on March 6, 2014 . 
7 
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I 8. On March 25, 2014, I recommended to the Executive Director of the Department 
of Environmental Quality ("Executive Director") deny the Motion for Stay finding that 
Petitioners had not satisfied the four factors required for issuance of a stay of an environmental 
permit. 
19. On May 8, 2014, the Executive Director of the Department of Environmental 
Quality adopted my proposed order and denied the Motion for Stay. 
20. Prior to briefing the merits, ]-lolly and UDAQ submitted Motions to Dismiss 
ce11ain issues in Petitioners' RAA. 
2 I. On Apri I 2, 2014, I denied without prejudice the Motions to Dismiss, finding at 
that time that "preservation issues would be most efficiently addressed in connection with 
briefing on the merits," which would afford a reviewing court "a more complete record for 
appellate review." [Order on Motions to Dismiss at 6-7]. 
22. On April 16, 2014, the Petitioners filed a Motion for Clarification Regarding 
Notice of Further Proceedings, in which they asked me to clarify the Marshaling Requirement 
imposed by the Notice of Further Proceedings. 
23. On April 17, 2014, J issued an Order Clarifying the Marshaling Requirement 
("Clarification Order") reiterating that the Petitioners bear the burden to marshal all of the 
evidence in the administrative record, both supportive of and contrary to their claims. 
24. On September 12, 2014, I issued a subsequent Order regarding the Marshaling 
Requirement, clarifying further the Petitioners' burden of proof in light of the Utah Supreme 
Cou11 decision in State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 326 P.3d 645. In that Order, I explained that 
Petitioners were required to marshal all of the evidence in the administrative record to carry their 
burden of proof on any particular issue. 
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25. On September 17, 2014, after receiving briefs on the merits from a ll the parties, I 
heard oral argument to hear the meri ts of Petitioners' RAA, as required by the Utah Code. After 
rev iewing and considering all of the facts and arguments presented in the briefi ng and at ora l 
argument and pursuant to Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5( 12)( c ), I hereby submit to the Executive 
Director the fo llowing Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Order 
Regarding the Merits. 
LAW APPLICABLE TO THIS ADJUDICATION 
I. Standard of Review 
1. This permit review adjudicative proceeding is governed by Utah Code Section 19-
1-30 1.5, which requires the presiding ALJ to "conduct a permit rev iew adj udicati ve proceeding 
based only on the administrative record and not as a trial de novo." Utah Code§ 19-l-
30 1.5(8)(a). Unlike many other adm inistrative proceedings involving an ALJ, in a permit review 
adj udicative proceeding it is clear that the Utah Legislature intended to limit the ALJ's authority 
to a review of UDAQ's decision, thereby placing the ALJ in an appellate-like review role. There 
is to be no trial. There will be no witnesses, no examination or cross examination, and no 
fi ndings of fact where disputed testimony is weighed and where witness credibility is at issue, as 
often occurs in other administrative adjudicative proceedings . Rather, a ll of the weighing of the 
evidence has already occurred at the UDAQ level. 
2. UDAQ prepared a written response to public comments in connection with the 
issuance of the Holly AO. [JR009174-9222]. The ALJ must " review .. . the director's 
determination, based on the record," culminating in a proposed d ispositive action that includes 
fi ndings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommended order. Utah Code§ 19- l -301.5(12)(b)-
(c). Because these proceedings are, by definit ion, limited to the issues raised during the public 
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comment period, UDAQ's written response to public comments plays a central role in evaluating 
whether UDAQ's conclusions satisfy applicable legal requirements. 
3. Petitioners have the burden of proof to demonstrate that the Director's 
determination to issue the Holly AO was in error. [Clarification Order at 4 ("Petitioners 
acknowledge that they have the burden of proof in this proceeding.")]; see also Taylor v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm 'n, 2005 UT App 121 , * 1 (unpublished) ("In the typical challenge to agency action, 
the party challenging the action carries the burden of demonstrating its impropriety." (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
4. The Director's determination can include factual findings, interpretations of law, 
and mixed determinations of law and facts. 
5. To carry their burden of proof with respect to their challenge of factual findings, 
the Petitioners must demonstrate that UDAQ's findings of fact are not supported by substantial 
evidence; otherwise, the ALJ must "uphold all factual technical, and scientific agency 
determinations that are supported by substantial ev idence taken from the record as a whole." 
Utah Code§ 19-l-301.5(13)(b).2 Under Utah case law relevant to this proceeding, the ALJ's 
review on questions of fact is limited to determining ifUDAQ's factual findings "were 
reasonable and rational," while giving "great deference" to UDAQ's factual findings and not 
"reweighing" the evidence. Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining. 2012 
2 While subsection ( 13)(b) expressly applies directly to the Executive Director's review, the standard of 
review that the ALJ is to apply to the record is not expressly stated in the Utah Code. Under a fair reading 
of the statute, it is clear that the ALJ is to apply the same standard as the Executive Director is required to 
apply. This conclusion is based on a reading of the permit review adjudicative proceeding statute as a 
whole. In the first instance, the ALJ's express duty and authority is to undertake a permit review 
adjudicatory proceeding and not a trial de novo on the merits, resulting in a recommended ruling for the 
Executive Director. In other words, the role of the ALJ is to "stand in the shoes" of the Executive 
Director and provide her with a recommended ruling on the merits. Thus, the ALJ is to apply the same 
standard ofreview to the administrative record as the Executive Director is required to apply. Utah Code 
Ann.§ 19-1- 301.5. 
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UT 73, ~ 11 , 38 P.3d 291 (hereinafter Sierra Club v. BOGM) (internal quotation marks omitted).3 
While reviewing an agency's determination for substantia l evidence, the ALJ should "state the 
facts and a ll legitimate inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the agency's 
findings." Id. ~ 12 . 
6. With respect to legal interpretations, the ALJ should grant "substantial discretion" 
to UDAQ in its interpretation of its governing statutes and rules. See Utah Code § 19-1-
301 .5(14)(c)(i). In this case, the governing statutes and rules include the Clean Air Act, the Utah 
Air Conservation Act, and the applicable regulations under these statutes. UDAQ's legal 
interpretation of these statutes and rules may be overturned only if Petitioners show that such 
interpretation is a "clearly erroneous interpretation or application of the law." See, e.g., Sierra 
Club v. BOGM, 2012 UT 73, ~ 10; see also Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Bd. of Oil. Gas & 
Mining, 2001 UT 112, ~ 18, 38 P .3d 291 (an agency's "interpretation of the operative provisions 
of the statutory law it is empowered to administer" must be given deference). 
7 . By contrast, UDAQ's general interpretations of the law, including constitutional 
questions, jurisdiction, and statutes unrelated to the agency, are granted little or no deference and 
are simply reviewed for correctness. Sierra Club, 20 I 2 UT 73, il 9; see also Sevier Citizens v. 
Dept. of Envt. Quality, 2014 UT App 257, ~ 6 (where the statute under review was procedural, 
and where issue was interpretation of the statute itself that granted agency interpretive discretion, 
the coutt applied a traditional approach to standard of review and imposed a correctness standard 
3 Section 19-1-301.5, however, also vests the ALJ with the authority to supplement the 
administrative record. Utah Code Ann. § 19-1-30 l.5(8)(c)(iv) (providing that the ALJ "may 
supplement the record with technical or factual information."). Based on these statutory 
provisions, if the ALJ determines that UDAQ has not addressed an issue or UDAQ's response 
to an issue is inadequate, the ALJ may request add itional technical or factual information from 
the parties as opposed to recommending a remand of the A Os . 
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to the question of whether the fai lure to file a petition to intervene strips the agency of 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5(7)). 
8. Finally, when the agency has been granted discretion to interpret the statute or 
regulation at issue, mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard. See Murray v. Utah Labor Comm'n, 2013 UT 38, ~ 39,308 P.3d 46 1. Here, Section 
19-1-301.5(14)(c)(i) expressly grants UDAQ "substantial discretion to interpret its governing 
statutes and rules." Agency decisions on mixed questions of law and fact must be upheld under 
this discretion standard if they are "rationally based" and set aside only "if they are imposed 
arbitrarily and capriciously or are beyond the tolerable limits ofreason." Assoc. Gen. 
Contractors, 200 I UT 112, ~ 18 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
II. Petitioners' Burden of Proof 
I. Petitioners, as the parties challenging UDAQ's decision to issue the Holly AO, 
carry the burden of demonstrating UDAQ's determinations were not suppo11ed by substantial 
evidence, were erroneous, or were an abuse of discretion. See Sierra Club v. BOGM, 2012 UT 
73, ~ 31; Associated Gen. Contractors, 2001 UT 112, ~ 34; Taylor, 2005 UT App 121, * I (Utah 
Ct. App 1993) (unpublished). 
2. A party with the burden of proof must "fully identify, analyze, and cite its legal 
arguments" and "provide meaningful legal analysis" but may not "dump the burden of 
argument and research" on the reviewing authority. W. Jordan City v. Goodman, 2006 UT 27, 
~ 29, 135 P.3d 874 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Kennon v. Air Quality Bd., 
2009 UT 77, ~ 29,270 P.3d 417 (declining to review a petitioner's challenge to an AO where 
the petitioners failed to adequately brief a claim). Moreover, a party's briefing is inadequate 
where the briefing "merely contains bald citations to authority without development of that 
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authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority." Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ~ 9, 194 
P.3d 903 (internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Lamb, 2013 UT App 5, ~ 11 , 294 P.3d 
639. 
III. Petitioners' Duty to Marshal All Relevant Evidence 
I. This tribunal 's statutory jurisdiction under Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5 requires 
this tribunal to conduct this proceeding based only on the administrative record and to uphold 
"all factual , technical, and scientific agency determinations that are supported by substantial 
ev idence viewed in light of the record as a whole." Utah Code§ 19-1-301.5(14)(c) (emphasis 
added). Accordingly, there will never be a "trial" on the merits. Rather, UDAQ undertook the 
adjudication of Holly's NO ls after receiving and considering, among other things, public 
comments . 
2. All of the evidentiary information upon which the Director could have relied is 
contained in the formal administrative record as defined by Utah Code Section 19- 1-
30 1.5(8)(6). For every issue raised in public comments, the Director provided a detailed 
written response, which also fonns part of the administrative record. Utah Code Ann. § 19-1 -
301.5(8)(6). 
3 . The Director's detailed response to comments provides a specific record as to 
how the Director considered and resolved each public comment and also, in some instances, 
refers to and provides citation to other evidence in the administrative record upon which the 
Director has relied in reaching any given conclusion. Thus, while there is no trial on the merits, 
the Director' s response to public comments provides a rather detail ed "roadmap" as to the 
factual and legal basis for the Director's decision to issue the Holly AO . 
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4. Because Petitioners have the burden of persuasion in this proceeding, the only 
way they can possibly carry that burden of proof it to convince the ALJ (or, by extension, the 
Executive Director, the Utah Court of Appeals, or the Utah Supreme Court) that any disputed 
factual, technical, or scientific agency determination is not supported by substantial evidence 
taken from the administrative record as a whole. By extension, therefore, they must marshal all 
of the evidence relevant to each claim they assert. See, e.g., Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ~ 42. In short, 
the Marshaling Requirement forms an inherent part of Petitioners' burden of proof in this 
proceeding. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court recently clarified that "a party who fails to identify 
and deal with supportive evidence will never persuade an appellate court to reverse under the 
deferential standard of review that applies to such issues." Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ~ 40 (emphasis 
added). 
5. In their briefing on the merits and at oral argument, Petitioners raised a number of 
objections to the Marshaling Requirement. These objections lack merit. 4 The Marshaling 
Requirement was properly imposed, either as an inherent part of Petitioners' burden of proof or, 
in the alternative, pursuant to the ALJ's statutory grant of authority to manage all non-dispositive 
aspects of these proceedings. 
6. The Utah Legislature has granted the ALJ the jurisdiction to "take any action in a 
permit review adjudicative proceeding that is not a dispositive action." Utah Code § 19-1-
301.5(9)(t). Although the Marshaling Requirement is not specifically adopted in the Utah Code 
or Utah Administrative Code as applied to these proceedings and Rule 24(a)(9) does not 
expressly apply here, an AL.I has the authorization to manage this proceeding in the most efficient 
4 The fact that Holly was able to marshal record evidence, point by point, in the manner that I had 
requested of Petitioners, provides further support for the conclusion that Petitioners' arguments against 
the Marshaling Requirement lack merit and should be rejected. 
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and effective way appropriate under the circumstances of this case.5 All of the policy reasons 
underlying Rule 24(a)(9) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure apply with fu ll force to a permit 
review adjudicative proceeding. 
7. In an analogous situation, the Utah Court of Appeals declined to unde11ake an 
independent review of a large record. Wright v. Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 512 n.2 
(Utah App. 1990). There, the court noted that Rule 24(a)(9) was intended precisely "to spare 
appel late courts such an onerous burden." Id. Hence, the com1 continued, "[a]bsent 
exceptional circumstances, our review of the record is limited to those specific po11ions of the 
record which have been drawn to our attention by the parties and which are relevant to the 
legal questions before us." Id. The court noted that Rule 24(a)(9) was intended precisely "to 
spare appellate courts such an onerous burden." Hence, the court continued, "[a]bsent 
exceptional circumstances, our review of the record is limited to those specific portions of the 
record which have been drawn to our attention by the parties and which are relevant to the 
legal questions properly before us." Id. I have appl ied this same standard to my review of the 
administrative record in this proceeding, for the same reasons as stated by the Utah Court of 
Appeals. If this rule were not applied to the administrative record in a permit review 
adjudicative proceeding, an appellant on future appeal could potentially argue that the 
administrative law judge overlooked or failed to consider, under his or her independent review 
of the record, certain evidence of record even though that evidence was not specifical ly drawn 
5 It is undisputed that should Petitioners appeal any issue arising from this proceeding to the Utah Court 
of Appeals, Rule 24(a)(9) would apply to their briefs on appeal. Because the administrative law judge 
and the Executive Director are called upon to apply the same standard of review to the agency 
determinations as the Utah Court of Appeals, it stands to reason that the marshaling requirement should 
also apply at the ALJ and Executive Director levels of review. Moreover, Petitioners have been on notice 
of this procedural requirement from the outset of this proceeding and did not appeal the ALJ's Order 
Clarifying the Marshaling Requirement to the Executive Director. They cannot therefore show undue 
burden or prejudice. 
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to the attention of the administrative law judge. I find and conclude that the types of 
"exceptional circumstances" that may warrant deviation from this rule, as stated in Wright, do 
not apply to the present proceedings.6 
8. This conclusion finds further support in Utah case law in the cases cited below, 
subject to the clarification that in these cases, the potential for a procedural default upon 
fa ilure to marshal the record is not an appropriate result, as held in State v. Nielsen, supra. 
However, to the extent that Utah case law regarding the burden of proof and marshaling does 
not deal with the procedural default issue rejected in State v. Nelson, it is still good law and 
should be considered as being re levant here. See, e.g., Simmons Media Group. LLC v. 
Waykar, LLC, 20 14 UT App 145, ,, 46, 763 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 (dismissing a claim where the 
appellant "does not identify and deal w ith the supportive evidence" (internal quotation marks 
omitted)) ; Nebeker v. Summit County, 2014 UT App 137,, 46, 762 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 ("To 
prevail on such a challenge, the County must acknowledge the evidence that suppo1ts the 
findings and demonstrate 'a basis for overcoming the healthy dose of deference owed to factual 
findings"' (quoting Nielsen, 2014 UT 10 ,, 41-42); Wachocki v. Luna, 2014 UT 139,, 11 , n. 
6, 330 P.3d 717 (ho lding that because appellants fai led to marshal the evidence, appellants did 
not carry their burden on appeal); W. Jordan City, 2006 UT 27,, 29; Heinecke v. Dep't of 
Commerce, 810 P .2d 459, 464 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (holding that parties fail to meet their 
burden to marshal the ev idence when they leave " it to the cowt to sort out what evidence 
6 There is simply nothing in the Utah Code to suggest that the administrative law judge in a pem1it review 
adjudicative proceeding has an independent duty to comb through the entire Administrative Record to identify all 
relevant facts in support of a disputed factual, technical, and scientific agency determination, particularly where, as 
here, Petitioners are represented by experienced and competent legal counsel. To be sure, a more generous standard 
of briefing may apply to a permit review adjudicative proceeding where parties appear prose. Because no prose 
parties are involved in the instant proceeding, 1 will not speculate as to the potential applicability of the Marshaling 
Requirement in cases where parties are not represented by legal counsel. 
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actually supported the finding" and instead argued their "own position without regard for the 
evidence suppo1ting the ... findings") . 
9. The duty to carry the burden of proof through marshaling must fall to Petitioners 
in this permit review adjudicative proceeding, because as a matter of longstanding 
administrative law, the patty challenging any factual finding underlying an agency' s 
determination is required to marshal "all" evidence supporting the agency' s determination. 
Sierra Club v. BOGM, 2012 UT 73, ~ 12; see also Kennon, 2009 UT 77, ~ 27 ("When 
challenging factual findings, a party is obligated to marshal 'all record evidence that supports 
the challenged finding."' (quoting Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9))); First Nat'I Bank of Boston v. 
County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 799 P .2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990) (In an 
appeal of an agency action, "the party challenging the finding ... must marshal all of the 
evidence supporting the finding ."). 
10. The duty to marshal the evidence in administrative appeals also applies to 
parties challenging an agency's determination on mixed questions of fact and law. Peterson 
Hunting v. Labor Comm'n, 2012 UT App 14, ~ 15, 269 P.3d 998; see also United Park City 
Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, ~ 25, 140 P.3d 1200 ("Even 
where the defendants purport to challenge only the legal ruling, as here, if a determination of 
the correctness of a court's application of a legal standard is extremely fact-sensitive, the 
[appellants] also have a duty to marshal the evidence." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
A party obligated to marshal the evidence must do so for each claim that the marshaling 
mandate applies. Sierra Club 2012, 2012 UT 73, ~ 30 & n.3 (holding that Petitioners 
failed to marshal one claim while determining that the same Petitioners marshaled 
another claim). At its core, the marshaling requirement demands that a patty "marshal 
all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, 
the ... findings are not support by substantial evidence." Id.~ 30. To do so, the paity 
may not "'simply attack [the agency's] credibility."' 
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Associated Gen. Contractors 200 I UT 11 2, ,r 34 ( quoting Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W . 
R.R., 2001 UT 77, ,r 36, 31 P.3d 557). 
11 . In light of the Marshaling Requ irement, the ALJ has ordered that Petitioners 
were not subject to a page limitation in their briefing on the merits. Rather, the only 
requirement has been that the briefing be of reasonable length. Thus, Petitioners have been 
afforded every opportunity to carry their burden of proof in this proceeding to convince the 
ALJ that any disputed factual , technical, or scientific agency determination is !J1l1. supported by 
substantial evidence taken from the administrative record as a who le. In order to meet that 
burden of proof, it wi ll be necessary for Petitioners to bring to the tribuna l's attention all 
evidence from the admin istrative record that relates to any such disputed issue. 
IV. Preservation Standard 
I . Pursuant to Utah Code Section 19-1-30 I .5( I 0), " [a] person who files a request for 
agency action has the burden of demonstrating that an issue or argument raised in the request for 
agency action has been preserved." Lacking such demonstration, the ALJ "shall dismiss, with 
prejudice, any issue or argument in a request for agency action that has not been preserved." Id. 
2. An issue or argument has been preserved for appeal if (a) the person raised it 
during the public comment period and it was supported with sufficient information or 
documentation to enable the director to fu lly consider the substance and significance of the issue, 
Utah Code§ 19-l-301.5(4)(a)-(b); or (b) the issue was not reasonably ascertainable during the 
public comment period, id.§ 19-l-301.5(6)(c). 
3. The failure to raise reasonably ascertainable issues or arguments relating to the 
proposed permit during the public comment period deprives UDAQ from considering all 
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possible issues prior to any issuance of an approval order and results in less effective agency 
process. 
4. The demonstration that each issue has been properly preserved must be found in 
the Petitioners' RAA at the outset of the case. See id.; see also Utah Admin. Code R305-7-
203(3)(h) (mandating that an RAA provide a showing on preservation) . 
5. The fa ilure to raise issues in the RAA frustrates the goals of the permit review 
adjudicative process by fai ling to place the respondents on notice of the specific claims. Such 
fa ilure prevents UDAQ and Holly from assessing whether it should have supplemented the 
record in response to newly presented claims in the RAA. Moreover, by not raising issues in the 
RAA and waiting to reveal claims until the briefing, Petitioners prevented Holly from assessing 
the full risks of proceeding with construction under an AO subject to a permit challenge . 
6. Any claims not preserved in accordance with the statutory standard set forth 
above will be dismissed. 
7 . Petitioners raised concerns in their RAA and then again in their Reply Brief about 
whether due process had been satisfied where Holly submitted additional information to UDAQ 
after the close of the public comment period and Petitioners were not given a second opportunity 
to submit comments on this additional material. 
8. First, Petitioners have waived this claim by not briefing it in their opening brief. 
Petitioners may not raise claims in their RAA and then wait to address such claims until their 
Reply brief. See e.g. , Coleman ex rel. Schefski v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, ~ 9, 17 P.3d 1122 
(refusing to consider matters raised for the first time in the reply brief). 
9. Even if Petitioners' claims regarding procedural due process were not waived and 
had merit, which is unclear in light of the fact that Petitioners do not adequately brief this issue, 
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fail to cite any case law, or quote from the due process clause of the Utah or United States 
Constitution, it is clear that Petitioners were afforded an opportunity to supplement the record 
and raise issues in the RAA relating to any new information submitted after the close of the 
public comment period. 
I 0. Petitioners were on notice that additional information had been submitted, as it 
was referenced multiple times in the response to comments document UDAQ issued in 
conjunction with the final Holly AO. Petitioners also had access to UDAQ's permitting file after 
the Holly AO was issued before the deadline for filing their RAA. 
11. Moreover, this tribunal has allowed arguments that were not reasonably 
ascertainable to be raised in the RAA, for the first time, in accordance with Utah Code Section 
l 9-1-301.5(6)(c)(ii), and allowed the parties to supplement the record via motion in accordance 
with Section 19-1-301.5(8)(c). This tribunal has also waived any page limits to allow the parties 
the opportunity to fully develop any claims that arose either during the public comment period, 
or after. 
12. Petitioners are incorrect that their due process rights have been implicated in this 
case.
7 Any claims or issues that were reasonably ascertainable during the public comment period 
must have been raised in Petitioners' comments. Any claims that were not reasonably 
ascertainable during the public comment period could be included for the first time in the 
Petitioners' RAA but may not appear for the first time in Petitioners' briefing on the merits. 
Petitioners have failed to demonstrate how, in light of this tribunal ' s treatment of the claims in 
accordance with 19-1-301.5, any procedural due process rights have been violated. 
7 To the extent Petitioners claim that permit review adjudication statute and rules violate the due 
process protections of the Utah and United States Constitutions, such claims are beyond the 
jurisdiction of the ALJ to decide in this permit review proceeding. See e.g. , Nebeker v. Utah 
State Tax Comm' n, 200 I UT 74, ,I 23, 34 P.3d 180. 
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V. Scope of Proceedings; Regulatory Background; and EPA Role 
1. The evidence Petitioners presented in this matter stands for the self-evident, 
general proposition that air pollution is harmful to human health and to the environment. [IR at 
009140-48; IR at 009139-45; IR at 009144-45; IR at 009145-47.] On that point, there is no 
disagreement. 
2. In enacting the Utah Air Conservation Act, the Utah Legislature declared: " lt is 
the policy of thi s state and the purpose of [the Utah Air Conservation Act] to achieve and 
maintain levels of air quality which will protect human health and safety, and to the greatest 
degree practicable, prevent injury to plant and animal life and property, foster the comfort and 
convenience of the people, promote the economic and social development of this state, and 
facilitate the enjoyment of the natural attractions of this state." Section 19-2-101 (2), Utah Code 
Ann. 
3. The Utah Legislature further declared that the "purpose" of the Utah Air 
Conservation Act is to "(a) provide for a coordinated statewide program of air pollution 
prevention, abatement, and control; (b) prov ide for an appropriate distribution of responsibilities 
among the state and local units of government; ( c) fac ilitate cooperation across jurisdictional 
lines in dealing with problems of air pollution not confined within single jurisdictions; and (d) 
provide a framework within which air quality may be protected and consideration given to the 
public interest at all levels of planning and development within the state." Section 19-2-1 01 ( 4), 
Utah Code Ann . 
4. Similarly, in enacting the Clean Air Act, the Congress found, among other things: 
(2) that the growth in the amount and complexity of air pollution brought about by 
urbanization, industrial development, and the increasing use of motor vehicles, 
has resulted in mounting dangers to the public health and welfare, including 
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injury to agricultural crops and livestock, damage to and the deterioration of 
property, and hazards to air and ground transportation; [and] 
(3) that air pollution prevention (that is, the reduction or elimination, through any 
measures, of the amount of pollutants produced or created at the source) and air 
pollution control at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local 
governments .... 
42 U.S.C. § 740 I (a). 
5. Congress also stated that the "primary goal" of the Clean Air Act is to "encourage 
or otherwise promote reasonable Federal, State, and local governmental actions ... for pollution 
prevention." 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (c). 
6. In these proceedings, I am charged to conduct a permit review adjudicative 
proceeding in this matter in accordance with Utah Code Ann., § 19-1-301 .5 and Utah Adm in. 
Code R305-7. 
7. As a matter of law, any source's compliance with the permitting requirements set 
forth in the Clean Air Act and the Utah Air Conservation Act satisfies the public policy of 
protecting the public and the environment from the harms of air pollution. 
8. The question before me in these proceedings is not whether air pollution is 
harmful but rather whether the Holly AO is in compliance with applicable laws, rules, and 
regulations. Based on the evidence in this record, the unavoidable conclusion is that the Holly 
AO is in compliance with the law, all as explained in more detai l below. 
9. The conclusions reached in these proposed Findings and Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, to the effect that the Holly AO is in compliance with all applicable laws, rules, and 
regulations, notwithstanding Petitioners' objections, find additional suppo1t in the EPA 's 
independent review of the Holly AO and that agency's conclusion that the Holly AO may be 
issued. See EPA Comment Letters [IR004001-004005; IR007840-00784 l]. In Alaska Dep 't of 
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Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 124 S. Ct. 983 (2004), the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that EPA is entitled to review the reasonableness of state permitting authorities' BACT 
determinations under the PSD program and has authority to issue stop construction orders if it 
reasonably believes that a BACT designation is erroneous or unreasonable. The CAA also 
provides EPA with concurrent enforcement authority that is directly applicable to the present 
proceeding. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7477, 7413(a)(5)(A) (describing the enforcement options available to 
the EPA when it finds that a state is not complying with any requirement of the CAA with 
respect to construction of a new source or modification of an existing source). See Jennifer A . 
Davis Foster, Note, EPA Oversight in Determining Best Available Control Technology: The 
Supreme Court Determines the Proper Scope of Enforcement, 69 Missouri L. Rev., Issue 4, at I 
(Fall 2004). Based on the foregoing, it is clear that if in EPA's independent judgment, any of the 
objections and issues Petitioners have briefed on the merits were meritorious, EPA had an 
independent duty and authority to pursue such issues. EPA declined to do so even after being 
given the opportunity in connection with the Holly AO . 
I 0. In this permit review adjudicative proceeding, we have a somewhat unusual 
situation in administrative law where not one but two regulatory agencies with significant 
technical expertise and concurrent (and somewhat overlapping) legal jurisdiction have been 
involved in the procedural and substantive process that led to the issuance of the Permit. This 
situation provides a second layer of regulatory oversight to ensure that the applicable procedural 
and substantive requirements of the Clean Air Act, as adopted and enforced through the Utah Air 
Conservation Act in the spirit of "cooperative federalism," have been met. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FOR CLAIMS PETITIONERS 
FAILED TO BRIEF ON THE MERITS 
I. Petitioners' RAA contains a number of claims that Petitioners did not raise in 
their briefing on the merits. Those claims are listed in a Table of Waived Claims attached hereto 
as Appendix A, incorporated herein by this reference. 
2. Both Holly and UDAQ pointed out in their briefing and at oral argument that 
Petitioners failed to brief these claims and therefore wa ived such claims. Petitioners did not 
rebut this argument and at oral argument conceded that this tribunal need not address claims they 
did not brief. 
3. Because Petitioners failed to brief these claims, they should be dismissed with 
prejudice on two separate and independent grounds: (a) waiver; and (b) failure to carry 
Petitioners' burden of proof. See, e.g., See Sierra Club v. BOGM, 2012 UT 73, ~ 3 I; Kennon, 
2009 UT 77, ~ 29; W. Jordan City, 2006 UT 27, ~ 29; Anderson v. Kriser, 2009 UT App 319, *2 
n.3 ("[A]rguments not raised in an appellant's initial brief are waived."); Brown v. Glover, 2000 
UT 89, ~ 23, 16 P.3d 540 ("Generally, issues raised by an appellant in the reply brief that were 
not presented in the opening brief are considered waived and will not be considered by the 
appellate court."). 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FOR CLAIMS PETITIONERS 
BRIEFED ON THE MERITS 
Petitioners' remaining claims can be grouped into eleven independent claims, each of 
which will be addressed below. Before addressing the specific claims, I would like to make the 
following general findings of fact relating to the regulatory context, inasmuch as the general aim 
of many of Petitioners' comments go to the issue of the harms caused by air pollution. 
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I. UDAO Is Properly Regulating the Holly Refining Flares as Required by Subpart 
Ja . 
Petitioners' first specific argument on the merits goes to the interplay between the 
regulation of the Holly flares, as required by law, and the Holly AO at issue in this matter. 
Petitioners argue that the Holly AO is inva lid because UDAQ did not "properly regulate" the 
refining flares by explicitly listing and explaining every applicable provision of the regulation 
governing the flares (New Source Performance Standards ("NSPS"), 40 C.F .R. Part 60, Subpart 
Ja ("Subpart Ja"). [Petitioners ' Opening Brief at 4-12.] More specifically, Petitioners argue that 
"the Director has fa iled to specify in the AO - or elsewhere - the exact conditions of Subpart Ja 
that apply to the Holly Refining Flares and has failed to impose these conditions on the faci lity. 
Without particular AO terms and conditions that reflect the relevant Supbart Ja standards on the 
flares, the Heavy Crude Project will not meet the requirements of Utah Adm in Code R307-40 l-
8(1)(b)(vi), Rule 307-401-8( l)(a) and Rule R307-401-8(5)." [Petitioners' Opening Briefat4-5.] 
For the reasons set forth below, this argument should be rejected . 
A. Findings of Fact 
I. Holly's NOi acknowledges that Subpart Ja applies to the refinery generally and to 
the flares specifica lly. [See IR002866-87, Holly's July 2012 NOi ("The fo llowing Subpa1ts are 
applicable to the proposed project...Subpart Ja- Standards of Performance for Petroleum 
Refineries"); IR002868-69 ("The provisions of [ 40 C.F .R. Part 60 Subpart Ja] apply to the new 
FCCU and fue l gas combustion devices, including flares and process heaters.");8 IR002962 
8 When Holly submitted its NOI, Subpart Ja included all flares in its definition of "fuel gas 
combustion device." See 40 C.F.R. § 60. 10I a(2012). However, during Holly' s permit review 
process, the regulation was revised to separate fue l gas combustion devices from flares . 40 
C.F.R. § 60.10I a(2013). Despite this change in the regu lations, in Holly's NOi and the Source 
Plan Review, flares were grouped together with other fuel gas combustion devices and subject to 
the same emission requirements. See IR005871-72. 
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("Because the flare is located at a petroleum refinery, the flare must comply with the 
requirements and limitations presented in 40 C.F.R. Part 60 Subpart Ja.")]. 
2. Holly's NOI also incorporated emission limits derived from Subpart Ja for 
combustion devices. [IR002868-69, Holly's July 2012 NOI ("Holly will comply with the 
following emission limitations ... Holly shall not burn in any new fuel gas combustion device any 
fuel gas that contains H2S in excess of 162 ppmv determined hourly on a three-hour rolling 
average basis and H2S in excess of 60 ppmv determined daily on a 365 successive calendar day 
rolling average basis.").] 
3. UDAQ independently recognized in the Source Plan Review that Subpart Ja 
applies to the Holly Refinery and that Holly is subject to the emission limitations contained in 
Subpart Ja. [IR00857 l -8572, Source Plan Review ("40 CFR 60 Subpart Ja: The provisions of 
this subpart apply to the new FCCU and fuel gas combustion devices, including flares and 
process heaters. Holly Refinery will comply with the following emission limitations ... Holly 
Refinery shall not burn in any new fuel gas combustion device any fuel gas that contains H2S in 
excess of 162 ppmv determined hourly on a three-hour rolling average basis and H2S in excess of 
60 ppmv determined daily on a 365 successive calendar day rolling average basis.").] UDAQ 
also made clear that Subpart Ja applies to the flares in its Response to Comments Memo. 
[IR009183, Response to Comments Memo ("NSPS Subpa1t Ja applies to the Woods Cross 
refinery generally and to both the No1th and South Flares.")]. 
4. UDAQ determined that Holly is required to comply with Subpart Ja whether or 
not such emission limits were contained in the Holly AO. [See IR009 I 83, Response to 
Comments Memo ("Regardless of whether the requirements [ofNSPS] are in the AO, Holly 
Refinery must comply with all applicable subparts ... Holly Refinery is not in violation of any 
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federal limits."); IR009252, Holly AO (listing Subpart Jain Section 111 , "Applicable Federal 
Requirements").] 
5. The EPA made no comments regarding issues with the applicability or 
enforcement of Subpart Ja as to the Holly Refinery generally or as to the AO specifically. [See 
IR00400 I, EPA First Comment Letter; JR007840-7841 , EPA Second Comment Letter.] 
B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation 
6. Petitioners preserved this argument in accordance with 19-1-301.5( 4) by raising 
the issue during the public comment period. [See IR007858-7860, Petitioners' Second Comment 
Letter.] 
C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof 
7 . Petitioners assert that this issue is purely a question of law-whether UDAQ is 
required to explicitly outline and explain every applicable provision of Subpart Ja in the Holly 
AO. Petitioners concede that Subpart Ja applies to Holly's flares and other combustion sources, 
but argue that the AO is deficient because each applicable provision is not explained in detail in 
the Holly AO. 
8. The question of whether Utah law requires applicable NSPS provisions to be 
listed in approval orders is a question of law that the agency has been given discretion to 
interpret and so shall be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Whether UDAQ correctly 
applied a particular NSPS provision and whether Holly is in compliance with NSPS are mixed 
questions of law and fact that are reviewed for reasonableness and whether there is substantial 
evidence in the record to support the determinations. Whether Holly is in compliance with 
subpart Ja is a question that is specifically handled by DAQ's enforcement section and therefore 
beyond the scope of these proceedings . 
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9. Jn their briefing, Petitioners failed to reference any of the specific evidence in 
Holly's NOJ in which Holly recognized it was subject to Subpart Ja. 
10. Additionally, Petitioners' reference to other evidence in the record is re legated to 
footnotes and lacks any description of the document being referenced. 
11. Because Petitioners have omitted multiple pieces of evidence from their analysis 
that show Subpart Ja does apply to the Holly Refinery, they have failed to meet their burden of 
proof on this issue for the reasons described in more detail above. 
D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits 
12. Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is 
not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' arguments should fail on 
the merits for the independent reasons discussed below. 
13. Subpart Ja is one of many NSPS the EPA has promulgated for particular types of 
new or modified sources that EPA has determined are major emitters of criteria air pollutants, 
such as petroleum refineries. See generally 42 U.S .C. § 7411, Standards of Performance for 
New Stationary Sources (granting the administrator of EPA the authority to regulate ce11ain 
sources). The applicability of a particular NSPS to a particular source is often specifica lly 
outlined in the text of the regulation app licable to that source category. See e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 
60.1 00a (defining modification for purposes of Subpart Ja applicability). The applicability of 
NSPS is evaluated separately fro m other Clean Air Act regulations such as the Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration Program ("PSD"), which is implemented through individual pre-
construction permits like the Holly AO. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475, 7503 (setting forth the 
pre-construction permitting requirements). 
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14. Unlike the PSD program, the NSPS regulations apply to a source whether or not 
that source is undergoing a modification requiring pre-construction approval. See, e.g., 40 
C.F.R. § 60.1 (a) (defining NSPS applicability); id. § 60.2 (defining when "construction" or 
"modification" takes places for purposes ofNSPS applicability); Envt'I Defense v. Duke Energy 
Corp., 549 U.S. 561 , 577-78 (2007) (recognizing the distinction between the NSPS and PSD 
regulations). Therefore, NSPS compliance and/or applicabi lity determinations are not dependent 
upon inclusion of the NSPS regulation's language in the pre-construction permit. Compliance or 
non-compliance with NSPS is entirely separate from the PSD permitting process . 
15. The oversight of Holly's compliance with Subpart Ja is a matter for UDAQ's 
enforcement section. This is true regardless of whether the provisions of Subpart Ja are in the 
permit or not. [IR009183, Response to Comments Memo ("Regardless of whether the 
requirements [ofNSPS] are in the AO, Holly Refinery must comply with all applicable 
subparts . .. Holly Refinery is not in violation of any federal limits.").] 
16 . If Holly were in violation of Subpart Ja, contrary to UDAQ's determination, the 
Clean Air Act provides Petitioners with a separate remedy in the form of a citizen suit under 
Section 304 of the Clean Air Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (Clean Air Act citizen suit 
provision). Challenging compliance with Subpart Ja in this permit review proceeding is 
therefore misplaced. 
17. Petitioners also are incorrect in their assertion that R307-415 of the Utah 
Administrative Code requires all federally-applicable NSPS requirements to be included in the 
Holly AO. The regulations Petitioners cite apply only to Title V operating permits- not 
approval orders. The Title V operating permit regulations are independent of the approval order 
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pre-construction permit regulations. Compare Utah Admin. Code R307-415 (Title V operating 
permit regulations), with id. R307-401 (pre-construction approval order permit regulations). 
18. The purpose of Title V is to consolidate all applicable federal and state regulatory 
requirements into one permit. See 40 C.F.R. § 71.1 (b) ("All sources subject to the operating 
permit requirements of title V and this part shall have a permit to operate that assures compliance 
by the source with all applicable requirements."). Thus, there is no legal requirement to include 
all applicable NSPS regulations in an approval order. 
19. Accordingly, Petitioners' arguments that the applicable provisions of Subpart Ja 
must be included in the Holly AO fail on the merits and should be dismissed. 
II. The North Flare is Subject to Subpart Ja. 
I. The Petitioners next contend that the Director erred in reversing his position 
regarding the applicability of Subpart Jato the North Flare. [Petitoners' Opening Brief at 12-
15.] For the reasons stated below, this argument should be rejected. 
A. Findings of Fact 
2. The Director determined that Holly must comply with all applicable subparts of 
the NSPS regulations and that Holly was not in violation of any federal limits. [JR.009183, 
Response to Comments Memo ("Regardless of whether the requirements [ of NSPS] are in the 
AO, Holly Refinery must comply with all applicable subparts ... Holly Refinery is not in violation 
of any federal limits.").] 
3. The Director determined that the North Flare was not being modified as part of 
this project and therefore was outside the scope of the permitting action. [IR009183, Response 
to Comments Memo ("The North Flare is not being modified as part of the project proposed by 
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Holly Refinery in its NOi, so it is outside the scope of this permit action. NSPS Subpart Ja 
applies to the Woods Cross refinery generally and to both the North and South Flares." ).] 
4. According to undisputed evidence in the record, Holly's North Flare was subject 
to and in compliance with Subpart J and A of the NSPS regulations. [IR007999, Email 
Correspondence between Eric Benson and Camron Harry ("Holly 's North Flare was appl icable 
and compliant w ith 40 CFR 60 Subpart A & J upon startup.").] 
5. A consent decree entered in 2008 between Holly and EPA required that Holly 
bring the North Flare into compliance with applicable NSPS standards. [See IR004800-4801 , 
Consent Decree (requiring flaring devices to become NSPS compliant).] 
6. As of December 2008, Holly reported to the EPA that its North Flare was in 
compliance with NSPS. [See IR007946, IR00795 I , Semi-Annual Progress Report to EPA and 
UDAQ re Consent Decree (reporting that "Performance tests for both North and South Flares 
[were] conducted December I 0, 2008" and " [the] North Flare [ was] subject to NSPS as of date 
of[Consent Decree] entry, e liminate all routinely-generated gas" and compliance status was 
"Complete .... [N]o routinely-generated gas sent to the flare. ").] 
7. In connection with its independent review of the entire Holly AO, the EPA made 
no comments about the No1th Flare or Subpart Ja, compliance with the Consent Decree, or any 
of the other related issues raised by Petit ioners here. [See IR00400 1, EPA First Comment Letter; 
I R007840-7841, EPA Second Comment Letter.] 
B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation 
8. Petitioners preserved this argument in accordance with 19-1 -301.5(4) by raising 
the issue during the public comment period. [See IR007858, IR007864, Petitioners' Second 
Comment Letter.] 
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C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof 
9. Petitioners' argument that the Director reversed his position re lative to the North 
Flare is a question of fact and the Petitioners bear the burden to demonstrate that the Director's 
decision is not supported by substantial ev idence in the record and was an abuse of discretion. 
I 0. Petitioners, in the ir briefing, fai led to marshal all of the evidence that supported 
the Director's ultimate conclusion that Subpart Ja applied to the North Flare and that Holly was 
in compliance with this Subpart. By contrast, Holly did marshal a ll of the evidence in its 
briefing. 
11. Nothing in the record supports the asse1tion that the Director changed his mind 
about the applicability of Subpa1t Ja. From the beginning of the project, all parties agreed that 
this NSPS provision applied to the Holly Refinery. 
12. Accordingly, Petitioners fa iled to satisfy their burden of proof for this claim. 
D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits 
13. Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is 
not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fa il on the merits 
for the independent reasons discussed below. 
14. The legislative intent of a permit review adjudicative process is to allow for an 
evolving understanding of a project before any fina l decisions are made. The Director may, at 
the beginning of a project, take a position in light of the information in the record at the time but 
later reverse that position based on additional information presented during the public comment 
period or otherwise, such as information provided by the source upon request. The question that 
must be answered in this permit rev iew adjudication proceeding is whether the Director's final 
decision to issue the Holly AO is supported by substantial evidence in the record. This question 
32 
ADJ011 567 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
remains the same whether or not the Director may have changed his mind during the permitting 
process. In fact, the entire point of the permitting process as defined by the Utah Legislature is 
to allow for well-informed administrative decisionmaking. To the extent that the Director may 
have reached a different view on any given point suggests that the process is working as 
intended . 
15. In this case, the Petitioners do not present any evidence that there was a reversal 
of position with respect to the applicability of Subpa11 Jato the North Flare. To the contrary, all 
of the evidence in the record supports the position that the Director ultimately took, which was 
that Subpart Ja applied to the North Flare. 
16. Petitioners argue that the North Flare was modified when all gases from the South 
Flare were routed to the North Flare and this modification triggered NSPS Subpart Ja 
applicability. [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 13.] 
17. Regardless of whether the North Flare was modified, the record evidence 
demonstrates that Holly and the Director agreed that Subpart Ja applied for this project. 
[IR009 l 83; IR009183; IR004800-4801 ; IR007946, IR007951.] Therefore, any evidence that a 
modification may have occurred on the North Flare would only be superfluous, not 
contradictory . 
18. The EPA raised no procedural or substantive comments regarding with UDAQ's 
handling of Subpart Ja. [See IR004001 , EPA First Comment Letter; IR007840-784 l , EPA 
Second Comment Letter.] 
19. The substantial weight of the evidence suppo11s the Director's ultimate 
determination that Subpart Ja applies to Holly's North Flare and Petitioners' arguments that the 
Director contradicted himself should be dismissed with prejudice . 
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III. A BACT Analysis Was Not Required for the North Flare. 
I. Petitioners argue that UDAQ erred in failing to perform or require a BACT 
analysis for the North Flare. [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 15-16] . For the reasons set forth 
below, this argument should be rejected. 
A. Findings of Fact 
2. Holly did not propose any physical modification of the North Flare as part of the 
project approved in the Holly AO. [IR009183, Response to Comments Memo ("The North F lare 
is not being modified as part of the project proposed by Holly Refinery in its NOi, so it is outside 
the scope of this permit action. NSPS Subpart Ja applies to the Woods Cross refinery generally 
and to both the North and South Flares."); fR009189, Response to Comments Memo ("Because 
neither the North Flare nor the SRU will undergo any physical change or experience an increase 
in emissions as a result of Holly Refinery's proposed project, the 'emission units' are not subject 
to the BACT analysis requirements in the PSD rules.").] 
3. UDAQ did not anticipate any increase in overall flare emissions as a result of the 
project. [IR00856 l , Source Plan Review ("there is no reason to assume that upset condition 
emissions will be any greater after the proj ect is complete than before the project.").] 
4. The North Flare is already subject to and in compliance with NSPS requirements. 
[JR009 l 83, Response to Comments Memo ("NSPS Subpart Ja applies to the Woods Cross 
refinery generally and to both the North and South Flares.").] 
5. UDAQ determined that BACT for flares was compliance with Subpart Ja. 
[IR0085 l 6-l 7, Source Plan Review ("The only technically feas ible control options for emissions 
of all pollutants from flares are: (1) equipment design specifications and good combustion work 
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practices ... ; and (2) flare gas recovery systems ... DAQ NSR recommends compliance with the 
requirements of 40 CFR 60 Subpart .la as BACT.").] 
6. According to the record, prior to the authorization of this project, all of the flare 
gases were being routed to the North Flare. [1R08200, Holly' s first revised netting analysis 
("currently al I gases are routed to the north flare").] 
7. The EPA raised no procedural or substantive comments regarding UDAQ's 
analysis regarding BACT for the North Flare. [See IR004001, EPA First Comment Letter; 
IR007840-7841, EPA Second Comment Letter.] 
B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation 
8. Petitioners preserved this argument in accordance with 19-1-301.5(4) by raising 
the issue during the public comment period. [See IR007858, IR007864, Petitioners' Second 
Comment Letter.] 
C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof 
9 . Petitioners' claim that UDAQ erred in failing to perform a BACT analysis on the 
North Flare is a mixed question of law and fact. There is also a dispute regarding the correct 
interpretation of the regulations that trigger BACT, which is a question of law reviewed under a 
clearly erroneous standard. The application of that law to the facts in this case triggers the mixed 
question standard of review in which the ALJ reviews the Director' s determination for 
reasonableness. 
I 0. Petitioners failed to marshal all of the evidence related to their claim . 
11. Specifically, Petitioners failed to cite UDAQ's finding that BACT for flares is 
compliance with Subpart .la and that the North Flare is already subject to NSPS requirements . 
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12. Accordingly, Petitioners failed to satisfy their burden of proof on this claim and it 
can be dismissed on this basis. 
D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits 
13. Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is 
not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits 
for the independent reasons discussed below. 
I 4. In the briefing on this issue, Petitioners erroneously conflate the same definition 
of modification they cite in their NSPS arguments. However, a "modification" that triggers a 
BACT analysis is different than what is required to trigger NSPS applicability. See, e.g., Envt'l 
Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 , 577 (2007) ("The 1980 PSD regulations on 
' modification' simply cannot be taken to track the Agency's regulatory definition under the 
NSPS."). 
15. A modification for purposes of BACT applicability occurs when a person 
" intend[s] to make modifications or relocate an existing installation which will or might 
reasonably be expected to increase the amount or change the effect of, or the character of, air 
contaminants discharged." Utah Admin. Code R307-401-3(l)(a) (emphasis added). An 
" installation" is defined as "a discrete process with identifiable emissions which may be part of a 
larger industrial plant" and a "modification" is defined as "any planned change in a source which 
results in a potential increase of emission." Id. R307-I 00-2. 
16. Accordingly, for there to be a "modification" triggering BACT applicability, there 
must be (I) a planned change in an emissions unit that (2) is reasonably expected to increase the 
amount or character of the emissions. The federal regulations contain similar requirements. See 
40 C.F.R. § 52.21 U)(3) (BACT is required on units that experience a net emissions increase "as a 
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result of a physical change or change in the method of operation in the unit."); 71 Fed. Reg . 
54,235, 54,240 (Sept. 14, 2006) ("We further note that our current rules do not require BACT or 
LAER at unchanged units .... "); Letter from Robert B. Miller, Chief of the Permits and Grants 
Section of the EPA to Lloyd Eagan, Director of the Bureau of Air Management in Wisconsin 
(Feb. 8, 2000) ("[W]here an emissions unit has not undergone a physical or operational change, 
BACT does not apply."). 
17. Here, UDAQ specifically found that Holly was not proposing any changes to its 
North Flare as part of the project. A shift of emissions from one flare to the other does not result 
in increased emissions, only redistributed emissions. In its NSPS regulations, the EPA discussed 
the analogous situation of tw o interconnected flares, stating "that interconnections between flares 
will not alter the cumulative amount of gas being flared (i.e., interconnecting two fl ares does not 
result in an emissions increase relative to the two single fl ares prior to interconnection) ... . 
Considering this, we agree that the interconnection of two flares does not necessarily result in a 
modification of the flare and we have specifically excluded flare interconnections from the 
modification provisions.... [W]e agree that connections that do not increase the emissions from 
the flare should not trigger a modification .... " 77 Fed. Reg. 56,422, 56,438 (Sept. I 2, 2012). 
Petitioners' argument is not the law. 
18. Moreover, to the extent Petitioners are arguing that the re-route of gases to the 
North Flare constitutes a change in operation, such a change occurred well before Holly initiated 
the current black wax crude project. This is evidenced by the language Petitioners themselves 
quote which reflects that "currently all gases are routed to the north flare." [IR08200, Holly's 
first revised netting analysis (emphasis added).] 
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19. Without a change in operation or an increase in emissions for the North Flare, 
Petitioners' argument (that a "modification" of the North Flare was part of this project triggering 
a BACT analysis for the North Flare) is not suppo1ted by the record and should be rejected. 
20. Even if Petitioners could demonstrate by substantial evidence that Holly proposed 
to modify the North Flare, conducting a BACT analysis on the North Flare would be superfluous 
because the North Flare is already subject to Subpart Ja, which itself constitutes BACT for 
Holly's flares. [See IR0085 I 6-17, Source Plan Review ("The only technically feasible control 
options for emissions of all pollutants from flares are: (1) equipment design specifications and 
good combustion work practices ... ; and (2) flare gas recovery systems .. . DAQ NSR recommends 
compliance with the requirements of 40 CFR 60 Subpart Ja as BACT."); see also IR009183, 
Response to Comments Memo ("NSPS Subpart Ja applies to the Woods Cross refinery generally 
and to both the North and South Flares.").] Petitioners' argument fails for this independent 
reason as well. 
21. Finally, the record suggests that Petitioners' argument is ultimately moot because 
Holly is required by the recently-adopted PM2_5 SIP to install flare gas recovery technology at the 
Refinery,9 which Petitioners do not contest is the most stringent pollution control device 
currently available for flares. 10 [See IR0085 l 6, Source Plan Review (referring to flare gas 
recover as "the top control technology").] This requirement is binding on Holly regardless of 
whether it is explicitly stated in the Holly AO. As such, even if Petitioners' argument were 
9 The Utah PM2_5 SIP requires "all major source petroleum refineries in or affecting a designated 
PM2.s non-atta inment area within the State shall install and operate a flare gas recovery system." 
See Utah PM2_5 SIP, Section TX, Part H, p. 43. 
1
° Flare gas recovery is a system that captures gases that would otherwise be combusted in the 
flare and redirects those gases as fuel sources for other refinery operations. This reduces the 
emissions associated with flaring and is an economic use of excess fuel gas. 
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correct, there is no need for a remand regarding control technology on the North Flare because 
there are no additional pollution controls that could be required of Holly . 
22. Accordingly, Petitioners have failed to demonstrate with substantial evidence in 
the record as a whole that UDAQ erred in not performing a BACT analysis on the North Flare 
and this claim should be dismissed with prejudice on the merits. 
IV. Emissions From Holly's Flares Were Properly Calculated and Are Regulated in 
Accordance With the Unavoidable Breakdown Rule. 
1. Petitioners next argue that the emissions from the flares have not been properly 
calculated and that UDAQ has not been appropriately regulating the flares in accordance with the 
Unavoidable Breakdown Rule ("UBR"). [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 16-22.] For the reasons 
stated below, this argument should be rejected . 
A. Findings of Fact 
2. In the Holly AO, UDAQ imposed a number of emission limits that included 
emissions from the flares, thereby limiting the routine emissions from the flares. [See IR009225, 
Holly AO ("Previous exclusions from the AO emission caps will be removed therefore the AO 
emission caps will be source wide caps."); IR009240, Holly AO ("PM10 Combustion Emissions 
Cap Sources ... Flares."); IR009247, Holly AO ("PM10 emissions from all combustion sources 
shall not exceed 4 7.5 tons per rolling 12-month period or 0.13 tpd."); IR009245, Holly AO ("The 
emission of SO2 into the atmosphere from all sources ( excluding routine turnaround maintenance 
emissions) shall not exceed 110.3 tons per rolling 12-month period or 0.31 tons per day."); 
IR009245, Holly AO ("Emissions of SO2 shall be limited as follows ... All other sources 0.21 
(tpd) 74.9 (tpy)."); IR009245, Holly AO ("For all the above listed emission points a CEM shall 
be used to determine compliance as outlined in 11.B.3.e."); JR009247-48, Holly AO ("Total 24-
hour PM10 emissions for the sources shall be calculated by adding the daily results of the above 
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PM 10 emissions equations for natural gas, plant gas, and fuel oil combustion. Results shall be 
tabulated for every day, and records shall be kept."); IROO8568, Source Plan Review (discussion 
of inclusion of flares into S02 and PM emission caps).] 
3. In response to Petitioners' comments that the emission estimates for the flares 
were inaccurate because they did not include upset emissions, UDAQ explained that Holly's 
emissions were capped and any exceedance due to an upset would constitute an exceedance of 
the cap. [JROO9187, Response to Comments Memo ("The commenter is correct that there are no 
limits on the flares. This is because the flares are in place as control device[s] for upset 
conditions. However Holly Refinery does have to comply with the requirements of 40 CFR 60 
Subpart Ja. The Commenter is incorrect that ' upset' conditions are not addressed ... 'the 
refineries were allowed maximum never-to-be exceeded daily limits of PM 10, S02, NOx based on 
the apparent variability. Emissions were capped at these maximum levels from the sources that 
could have their emissions metered by fuel metering/and calculations and from the other sources 
that would be stack tested every 1-3 years."' ( quoting Utah SIP § IX.A.6.c.(2) (1991 )).] 
4. The assumption in determining the PTE for the flares was that upset emissions 
would be zero because they are not part of normal refinery operation. [1ROO2852, July 2012 NOI 
("PM10 and PM2_5 emissions for the Woods cross refinery flares were assumed to be zero."); see 
also IRO02857, July 2012 NOJ ("Startup, shutdown, malfunction events were considered to be 
zero.").] 
5. According to the evidence in the record, the PTE for the flares was calculated 
based on the purge gas flowing through the flare and planned startups and shutdowns, but did not 
include calculations for upset emissions. [IROO3 l 75-76, July 2012 NOJ (recognizing emissions 
from the flares of S02 were estimated based on the assumption of 1700 scfl1 non-upset 
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throughput to the flare. This is the "purge gas" amount that must run to the flare to keep it from 
backdrafting); JR009196, Response to Comments ("startup and shutdown emissions were 
included in the analysis"); IR008560-8561, Source Plan Review ("to be conservative and 
representative of potential increases in emissions from SU and SD, UDAQ and Holly Refinery 
have agreed to include these emissions in Step I of the PSD and NNSR applicability analysis"); 
IR008522, Source P lan Review ("To ensure proper flare operation, Holly Refinery will install 
flow meters and gas combustion monitors on the flare gas line."); IR009211 ("The combustion 
of flue gas through the pilot flame is accounted for in the emission calculations.").] 
6. According to the record, upset emissions from flares are unpredictable and 
uncontrollable because the flare is the safety valve for excess refinery gases generated in a period 
of malfunction. [IR0085 l 6, Source Plan Review ("The flare system at Holly Refinery provides 
for the safe disposal of hydrocarbon gases which are vented automatically from process units 
through pressure relief valves, control valves or are manually vented."); IR00856 I , Source Plan 
Review ("Section 3.6 of the July 20 12 NOi lists upset conditions for both the No1th and South 
Flares. These upset conditions (malfunctions) do not include normal process flow combustion at 
the flares and there is no reason to assume that upset condition emissions will be any greater 
after the project is complete than before the project. Although these emissions have not been 
included in the netting analysis, they are noted below for reference.").] 
7. The Holly AO does not contain exceptions for emissions due to malfunctions at 
the refinery; such excess emissions are subject to the UBR. [IR009 I 96, Response to Comments 
Memo ("All limits of the permit apply at all times, which include periods of startup, shutdown 
and malfunction. The IT A contains no exclusion for these events."); IR0092 11 ("Flare 
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emissions during malfunction/upset conditions are regu lated through R307-107 (ITA Condition 
11.3).").] 
8. In connection with its independent review of the Holly AO, the EPA raised no 
procedural or substantive comments regarding with UDAQ's regulation of the Refinery Flares, 
including the UBR. [See IR00400 I , EPA First Comment Letter; IR007840-784 J, EPA Second 
Comment Letter.] 
B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation 
9. Petitioners have partially preserved this argument in accordance with Section I 9-
1-301.5( 4). In their comments, Petitioners challenged the calculation of the PTE for the flares 
but said nothing about misapplication or noncompliance with the UBR. [See IR009056-9057, 
Sagady second comment letter.] 
I 0. Petitioners could have reasonably ascertained this issue as the UBR was 
specifically referenced in the !TA. [See IR008453.] 
11. The argument that the issue is preserved because UDAQ referenced the UBR in 
the Response to Comments Memo is misplaced. In the responses, UDAQ simply referenced the 
UBR in response to an entirely unrelated comment. [ See I R0092 I 0-9211, Response to 
Comments Memo (referring to R307- l 07 in response to the comment that "nothing provided by 
the applicant's final revised notice of intent justifies the claimed 98% control efficiency claimed 
for VOC, HAP and CO Destruction efficiency from Applicant's open air flares").] 
I 2. UDAQ's unrelated response does not save Petitioners from the requirement to 
raise their issues and arguments in a way that gives UDAQ notice of the substance of the issue. 
13. To the extent Petitioners argue that the UBR has been violated by Holly or is not 
being enforced by UDAQ, the argument is beyond the scope of what was raised during the 
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comment period and is unpreserved pursuant to Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5( 4). Accordingly, 
it should be dismissed. 
C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof 
14. The claims Petitioners assert (both preserved and unpreserved) regarding the PTE 
for the flares constitute mixed questions of law and fact. The questions of law involve the 
interpretation of the UBR and the regulations and guidance relating to how PTE for flares should 
be calculated-specifically, whether upset emissions must be included in such calculations. The 
application of those laws to the facts of this case and the calculations performed by Holly create 
a mixed question. Accordingly, a reasonableness standard of review shall apply. 
15. Petitioners have fai led to meet their burden of proof for this claim because they 
failed in their briefing to marshal all of the relevant evidence from the record . 
16. Petitioners ignore multiple pieces of evidence that explain how Holly calculated 
the PTE for the flares in accordance with applicable guidance and the UBR. 
17 . Having fa iled to meet their burden of proof, Petitioners' claim should be 
dismissed on this basis. 
D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits 
18 . Even if Petitioners had properly preserved all of their arguments regarding the 
PTE calculations of the flare emissions, and even had carried their burden of proof ( or to the 
extent marshaling is not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law)), Petitioners' 
claims fail on the merits for the independent reasons discussed below . 
i. UBR Application 
19. Petitioners claim that the UBR requires emission limits on sources of malfunction 
emiss ions. Nothing in the plain language of the UBR requires numeric limits on malfunction 
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emissions. Nor is there any other authori ty in support of requiring such a limit as part of the 
UBR. To the extent that Petitioners' arguments constitute a request for rulemaking, they must be 
rejected in these permit review proceedings. 11 
20. In any event, such limits are impossible for malfunction emissions because such 
emissions are, by their very nature, unpredictable and uncontrollable. [See IR008516.] 
21. The UBR simply sets forth criteria that must be met in the event of excess 
malfunction emissions to allow UDAQ the enforcement discretion to forgo monetary penalties. 
See Utah Admin. Code R307-107-I to -3. 
22. Stated differently, the UBR assumes that malfunction emissions are violations of 
an applicable approval order but affords to UDAQ enforcement discretion regarding the 
imposition of fines and penalties if a source is otherwise in compliance with the other 
requirements of the rule, including monitoring and good combustion practices. Utah Adm in. 
Code R307-107-1 to -3 (requiring reporting of breakdown emissions and giving UDAQ 
enforcement discretion). 
23. The limit in the Holly AO for malfunction emissions from the flare is zero tpy, 
which is accounted for in the overall SO2 and PM emission caps. [See IR002857, July 2012 NOi 
("Startup, shutdown, malfunction events were considered to be zero.").] Any violation of those 
limits due to an upset or malfunction subjects Holly to the enforcement discretion of UDAQ 
under the UBR. 
11 Petitioners may not advocate for a rulemaking change in a permit review adjudicative 
proceeding. [See In the Matter of: South Davis Sewer District, Order (Remand to ALJ with 
Directions on Determining Whether There is a Basis to Grant Friends Standing to Intervene), 
March 29, 2011 , p. 11 ("a permitting proceeding is not the appropriate forum in which to 
advance adoption of new rules or challenge existing ones").] Such a request is only proper in a 
ru lemaking proceeding under Utah Code Section 630-3-1 0 I et seq. 
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24. Any enfo rcement action by UDAQ, however, would be an independent 
proceeding separate from this adjudication and not a valid basis to remand the AO. 
ii. Flare PTE 
25. Petitioners challenge the PTE calculations of SO2 and PM from the flares by 
arguing that the PTE inappropriately excluded upset and malfunction emissions. This argument 
fa ils for three reasons. 
26. First, the law does not require the inclusion of upset emissions in a PTE 
calculation for flares because such upset emissions are not considered pa1t of normal operation . 
See Sierra Club v. Wyoming Dep 't of Envtl. Quality, 25 1 P .3d 3 10, 314 (Wyo. 20 11 ) (holding 
that "hypothesizing the worst possible emissions from the worst possible operation is the wrong 
way to calculate potential to emit. .. PTE includes only emissions that occur during normal 
operations" thus "cold start" emissions and "malfunctions" were properly excluded from the 
plant's PTE); see also Alabama Power Co. v. Cost le, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United 
States v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 682 F. Supp. 11 4 1, 1158 (D. Colo. 1988) (" [P]otential to emit 
does not refer to the maximum emissions that can be generated by a source hypothesizing the 
worst conceivable operation. Rather, the concept contemplates the maximum emissions that can 
be generated while operating the source as it is intended to be operated and as it is normally 
operated."). 
27. Holly excluded malfunction emissions from its PTE calculations for the flares 
and, instead, calculated emissions based on the "average non-upset throughput to [the] flare" and 
appropriate emissions factors. [See IR 003 175.] 
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28. Second, Petitioners' arguments challenging the PTE calculations for the flares 
also fail because federally enforceable permit conditions in the Holly AO limit malfunction 
emissions to zero tons per year from the flares. 
29. PTE is defined as: 
the maximum capacity of a stationary source to emit a pollutant under its physical 
and operational design. Any physical or operational limitation on the capacity of 
the source to emit a pollutant, including air pollution control equipment and 
restrictions on hours of operation or on the type or amount of material combusted, 
stored, or processed, shall be treated as part of its design if the limitation or the 
effect it would have on emissions is federally enforceable. 
40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (b)(4) (emphasis added); Utah Adm in. Code R307-101-2 (same definition). 
30. Holly assumed a limit of zero tpy for malfunction emissions, which it factored 
into its emissions totals for the SO2 and PM 1o emission caps in the Holly AO. [See IR002857, 
July 2012 NOi ("Startup, shutdown, malfunction events were considered to be zero.").] The SO2 
and PM 10 emission caps, which include emissions from all combustion sources including flares, 
are federally enforceable operational limitations. [See IR009245, Holly AO (Section 11.B.6.a, 
"The emission of SO2 into the atmosphere from all sources (excluding routine turnaround 
maintenance sessions) shall not exceed 110.3 tons per rolling 12-month period or 0.3 I tons per 
day."); see also IR009247, Holly AO (Section II.B.7.a "PM 10 emissions from all combustion 
sources shall not exceed 47.5 tons per rolling 12-rnonth period.").] 
31. If Holly exceeds its emission caps due to an upset or malfunction, Holly will be in 
violation of its permit and subject to enforcement by UDAQ. [See IR009196, Response to 
Comments Memo ("All limits of the permit apply at all times, which include periods of startup, 
shutdown and malfunction.").] The UBR was put in place to deal with these very kinds of 
emissions. 
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32. Finally, the 240 tpy that Petitioners contend will be emitted every year as a result 
of upset emissions was a conservative estimate of what malfunctions could be- not what they 
actually are. [See IR003780.] 
33. In fact, the emission calculation documentation in the record demonstrates that 
actual recorded historic malfunction emissions from the flare averaged only 34 tpy of SO2 from 
both flares combined. 12 [Id.] 
34. An addition of 34 tpy of SO2 from the flares, even if such emissions were required 
for purposes of calculating PTE, would not have changed the conclusions of the netting analysis 
or made this project major for SO2 given that the netting analysis demonstrated a 150.69 tpy 
overall emission reduction in SO2. [See IR007574-7575.] 
35 . For all of these independent reasons, Petitioners' arguments regarding the PTE for 
the flares fail on the merits and should be dismissed. 
iii. Reporting Requirements for the Flares 
36 . Petitioners' fi nal argument relating to the flares is that the Holly AO lacks limits 
or enforceable reporting requirements for its flares. The substantial weight of record evidence 
shows that this contention is unfounded . 
12 The prediction for malfunction emissions utilized three standard deviations of the average 
actual malfunction emissions to come up with the 120 ton per flare figure. [See IR003780] The 
actual total of SO2 emitted from the North and South Flares combined was: 
12.7 tons of SO2 in 2009 
25.5 tons of SO2 in 2008 
9 1.0 tons of SO2 in 2007 
19.7 tons of SO2 in 2006 
20.8 tons of SO2 in 2005 
Id. Accordingly, contrary to Petitioners' contention that 240 tons of SO2 from the flares will be 
emitted on a yearly basis, the highest emissions in any one given year was only 91 tons and the 
lowest was 12.7 tpy. 
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37. Holly is required to perform continuous emissions monitoring ("CEM") of SO2 
emissions on all sources of SO2, including flares. [IR009245, Holly AO, ("For a ll the above 
li sted emission points a CEM shall be used to determine compliance as outlined in Il.B.3.e.").) 
38. Holly also is required to install "flow meters and gas combustion monitors" on the 
South Flare gas line "to monitor flare combustion efficiency" [IR009251 , Holly AO); and Holly 
is required to calculate PM emissions from all PM sources based on the amount of fuel 
combusted, the totals of which are then added into Holly' s emission cap for PM and reported to 
the state. [IR009245-47, Holly AO.) 
39. Finally, Subpart ]a-applicable to a ll Holly Flares-contains requirements for 
monitoring and recordkeeping. See 40 C.F.R. § 60.107a(a)(2) (requiring owners or operators of 
fl ares to install a continuous monitoring device to measure H2S in the fuel gases going to the 
flare); see also 40 C.F.R. § 60.108a (record keeping and reporting requirements). 
40. These multiple record keeping and reporting requirements all apply to Hol ly's 
flares. Accordingly, Petitioners arguments regarding the flares all fail and should be dismissed 
with prejudice on the merits. 
V. 
I. 
The Record Demonstrates That Holly's Emissions Will Not Cause or Contribute 
to an Exceedance of the NAAOS. 
Petitioners next argue, at some length, that the Holly AO is insufficient to protect 
the short term National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS") because it does not contain 
short term emission limits on all of Holly's emission sources. [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 22-
34.] For the reasons stated below, this argument should be rejected. 
A. Findings of Fact 
2. UDAQ determined that its regulations did not requ ire sho1t term emission limits 
when there was no risk of exceedance of the NAAQS. [IR009186, Response to Comments 
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Memo ("Where it is clear that a source would not cause or contribute to a NAAQS violation, 
there is no free-standing regulation requ iring short-term emissions limits.").] 
3. Based on modeling information provided by Holly and reviewed by UDAQ's 
modeling staff, UDAQ determ ined there was no risk of any exceedance of the NAAQS from 
Holly's proposed project. (IR009 I 90-91, Response to Comments Memo ("Holly Refinery's 
October 9, 2012 memo ... was based on a request by UDAQ for Holly Refinery to submit an 
initial impact analysis based on the July 2012 NOJ. This analysis showed no impact on the 
NAAQS CO, PM 10, NO2, or SO2." ); IR009209, Response to Comments Memo ("This modeling 
analysis demonstrates that the predicted I-hour SO2, concentrations would be 50.4 µg/m3, much 
lower than the NAAQS of 195 µg/m3" ).] 
4. Ho lly submitted its plans for modeling to UDAQ and those plans were approved 
by UDAQ's modeling staff. [IR00031-48, Modeling Protocol (prepared by MS! setting forth the 
plan for the modeling); IR00l 153-54, Letter from UDAQ to Holly (approving of the Modeling 
Protocol submitted for emissions impact modeling); IR003591-97, Tom Orth Memo (analyzing 
Holly ' s modeling and agreeing with results).] 
5. Holly's emission modeling analysis contemplated the maximum emissions that 
Holly could generate on a lb/hr basis, thereby ensuring that any short-term spikes in emissions 
were accounted for in the modeling and would not cause exceedances. (IR002993-96, Ju ly 2012 
NOi (explaining that emissions input for the modeling were measured in lb/hr); IR009209, 
Response to Comments Memo ("This modeling analysis demonstrates that the predicted I-hour 
SO2, concentrations would be 50.4 µg/m3, much lower than the NAAQS of 195 µg/m3").] 
6. Malfunction emissions were not considered in the modeling analysis because 
federal and state guidance exclude malfunction emissions from the modeling protocols . 
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[IR00921 4, Response to Comments Memo (explaining the appl ication of Appendix Wand that 
malfunction emissions need not be included in modeling).] 
7. The results of Holly ' s modeling efforts clearly demonstrated there would be no 
exceedance of the NAAQS, including short-term NAAQS. [IR003017, July 2012 NOi (Table 6-
15) (demonstrating no exceedance ofNAAQS).] 
8. UDAQ determined that Holly's permit application was complete in an email sent 
on July 19, 2014. [See IR003767, email from Camron Harry to Eric Benson, dated July 19, 2012 
("I am notifying you that I have now determined Holly Refinery' s NOI is administratively 
complete.").] 
9. In connection with its independent review of the Holly AO, EPA submitted two 
separate comment letters to UDAQ but did not raise any comments regarding short-term 
NAAQS protection or otherwise exercise EPA's broad oversight or enforcement discretion over 
the final Holly AO for any real or perceived failure to protect the short-term NAAQS. [See 
IR00400 I , EPA First Comment Letter; IR007840-7841, EPA Second Comment Letter.] 
B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation 
10. Petitioners preserved this argument in accordance with 19-1-301.5(4) by raising 
the issue during the public comment period. [See IR00786 l-7863, Petitioners' Second Comment 
Letter.] 
C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof 
11. Petitioners have not satisfied their burden of proof for this argument because they 
have failed to marshal a ll of the evidence that demonstrates the NAAQS wi ll not be exceeded. 
12. While Petitioners cite some of UDAQ's reasoning in the response to comments, 
they failed to marshal the actual modeling evidence showing that short term emissions were 
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calculated on a lb/hr basis. This evidence supports UDAQ's determination that the short-term 
NAAQS were being protected regardless of whether there are short term emission limits in the 
Holly AO. 
13. Having fa iled to provide any contradictory evidence in the record, Petitioners 
cannot satisfy their burden of proof and their claims regarding the NAAQS fail. 
D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits 
14. Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is 
not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits 
for the independent reasons discussed below. 
15. 
i. Short-Term Emission Limits Are Not Required for Minor 
Modifications 
Petitioners contend that short-term emission limits are always required to ensure 
protection of the short-term NAAQS. However, the one-hour NO2 and SO2 guidance documents 
Petitioners rely upon for this contention, [Petitioners' Opening Br. at 23-24], by their terms apply 
only to "major" modifications. See Memorandum from Anne Marie Wood, Air Quality Policy 
Division, to EPA Regional Directors, General Guidance for Implementing the I-hour SO2 
National Ambient Air Quality Standard in Prevention of Significant Deterioration Permits, at 6 
(Aug. 23, 20 I 0) ("We are issuing the following guidance to explain and clarify the procedures 
that may be followed by applicants for Prevention of Significant Deterioration Permits." 
(emphasis added)). 
16. Moreover, the guidance expressly states that it does not bind state permitting 
authorities. See Memorandum from Stephen D. Page, Office of Air Quality Planning and 
Standards, to Regional Air Division Directors, at 2 (Aug. 23, 2010) ("This guidance does not 
bind state and local governments and permit applicants as a matter of law.") . 
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17. According to UDEQ's analysis, Holly' s proposed project fell into the "major" 
category for CO and GHG emissions, not for NOx, SO2, or PM. [IR009186, Response to 
Comments Memo.] 
basis: 
18. Whether a modification is "major" is determined on a pollutant-by-pollutant 
Applicability of the major NSR program must be determined in advance of 
construction and is pollutant-specific. In cases involving existing sources, this 
requires a pollutant-by-pollutant determination of the emissions change, if any, 
that will result from the physical or operational change . . . . Once a modification 
is determined to be major, the PSD requirements apply only to those specific 
pollutants for which there would be a significant net emissions increase. 
67 Fed. Reg. 80,186, 80,188 & n. 5 (Dec. 31, 2002). Because the project is not major for NOx, 
SO2, or PM, the Director, as a matter of law, was not required to adhere to federal guidance or 
impose short-term emissions limits for these pollutants. 13 
13 Petitioners claim that the Utah Supreme Court has "held that BACT emission limits must 
protect short term NAAQS," citing Sierra Club v. Air Quality Board, 2009 UT 76,226 P.3d 719. 
[Petitioners' Opening Br. at 23-27.] Petitioners incorrectly interpret the Court's holding. In that 
case, the court simply observed in dicta "the EPA has described the goals ofBACT emission 
limitations in three-parts: (1) to achieve the lowest percent reduction, (2) to protect short-term 
ambient standards, and (3) to be enforceable as a practical matter." Id. at 734. The court never 
evaluated or held this was a correct interpretation of the relevant regulations. Moreover, the fact 
that a goal of BACT is to protect the short-term NAAQS does not mean that short-term limits 
must invariably be imposed as pa11 of a BACT determination regardless of whether the project 
involves a major modification or poses any actual risk of an exceedance. EPA guidance 
indicates that while any BACT emissions limits are to be considered in determin ing whether the 
source will cause or contribute to a NAAQS violation, the BACT requirement is not an 
independent basis for imposing additional short-term emissions li mits. See Memorandum from 
Anne Marie Wood, Acting Director Air Qual ity Policy Division to Regional Air Division 
Directors, at 7 (Aug. 23, 2010) ("Once a level of control is determined by the PSD applicant via 
the Best Available Control Technology (BACT) top-down process, the applicant must model the 
proposed source's emissions at the BACT emissions rate(s) to demonstrate that those emissions 
will not cause or contribute to a violation of any NAAQS or PSD increment."). 
52 
ADJ011587 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
19. Petitioners' reliance on In re: Mississippi Lime, PSD Appeal No. 11-01 (Aug. 9, 
2011 ) as an a lternate basis for the requirement for imposition of short-term emission limits in the 
Holly AO is a lso misplaced. The decision is inapplicable for two reasons. 
20. First, in Mississippi Lime, the permit applicant proposed to construct a facility 
that, unlike Hol ly's proposed expansion, would emit SO2 and NOx in quantities well above the 
significance thresholds so as to render the proposed facili ty subject to the PSD requirements for 
those pollutants. See JEPA, Project Summary at 4 (20 10) (noting that " Mississippi Lime's 
proposed lime manufacturing plant is subject to PSD for emissions of SO2, NOx and CO because 
the potential emissions of the plant are more than 100 tons/year"), available at 
http ://www.epa.state.il.us/public-notices/2010/mississippi-lime-pdr/project-summary.pdf; see 
also Mississippi Lime, slip op. at I (noting that M ississippi Lime sought to construct a new lime 
manufacturing plant). 
21. Second, as the Director explained in his response to comments-which 
Petitioners do not contest-in Mississippi Lime, the permit was remanded to the state permitting 
authority "not simply because it fai led to establish a limit, but because IEPA fai led to provide ' a 
coherent, well-reasoned explanation of the decision' not to impose such a limit." [IR009186, 
Response to Comments Memo.] 
22. By contrast, UDAQ has a well-reasoned explanation for why it did not impose the 
short-term limits requested by Petitioners-the modeling demonstrated there would be no 
exceedance of the sh01t-term NAAQS. [IR00301 7, July 20 12 NOi (Table 6-1 5) (demonstrating 
no exceedance ofNAAQS).] 
23. Accordingly, Petitioners' argument that short-term limits were required in the 
Holly AO fails on the merits and should be rejected . 
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ii. Holly's Modeling Constitutes Substantial Evidence That the 
NAA OS Will Be Protected 
24. Although UDAQ and Holly were not required to conduct modeling to 
demonstrate compliance with the NAAQS because Holly proposed only a minor modification for 
NOx, SO2, and PM, see 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (a)(2)(ii) ("The requirements of paragraphs G) through 
(r) of this section apply to ... the major modification of any existing major stationary source."), 14 
in an effort to be thorough, Holly conducted the modeling anyway. 
25. Before conducting any modeling, Meteorological Solutions lnc. ("MS!"), Holly's 
technical consultant, developed a modeling protocol setting fo11h the procedure that MSJ would 
use to demonstrate that there were would be no exceedance of the NAAQS, including the short 
term NAAQS. This protocol was sent to the modeling staff at UDAQ, who approved of the 
protocol. [See IR00031-48, Modeling Protocol; IROOl 153; IR003593, Orth Modeling Memo 
("The applicant had an approved modeling protocol for using AERMOD in PSD modeling 
protocols.").) MSI used the PTE calculations of all SO2 and NOx emission sources at the 
refinery for input into the model for the short-term modeling. [See IR000038 ("Maximum 
hourly potential to emit (PTE) emissions for existing and proposed sources will be input to the 
model."); JR.000041 (same).) 
26. PTE is defined as "the maximum capacity of a stationary source to emit a 
pollutant under its physical and operational design," taking into account enforceable emissions 
limits. 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.21 (b )(4), 51. I 65(a)( I )(iii), 5 l. l 66(b)( 4). Using the maximum capacity 
of each unit, MSI determined the total emissions the refinery could generate in one hour of 
operation measured in terms of lbs/hr. [See 1R002993-96, July 2012 NOL] Because PTE is 
14 See also Utah Admin. Code R307-403-3 ("Every ... major modification must be reviewed by 
the director to determine if a source will cause or contribute to a violation of the NAAQS.") 
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based on maximum capacity, this calcu lation represented the maximum emissions that could be 
produced at the refinery in a one-hour period. These va lues were used in the model and, once the 
background concentrations were combined with the PTE emissions, the modeling results showed 
that there would be no exceedance of the NAAQS, including the short-term NAAQS. [See 
IR003017, July 2012 NOi (Table 6-15); IR003596, Tom Orth Memo (Table 3); see also 
IR009209 ("This modeling analysis demonstrates that the predicted I-hour SO2, concentrations 
would be 50.4 µg/m3, much lower than the NAAQS of 195 µg/m3 ... Accordingly there is no need 
to impose I or 24-hour SO2 limits to protect the SO2 NAAQS.").] 
27. UDAQ's Orth Memorandum specifically found that "the proposed project' s 
impacts, when combined with other industrial sources and ambient background, would comply 
with federal standards," including the one-hour NOx and SO2 NAAQS. In light of all of this 
record evidence, it was reasonable for UDAQ not to include any additional short-term emission 
limits in the Holly AO. 
28 . Petitioners do not di spute that the modeling results showed no exceedance of the 
NAAQS. Instead Petitioners challenge the modeling itself. These challenges do not undermine 
UDAQ's approval of and reliance on the modeling analysis, particularly given the deference that 
UDAQ is due with respect to technical issues such as a ir quality modeling: " [Q]uestions 
pe1taining to the appropriate pollutant emissions rates and other inputs to a ir quality models raise 
scientific and technical concerns that generally are best left to the specialized expertise and 
reasoned judgment of the permitting authority." In re: N. Mich. Univ. Ripley Heating Plant, 
PSD Appeal No. 08-02, at 53 (EAB Feb. 18, 2009). 
29. First, Petitioners argue that DAQ's 01th Memorandum is unreliable because it 
states that " [t]his report outlines the methodology used in the dispersion modeling analysis of 
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emissions of criteria and HAP proposed in the NOi and the subsequent modeling resu lts. lt 
makes no determination with respect to compliance with the NAAQS or UDAQ - Toxic 
Screening Levels for HAPs or compliance thereof." [IR00359 1-92, Tom Orth Memo.] However, 
that language simply indicates that the 01th Memorandum, by itself, did not constitute a 
determination as to compliance with the NAAQS, as illustrated by the fact that the memorandum 
made only a "recommendation" as to what further steps to take. [IR003597, Tom Orth Memo.] 
It does not mean that the Director may not consider the Orth Memorandum in determining 
compliance with the NAAQS and whether short-term limits are required, as the Director did in 
the Response to Comments Memorandum. [See IR0091 90-9 I , lR009209, Response to 
Comments Memo.] 
30. Second, Petitioners assert that the modeling analysis cannot be used because the 
modeling must be "based on short term limits specified in the AO," and may not "merely 
estimate short term emission rates." [Petitioners' Opening Br. at 29-3 1.] However, the modeling 
done here was based on the max;mum possible hourly emissions level based on the maxhnum 
capacity of each emissions unit as explained above, not an estimate of average short-term 
emission rates. [See IR002993-96, July 2012 NOJ.] UDAQ acted within its discretion when it 
re lied upon this modeling analysis. 
31. Third, Petitioners argue that the modeling is inadequate to demonstrate 
compliance with the short-term NAAQS because the modeling does not include upset emissions 
from the flares. [Petit ioners' Opening Br. at 31-33 .] In support of this argument, Petitioners rely 
on 40 C.F.R. § 51 , Appendix W, for the proposition that such emissions must be modeled. 
Petitioners are incorrect. As UDAQ specifically explained in rejecting Petitioner's argument: 
The commenter references 40 CFR 5 1 Appendix W, Section 8. l.2(a) as reference 
that malfunction/upset emissions should be included in the modeling analysis. 
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However, the commenter neglected to include the following footnote from that 
same section: "Malfunctions which may result in excess emissions are not 
considered to be a normal operating condition. They generally should not be 
considered in determining allowable emissions. However, if the excess emissions 
are the result of poor maintenance, careless operation, or other preventable 
conditions, it may be necessary to consider them in determining source impact." 
[IR009214, Response to Comments Memo (quoting 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, App'x W, § 11.B.7.a.1.2(a) 
n.a).] UDAQ' s explanation has not been rebutted by Petitioners. 
32. UDAQ's interpretation of Appendix Wis supported by a 2011 EPA guidance 
document providing additional clarification of the modeling requirements under Appendix W . 
See Memorandum from Tyler Fox, Leader Air Quality Modeling Group to Regional Air Division 
Directors, Additional Clarification Regarding Application of Appendix W Modeling Guidance 
for the ]-hour N02 National Ambient Air Quality Standard (Mar. 1, 2011 ). There, EPA stated 
that modeling for compliance with the ]-hour NAAQS should only 
address emission scenarios that can logically be assumed to be relatively 
continuous or which occur frequently enough to contribute significantly to the 
annual distribution of daily maximum 1-hour concentrations based on existing 
modeling guidelines, which provide sufficient discretion for reviewing authorities 
to not include intermittent emissions from emergency generators or 
startup/shutdown operations from compliance demonstrations for the I-hour NO2 
standard under appropriate circumstances. 
Id. at 2. 15 
33. In an attempt to fit within the language of Appendix W, Petitioners contend that 
Holly's malfunction emissions must be the result of poor maintenance, careless operation, or 
15 EPA further clarified that "we are concerned that assuming continuous operations for 
intermittent emissions would effectively impose an additional level of stringency beyond that 
intended by the level of the standard itself. As a result, we feel that it would be inappropriate to 
implement the I-hour NO2 standard in such a manner and recommend that compliance 
demonstrations for the I-hour NO2 NAAQS be based on emission scenarios that can logically be 
assumed to be relatively continuous or which occur frequently enough to contribute significantly 
to the annual distribution of daily maximum 1-hour concentrations." Id at 9. The same logic 
applies to the 1-hour SO2 standard. 
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other preventable conditions, and therefore shou ld have been included in the modeling analysis. 
Petitioners argue that because EPA ' s NSPS regulations relating to flares require a root cause 
analysis where a flare emits more than 500 pounds of SO2 in a 24-hour period, emissions over 
that level are necessarily the result of poor maintenance, careless operation, or other preventable 
conditions. [Petitioners' Opening Br. at 33.] However, Petitioners cite no authority suggesting 
that the separate requirement to conduct a root cause analysis contained in the NSPS regulations 
somehow amounts to a determination that as a matter of law all upsets emitting more than 500 
pounds of SO2 are necessarily caused by preventable conditions for purposes of Appendix W. 
Petitioners cite no reason to conclude that, just because an investigation into the cause of al l 
emission events over a certain size is required, all such emission events are necessarily caused by 
preventable conditions. Indeed, EPA recognizes that "the probabi lity of successfully identifying 
a means to avoid future emissions from each root cause analysis performed is certain ly less than 
I 00 percent," 72 Fed. Reg. 27,178, 27,197 (May 14, 2007), indicating that far from a ll emissions 
that trigger a root cause analysis wou ld be caused by preventable conditions. [Petitioners' 
Opening Br. at 32-33.] Petitioners' argument finds no support in the record. The record 
evidence is to the contrary, recognizing that 
if SO2 modeling would have been requ ired, then the malfunction emissions for 
SO2 would not have been included because they do not represent normal, 
controlled operations. The 120 tpy of SO2 from the flares due to malfunctions, as 
documented in the SPR Reviewer Note 5 (pp8 l-82), are based on Holly 
Refinery's historical data and do not predict future malfunctions. Nor do they 
result from poor maintenance or careless operation of the flare. 
[IR0092 l 4-15, Response to Comments Memo.] 
34. In light of UDAQ' s technical conclusion, it was well within UDAQ's discretion 
to determine that the malfunction emissions shou ld not be included in the modeling analysis. 
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iii. Hollv Was Not Required to Model for PMl..5. 
35 . Petitioners ra ise one final challenge to Holly ' s modeling. Specifi cally, Petitioners 
argue the modeling d id not address the revision of the annual PM2.s NAAQS that took place in 
January 20 13. This argument does not relate to any purported need for short-term emissions 
limits but rather is a separate attack on the modeling analys is . 
36. For the same reasons as stated above, Holly ' s modification was not determined to 
be "major" for PM2.5 and therefore Holly was not required to do any modeling for PM regardless 
of whether the NAAQS were amended. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(k)-(m); see also Utah Admin . 
Code R307-4 l 0-4. 
37. Additionally, Holly's application fe ll within the grandfathering provision of the 
rev ised PM2.s NAAQS and so did not need to be updated to address the revised NAAQS. In 
finalizing the PM2.5 NAAQS, EPA explained: 
To facilitate timely implementation of the PSD requirements resulting from the 
revised NAAQS, which would otherwise become applicable to a ll PSD permit 
applications upon the effective date of this final PM NAAQS rule, the EPA is 
finalizing a grandfathering provision for pending permit applications. This final 
rule incorporates revisions to the PSD regulations that provide for grandfathering 
of PSD permit applications that have been determined to be complete on or before 
December 14, 2012 or for which public notice of a draft permit or preliminary 
determination has been published as of the effective date of today's revised PM2.s 
NAAQS. Accord ingly, for projects e ligible under the grandfathering provision, 
sources must meet the requirements associated with the prior primary annual 
PM2.s NAAQS rather than the revised primary annual PM2.5 NAAQS. 
78 Fed. Reg. 3,086, 3,249 (Jan. 15, 2013). 
38. Holly's application was determined to be administratively complete on July 19, 
201 2, long before the PM2.5 NAAQS modeling requirements became effective. [See 1R003767, 
email from Camron Harry to Eric Benson, dated July 19, 2012 ("I am notifying you that I have 
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now determined Holly Refinery's NOI is administratively complete.").] Therefore, no add itional 
modeling was required. 
39. In sho11, none of Petitioners' challenges to the modeling analysis itself succeed. 
Petitioners have fai led to provide any evidence that would undermine the significant evidence in 
the record demonstrating there would not be an exceedance of the NAAQS. The modeling 
analysis demonstrated that Holly's project would not cause or contribute to any NAAQS 
violation, including the short-term NAAQS. EPA raised no comments about any of the 
foregoing issues in connection with its independent technical and legal review of the Holly AO. 
Therefore Petitioners' arguments fail on the merits and should be dismissed. 
VI. Holly and the Director Properly Calculated PM Emissions from the FCC Units. 
I. Petitioners next argue that the Director erred in fai ling to require Holly to count 
condensable emissions in determining compliance with the emission limits on the FCC Units. 
[Petitioners' Opening Brief at 34-36.] For the reasons stated below, this argument should be 
rejected. 
A. Findings of Fact 
2. UDAQ determined that condensable particle emissions would not be counted for 
compliance with FCC Unit limits, but would be included in inventory calculations. [rR009243, 
Holly AO ("The condensable particle emissions shall not be used for compliance demonstration, 
but shall be used for inventory purposes.").] 
3. The Utah PM10 SIP, approved by EPA in 1994 (64 Fed. Reg. 68031 (July 8, 
1994)), exc luded condensable PM emissions from compliance demonstration with the PM 10 
emission caps in the SIP. [IR007826, PM 1o SIP (attached as Exhibit L to Holly' s Comment 
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Letter, ("The back half condensibles are required for inventory purposes and shall be determined 
using the method specified by the Executive Secretary.").] 
4. UDAQ recognized that the language in the PM 1o SIP controlled for purposes of 
drafting the Holly AO and excluded condensable emissions from all compliance limits for all 
PM10 SIP cap sources-including the FCC Unit 25. [IR008569, Source Plan Review ("Holly 
Refinery is listed in the PM 10 SIP. That document established several emission limitations, one 
of which is a cap on PM 10 emissions. At the time the SIP was written the cap on PM 1o emissions 
was established using only the filterable PM10 emissions captured during stack testing. This 
limitation was then included in the AO (and subsequent revisions) issued to Holly Refinery. 
UDAQ has since agreed that all future particulate (PM 10 and PM2s) limitations at all sources will 
also include the condensable fraction of particulate emissions (such as those found in the back 
half of a particulate sampling train or by reference test method 202). However, any limitation 
which is derived directly from the PM10 SIP cannot be altered without similarly altering the SIP. 
Therefore, those limitations on SIP-listed sources will continue to retain the original ' filterable 
emissions only' language, with the condensable emissions being used only for inventory 
purposes. Such is the case with Holly Refinery's PM10 cap emission limit. It is the intent of the 
Division to update these types of conditions once new SIP limitations are established in the 
PM2.s SIP.").] 
5. UDAQ specifically determined that it would not set PM2.s limits on the new FCC 
Unit 25 because source wide limits of PM2s were being set for Holly in the new PM2.s SIP that 
was being developed at the time UDAQ issued the Holly AO. [IR009183, Response to 
Comments Memo ("UDAQ has not set a condensable limit on the FCC Unit 25 in this permitting 
action because UDAQ is currently developing a SIP for PM2.5. In this SIP, the contribution of 
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Holly Refinery to the valley airshed will be part of that evaluation and condensable limitations 
will be addressed."); IR009206, Response to Comments Memo ("PM2_5 condensable emissions 
will be addressed in the PM2.s SJP.").] 
6. In connection with its independent review of the Holly AO, the EPA submitted 
two separate comment letters to UDAQ but did not raise any comments regarding condensable 
emissions in determining compliance with the PM emission limits on the FCC Units or otherwise 
exercise EPA's broad oversight or enforcement discretion over the final Holly AO for any real or 
perceived failure regarding the same. [See IR00400 I, EPA First Comment Letter; IR007840-
784 I, EPA Second Comment Letter.] 
B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation 
7. During the public comment period, Petitioners' comments were limited to 
challenging the PTE calculations for the new FCC Unit 25 and whether such calculations 
properly included condensable emissions. [See IR007857, WRA Second Comment Letter 
("Holly's Permit Application Underestimates the Increase in PM Emissions from the new 
FCCU").] 
8. Petitioners' challenge to the FCC Unit 25 emission limit and the exclusion of 
condensables was never raised in the comments notwithstanding the fact that this issue was 
reasonably ascertainable as the limit was included in the ITA. [See IR008469, IT A 
("Condensable particle emissions shall not be used for compliance demonstration, but shall be 
used for inventory purposes").] 
9. Petitioners also appear to argue in their Opening Brief that the BACT analysis for 
the FCC Unit 25 was invalid because it did not address condensables. Petitioners failed to raise 
this argument during the comment period and therefore it was not preserved. 
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I 0. Because, Petitioners failed to preserve both of these arguments as required by 
Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5( 4), they should be dismissed. 
C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof 
11. Even if Petitioners had preserved their claims, Petitioners have failed to meet their 
burden of proof . 
12. Whether condensable emissions are required to be included for purposes of 
compliance with emission limits is a question of law. Because this question of law is one with 
which UDAQ has been charged to administer, the ALJ must apply a clearly erroneous standard 
of review. 
13. Petitioners do not acknowledge the requirements of the PM10 SIP. Although this 
is not an instance where marshaling is required, Petitioners' disregard of the PM10 SIP 
requirements is fatal to their claim that condensable emissions must be included for compliance 
with the FCC Unit's limits. 
14 . Petitioners have failed to point to any valid legal basis that undermines UDAQ's 
conclusion that the PM1o SIP does not require condensables to be included for compliance with 
the PM emission limits in the Holly AO. 
D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits 
15. Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is 
not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits 
for the independent reasons discussed below . 
16. The PM10 SIP imposes a cap on all PM10 sources at the Holly refinery including 
the new FCC Unit 25 but does not require condensable PM emissions to be calculated for 
compliance with that cap. [IR007826, PM10 SIP (attached as Exhibit L to Holly's Comment 
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Letter ("The back half condensibles are required for inventory purposes and shall be determined 
using the method specified by the Executive Secretary."); IR009243, Holly AO ("The 
condensable particle emissions shall not be used for compliance demonstration, but shall be used 
for inventory purposes."); IR008569, Source Plan Review (recognizing the PM 10 SIP cap).] 
17. At the time the Holly AO was being considered, the PM 1o SIP was the only 
applicable PM SIP and any provisions in the Holly AO that conflicted with that SIP would have 
required a SIP amendment. [See IR008569, Source Plan Review ("any limitation which is 
derived directly from the PM 10 SIP cannot be altered without similarly altering the SIP"); 
IR007826; Attachment L to Holly's second comment letter (excerpt from PM 10 SIP stating " [t]he 
back half condensibles are required for inventory purposes ... [t]he PM1o captured in the front 
half. .. shall be considered for compliance purposes").] 
18. Although the recently adopted PM2.5 SIP now requires condensable PM emissions 
to be calculated for compliance purposes, such a requirement was not in place prior to the 
issuance of the Holly AO. Utah law is clear that permits are only required to incorporate 
regulatory requirements that exist at the time of permit issuance. [See, e.g., In the Matter of 
Petroleum Processing Plant Emery Refining, LLC, Order Returning Recommended Order Re 
Motions to Stay to Administrative Law Judge for Further Action, April 8, 2014 ("Emery Order") 
at 4 (limiting ALJ's review to the record before her and prohibiting consideration of a separate 
NOi that could be granted or denied sometime in the future.).] 
19. Petitioners' references to Federal Register notices and guidance requiring PM 
condensable emissions for compliance purposes are misplaced because such requirements had 
not yet become binding on Holly. See 73 Fed. Reg. 28321, 28334 (May 16, 2008) (describing a 
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transition period for incorporation of condensable requirements into state implementation plans 
but only requiring such inclusion on major NSR projects). 
20. IfEPA believed UDAQ erred in its handling of condensables in the Holly AO, it 
had the jurisdiction and obligation to raise that issue in connection with its independent review of 
the Holly AO. EPA declined to do so. [See IR007840-7841, EPA comment letter (raising no 
issues about permit limits or the inclusion of condensables for compliance purposes).] 
21. Petitioners also appear to argue that the BACT analysis for the new FCC Unit 25 
is invalid because it does not account for condensable emissions. This argument fails not only 
because Petitioners did not preserve it during the comment period but also because any emission 
control technology that reduces filterable emissions will necessarily control for condensable 
emissions, both being post-control components of Holly's emission sources. Petitioners do not 
present any evidence that an alternative emission control technology would more effectively 
control condensable emissions beyond that which Holly is already required to install. 
22 . All of Petitioners' arguments regarding UDAQ' s treatment of condensable PM 
emissions in the Holly AO fail on the merits and should be dismissed with prejudice. 
VII. Holly Properly Calculated and Included in its Netting Analysis VOC Emissions 
Reductions From its Cooling Towers . 
1. Petitioners next argue that Holly improperly claimed a 39.28 tpy VOC emission 
reduction from its cooling towers in the netting analysis it submitted to UDAQ. [Petitioners' 
Opening Brief at 36-41.] For the reasons set forth below, this argument should be rejected . 
A. Findings of Fact 
2. In 2009, Holly implemented a voluntary monitoring program in which it 
identified leaks in its cooling tower operation and fixed those leaks, thereby reducing emissions 
of VOCs from its cooling towers. [IR009203, Response to Comments Memo ("The reduction in 
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VOC emissions reported in Holly Refinery's NOJ was a result of a voluntary monitoring 
program of the cooling towers that identified leaks from the towers that Holly Refinery fixed, 
thereby reducing its VOC emissions.").] 
3. This monitoring program was made mandatory in the Holly AO on a going 
forward basis to ensure that the emission reductions Holly experienced by fixing its equipment 
remained at the reduced level. [IR007236, email from Mike Astin (environmental manager for 
Holly) to Camron Harry (permit writer for UDAQ), dated March 26, 2013 ("For the cooling 
towers, we monitor the cooling water return lines monthly for volatile organics using the Texas 
EI Paso method. Jf any leaks are identified, we use screening methods to identify the leaking 
heat exchanger and repair it."); JR009230; Holly AO (requiring that "all cooling towers 
implement the Modified El Paso Method."); IR009244, Holly AO (requiring repair of any leaks 
detected "as soon as practicable, but no later than 45 days after identifying the 
leak ... [v]erification of the repair shall be done through additional testing").] 
4. Prior to implementing the leak detection and monitoring program, Holly utilized 
an "uncontrolled" emission factor to calculate emissions from its cooling towers. [IR009203, 
Response to Comments Memo ("Prior to using the Modified El Paso Method, the AP-42 VOC 
'uncontrolled' emissions were the basis for refineries to report cooling tower VOC emissions.").] 
5. After implementation of the monitoring program made mandatory by the Holly 
AO, Holly utilized a "controlled" emission factor to calculate emissions from its cooling towers. 
[JR008558, Source Plan Review ("VOC emissions from cooling towers 4 through 8 were 
previously estimated using the uncontrolled emission factor listed in AP-42 Section 5.1 of 6 
lb/I 0"' 6 gal cooling water. In 2009, Holly Refinery began a voluntary daily monitoring program 
to detect VOC leaks into cooling water and to eliminate those leaks. In 2012, the monitoring 
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method was replaced with monthly monitoring using the Texas El Paso method. With continued 
use of regular monitoring, it is proposed to utilize the 'controlled' emission factor of 0.7 16/10/\6 
gallons cooling water in AP-42 Section 5.1. This method will also be implemented for cooling 
towers IO and 11.").] 
6. It is the difference between the calculations with the "uncontrolled" and 
"controlled" emission factor that makes up the emission reduction that Holly included in its 
netting analysis. [Id.] 
7 . ln connection with its independent review of the Holly AO, EPA submitted two 
separate comment letters to UDAQ. [See IR004001 , EPA First Comment Letter; IR007840-
784 I, EPA Second Comment Letter.] While the Second Comment Letter requested more 
infonnation regarding "the basis for the estimate of emissions reduced by conve11ing from gas 
fired to electric motors for the compressors" [IR007840], the EPA raised no concerns about the 
netting issues raised by Petitioners here. Moreover, EPA's request for supplemental information 
on this issue was satisfied in UDAQ's response to comments . 
B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation 
8. Petitioners preserved this argument in accordance with 19-1-301.5(4) by rai sing 
the issue during the public comment period. [See IR004214-42 l 6, Mark Hall First Comment 
Letter.] 
C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof 
9 . Petitioners' claim that Holly incorrectly included a VOC emission reduction from 
its cooling towers is a mixed question of law and fact. The correct interpretation of the 
regulations governing when a source can utilize an emission reduction in a netting analysis is a 
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question of law. However, the application of those regulations to the facts in this case presents a 
mixed question to which the ALJ must apply a reasonableness standard of review. 
I 0. Because this is a mixed question of law and fact, Petitioners had the burden to 
marshal the relevant factual evidence that pertained to this claim. 
l 1. Petitioners failed to meet this burden by failing to reference the requirements in 
the Holly AO that make monitoring and leak repairs for the cooling towers enforceable permit 
conditions. This evidence undermines Petitioners' argument that the cooling tower emission 
reductions are not enforceable or creditable. 
12. Having failed to marshal this and other relevant evidence, Petitioners cannot 
satisfy their burden to prove that UDAQ acted unreasonably in accepting Holly's netting 
analysis. 
D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits 
13. Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is 
not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits 
for the independent reasons discussed below. 
14. Petitioners challenge the creditability and enforceability of the VOC emission 
reduction from the cooling towers because they claim it resulted from a voluntary monitoring 
program and therefore was unenforceable. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.2l(b)(3) (requiring decreases in 
actual emissions be creditable and enforceable in order to be included in a netting analysis); [see 
also Petitioners' Opening Br. at 36-37). Petitioners also claim that Holly was precluded from 
including the emission reduction in its netting analysis because the State of Utah arguably relied 
upon the emission reduction for demonstration of attainment of the PM25 SIP. [Id.] Both 
arguments fail on the merits. 
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i . Creditabilitv o[tlte VOC emission reduction 
15. The UDAQ reasonably found that Holly's VOC emission reduction to be 
creditable because it resulted from a physical change to refinery equipment and will be 
maintained through an enforceable permit condition in the Holly AO. [See IR009230; Holly AO 
(requiring that "all cooling towers implement the Modified El Paso Method."); IR009244, Holly 
AO (requiring repair of any leaks detected "as soon as practicable, but no later than 45 days after 
identifying the leak ... [v]erification of the repair shall be done through additional testing").] 
16 . Under applicable law, an emission reduction is creditable if "(a) the old level of 
actual emissions exceeds the new level of actual emissions; (b) it is enforceable as a practical 
matter; [and] (c) it has approximately the same qualitative significance for public health and 
welfare as that attributed to the increase from the particular change." 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (vi)(a)-
(c). The VOC emission reduction Holly claimed satisfies each of these three requirements. 
17. First, Holly' s VOC cooling tower emissions were higher prior to Holly' s physical 
repairs to the cooling towers. [See IR009203, Response to Comments Memo ("The reduction in 
VOC emissions reported in Holly Refinery's NOi was a result of a voluntary monitoring 
program of the cooling towers that identified leaks from the towers that Holly Refi11e1y fixed, 
thereby reducing its VOC emissions." ) (emphasis added); see also IR007236, email from Mike 
Astin (environmental manager for Holly) to Camron Harry (permit writer for UDAQ), dated 
March 26, 2013 ("For the cooling towers, we monitor the cooling water return lines monthly for 
volatile organics using the Texas El Paso method. If any leaks are identified, we use screening 
methods to identify the leaking heat exchanger and repair it.").] 
18. Petitioners argue that these emissions are merely estimated from emission factors 
and do not represent actual emission reductions, and therefore are not credible. Contrary to 
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Petitioners' arguments, however, the applicable regulations contemplate the calculation of 
emissions through emission factors. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (b )(21 )(i) (providing that emissions 
"shall be calculated"). The EPA-drafted preamble to the re levant regulation explains that 
emission factors may be used in calculating "actual emissions." 67 Fed. Reg. 80,186, 80,195 
(Dec. 31, 2002) ("When you calculate the baseline actual emissions for an existing emissions 
unit. .. you may select any consecutive 24 months of source operation within the past 10 years. 
Using the relevant source records for that 24-month period, including such information as the 
utilization rate of the equipment, fuels and raw materials used in the operation of the equipment, 
and applicable emission factors, you must be able to calculate an average annual emiss ions rate, 
in tpy, for each pollutant emitted by the emissions unit that is modified, or is affected by the 
modification." (emphasis added)). 
19. l find that a "calculation" of emissions from cooling towers would necessarily be 
an estimate based on operating hours, production rates, and types of materials. Holly's VOC 
calculation was based on these same factors. [See IR008558, Source Plan Review (noting that 
Holly used the 'controlled' emission factor of 0.7 lb/10"'6 gallons cooling water as described in 
AP-42 Section 5.1 )]; See also AP-42 5.1 Petroleum Refining emission calculation descriptions, 
available at http://www.epa.gov/ttnchie l/ap42/ch05/final/c05s01.pdf (including in the emission 
calculation for cooling tower emissions the cooling water rate and refinery feed rate).] 
20. Prior to Holly's voluntary monitoring program and physical changes to its cooling 
towers to reduce and e liminate VOC leaks, Holly utilized the "uncontrolled" AP-42 emission 
factor to calculate the VOC emissions from the cooling towers. [See IR009203, Response to 
Comments Memo ("Prior to using the Modified El Paso Method, the AP-42 VOC 'uncontrolled' 
emissions were the basis for refineries to report cooling tower VOC emissions.").] 
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2 l. After the units were repaired, Holly used the AP-42 "controlled" emission factor 
which resulted in a calculated emission reduction. [IR008558, Source Plan Review ("VOe 
emissions from cooling towers 4 through 8 were previously estimated using the uncontrolled 
emission factor listed in AP-42 Section 5.1 of 6 lb/ I 0"6 gal cooling water. In 2009, Holly 
Refinery began a voluntary daily monitoring program to detect voe leaks into cooling water 
and to eliminate those leaks. In 2012, the monitoring method was replaced with monthly 
monitoring using the Texas El Paso method. With continued use of regular monitoring, it is 
proposed to utilize the 'controlled' emission factor of 0.7 lb/I 0"6 gallons coo ling water in AP-42 
Section 5.1. This method wi ll also be implemented for cooling towers IO and 11.").] 
22. Where actual emissions are not easily measured-such as voe emissions leaking 
from cooling towers-calculation estimates can prov ide reliable information to satisfy 40 C.F.R . 
§ 52.2 1 (vi)(a)-(c). See 74 Fed. Reg. 55,670 55,679 (Oct. 28, 2009) (noting that certain historical 
inventory data based on the AP-42 factors and "the AP-42 emission factors are the best available 
data by which to estimate cooling tower emissions"). 
23. Second, the voe emission reduction from the cooling towers is enforceable 
because it was the result of a physical change to the refinery equipment, which must be 
monitored and maintained under the terms of the Holly AO. [JR009224, Holly AO (condition 
11.B.4.a Id.; see also 40 e.F.R. § 52.21 (b)(3)(vi)(b) (reduction is creditable if it is enforceable "at 
and after the time that actual construction on the particular change begins").] 
24 . Holly is required, pursuant to the terms of the Holly AO, to continue monitoring 
for leaks from the cooling towers and must fix any discovered leaks in order to maintain the 
lower voe emission levels from the cooling towers. [See IR009230; Holly AO (requiring that 
"all cooling towers implement the Modified El Paso Method."); IR009244, Holly AO (requiring 
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repair of any leaks detected "as soon as practicable, but no later than 45 days after identifying the 
leak . .. [v]erification of the repair shall be done through additional testing").] Any failure to do so 
subjects Holly to enforcement action by UDAQ-making these requirements, and the associated 
emission reduction, enforceable. 
25. Third, Holly has satisfied the qualitative significance requirement that Petitioners 
claim has been violated. EPA's NSR Manual states that " [c]urrent EPA policy is to assume that 
an emissions decrease will have approximately the same qualitative significance for public 
health and welfare as that attributed to an increase" unless the state has reason to believe 
otherwise. [Petitioners' Reply Brief at 34 (emphasis added) (quoting EPA NSR Workshop 
Manual, 1990, A-38-39).] 
26. Holly's modeling demonstrates that there will be no violation of any NAAQS or 
PSD increments and overall, VOC emissions will be reduced. [See IR002980-3021, Holly's 
NOi, section 6.0; see also IR003591-3597, Tom Orth Memorandum; IR007575, UDAQ 
information sheet (indicating a -17.02 overall VOC emission decrease from the project).] 
27. Consequently, UDAQ had no reason to believe that the qualitative presumption 
would not be met in this case, and Petitioners have not identified any contrary evidence. See, 
e.g., In re Inter-Power of N. Y., Inc. , No. 92-8, 5 E.A.D. 130, 153-54 (EAB Mar. 16, 2014) 
(rejecting the argument that EPA should have conducted a health assessment to demonstrate that 
the qualitative significance of emissions was approximately the same, and holding that the 
burden was on the petitioner to "document[] that [the source's] fuel change has increased its 
heavy metals emissions or created any health concerns. Accordingly, [petitioner] has not pointed 
to any record evidence" that indicates that this provision was not satisfied). Holly's inclusion of 
the VOC emission reductions from the cooling towers therefore was proper. 
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28. Petitioners also argue that the 52.95 tpy VOC emission baseline referenced in the 
July 2012 NOJ is inflated and, therefore, the emission reduction of 39.28 tons ofVOC is inflated. 
Petitioners overlook that the emission spreadsheet they cite indicates that if 52.95 tpy was the 
VOC baseline, the associated emission reduction would have been 48.08 tons-not 39.28. 
[IR003059, July 20 12 NOL] Holly had two different baseline calculations for VOC emiss ions 
because at different points in the application process it used different baseline years for its 
netting calculations. [Compare 1R003059, July 2012 NOI, with 1R007300, Revised NOL] In its 
Revised NOJ, Holly used 44.15 tpy as a baseline for VOC emissions, which resulted in the 
reduction of 39.28 tons of VOC. [IR007300.] Had it used the higher baseline, the emission 
reduction would have also been higher, which means Holly's netted VOC reduction is 
conservatively low. All of these baseline totals are derived from emission inventory reports that 
Holly submitted to DAQ, and they were a ll calculated with AP-42 emission factors. [1R003059, 
July 2012 NOi (citing "VOC Baseline 2008-2009" inventory years; IR007300, Revised NOi 
(citing "VOC baseline 2008-2009" inventory years").] 
ii. Holly Was Not Required to Adiust Downward its Baseline VOC 
Emission Calculations 
29. Petitioners also challenge the VOC emission reduction on the basis that Holly 
should have adjusted downward its baseline VOC emission calculations because the El Paso 
monitoring method is required by a Maximum Achievable Control Technology ("MACT") 
requirement under a National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants and has been 
relied upon by UDAQ as a Reasonably Available Control Technology ("RACT") requirement in 
the PM25 SIP to demonstrate attainment. 
30. Any requirements that are otherwise required to be imposed as MACT standards 
under section 11 2 of the Clean Air Act that result in emission reductions can still be used for 
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netting purposes unless the state has specifical ly relied upon the emission reduction in 
demonstrating attainment ofa NAAQS in a SIP. See 40 CFR § 52.21(b)(48)(ii)(b) & (c) ("[l]f 
an emission limitation is part of a maximum achievable control technology standard ... , the 
baseline actual emissions need only be adjusted if the State has taken credit for such emissions 
reductions in an attainment demonstration or maintenance plan."); see also Memorandum from 
John S. Seitz, Director, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, to Bob Hannesschlager, 
Acting Director, Multimedia Planning and Permitting Division, Region VI (Nov. I 2, 1997) 
("Since the MACT program is not designed to limit criteria or other pollutants regulated by NSR 
programs of parts C and D of title I of the Act, EPA's policy is that actual emissions reductions 
of hazardous or other air pollutants that result from complying with MACT regulations codified 
at 40 CFR part 63 may be considered 'surplus' for purposes ofNSR netting and are not 
precluded from NSR netting as long as the reductions are otherwise creditable under NSR."). 
31. Petitioners argue that UDAQ relied upon the MACT standard of the Texas El 
Paso Method in the PM2.s SIP to demonstrate compliance. However, that assertion is misplaced 
because the PM2.s SIP had not been formally adopted at the time UDAQ issued the Ho lly AO. 
Petitioners overlook that the regulation upon which they rely for this assertion provides only that 
emissions must be adjusted downward where such emissions "would have exceeded an 
emissions limitation with which the major stationary source must currently comply," with 
"currently comply" referring to the time of permit issuance. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (b)(48)(ii)(c) 
(emphasis added). 
32. That Holly may have been on notice that the El Paso Method might subsequently 
be required as a RACT standard is irre levant in this analysis and Petitioners cite no authority 
holding otherwise. 
74 
ADJ011609 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
33. Accordingly, UDAQ acted reasonably in accepting Holly's netting analysis w ith 
the VOC emission reductions included therein. Petitioners' c laims to the contrary should be 
dismissed with prejudice on the merits. 
VIII. The FCC Unit 25's PTE Was Accurate and its Emission Limits Are Adequate. 
I. Petitioners challenge the accuracy of Holly's PTE calculations for the FCC Unit 
25, arguing that the Holly AO is insufficient because it does not impose specific PM emission 
limits on the unit. [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 41-46.] For the reasons stated below, this 
argument should be rejected . 
A. Findings of Fact 
2. The emissions from the FCC Unit 25 are limited by the maximum capacity of the 
unit of 8500 barrels per day ("bpd"). [IR00281 I , July 2012 NO I ("A Fluid Catalytic Cracking 
Unit (FCCU) with a capacity of processing 8500 barrels per day will be constructed along with a 
45 MMBtu/hr feed heater. Emissions from the FCCU will be controlled by a wet gas 
scrubber."); IR002820, July 2012 NOi ("A Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit (FCCU) from an idled 
New Mexico refinery wi ll be relocated to the Woods Cross Refinery. This unit is capable of 
processing 8500 barrels of gas oil per day and is simi lar in size to the existing FCCU."); 
IR003078, July 2012 NOI ("FCC Capacity Limit based on Equipment Specifications 8500 
bbls/day."); IR003160, July 2012 NOi ("New FCCU ... Capacity ... 8500 bbpd."); IR008491, 
Source Plan Review ("To process the additional bottom cut from the new crude unit (Unit 24), 
an additional Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit ('FCCU Unit 25') with a capacity of processing 8500 
barrels per day wi ll be constructed."); IR009227, Holly AO ("Unit 4: Fluid Catalytic Cracking 
Unit (FCCU) 8,880 bpd annual average capacity" ); IR009229, Holly AO ("Unit 25: FCCU 8,500 
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bpd annual average capacity"); IR009 l 92, Response to Comments Memo ( explanation for why 
the FCC Unit 25 emissions are limited by the operational capacity of the unit).] 
3. The information relating to the capacity of the FCC Unit 25 contained in Holly's 
NOi was certified as accurate by the Plant Manager, Mike Wright. [IR007836, certification 
signature page (Mike Wright certified that the information provided for the approval order was 
accurate and complete.).] 
4. UDAQ determined that a coke burn rate of 6200 lb/hr was reasonable based on 
the data Holly provided. [IR009219, Response to Comments Memo ("Based on UDAQ's 
technical expertise and experience," UDAQ determined that "the 6200 lb/hr value is a fair and 
reasonable estimate of the quantity of coke burn in FCC Unit 25."); JR008052, November 7, 
2013 letter (Holly's emission calculations for PTE of the FCC Unit 25).] 
5. UDAQ also determined that Holly was subject to a PM emission cap that included 
the FCC Unit 25, and that any exceedance of the PTE calculated for the unit would subject Holly 
to enforcement for exceedance of the emission cap. [JR009208, Response to Comments Memo 
("regardless of maximum throughput rates, the emissions are limited at the values established in 
IT A"); IR009219, Response to Comments Memo (explanation for why the PTE for the FCC Unit 
#25 was correct because the unit is subject to the PM emission cap and any exceedance of that 
cap would be a violation).] 
6. In connection with its independent review of the Holly AO, the EPA submitted 
two separate comment letters to UDAQ but did not raise any comments regarding UDAQ's PTE 
calcu lations for any FCCU or otherwise exercise EPA's broad oversight or enforcement 
discretion over the final Holly AO for any real or perceived failure regarding the same. [See 
IR004001, EPA First Comment Letter; IR007840-7841, EPA Second Comment Letter.] 
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B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation 
7. In their public comments, Petitioners only challenged the accuracy of the PTE 
calculations for Holly's FCC Unit 25. Specifically, Petitioners argued there was insufficient 
evidence to support the 6200 lbs/hr coke burn rate calculation, and that as a result, additional 
limits were needed for the unit. [See IR008598-8599, Mark Hall Second Comment Letter.] 
8. Jn response to this comment, UDAQ requested that Holly provide additional 
documentation and calculations to support the 6200 lb/hr coke burn rate. [IR00802 l .] 
9 . Holly responded by providing the calculations it used to determine the coke burn 
rate. [IR8022-8023; IR008052.] 
10. Petitioners argued differently in their Motion for Stay, that the 6200 lb/hr figure 
would not effectively limit PM emissions because emissions would increase if more coke was 
burned. 
11. In Petitioners' briefing on the merits, Petitioners challenge for the first time the 
accuracy of the maximum capacity of the FCC Unit 25 , claiming that there was no evidence in 
the record to support the 8500 bpd figure. 
12. This maximum capacity was expressly stated in multiple places in the NOI and 
IT A. Any concern with the accuracy of the number was therefore reasonably ascertainable 
during the public comment period. [IR00281 l , July 2012 NOI ("A Fluid Catalytic Cracking 
Unit (FCCU) with a capacity of processing 8500 barrels per day"); JR008491, Source Plan 
Review ("To process the additional bottom cut from the new crude unit (Unit 24), an additional 
F luid Catalytic Cracking Unit ('FCCU Unit 25') with a capacity of processing 8500 barrels per 
day wi ll be constructed.").] 
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13. Accordingly, the only issue that has been adequately preserved by Petitioners is 
their challenge to the 6200 lb/hr coke burn rate and their assertion that additional limits are 
required for the FCC Unit 25. Their most recent challenge to the accuracy of the 8500 bpd 
capacity limit on the FCC Unit 25 has not been preserved in accordance with Utah Code Section 
I 9-1-30 I .5( 4) and should be dismissed for the reasons described above. 
C. Findings and Conclusion on Burden of Proof 
14. Even if Petitioners had preserved their challenge to the accuracy of the 8500 bpd 
capacity limit on the FCC Unit 25, Petitioners have failed to satisfy their burden of proof. 
15. Whether the PTE emission calculations for the FCC Unit 25 are supported in the 
record is a highly technical factual issue that requires this tribunal to give deference to UDAQ in 
its review of the issue. Petitioners must demonstrate that UDAQ lacked substantial ev idence in 
the record to suppo11 its decision that the PTE was calculated correctly. 
16. Accordingly, Petitioners carry a heavy burden of proof to marshal the evidence 
relating to this issue to allow this tribunal to adequately evaluate and weigh the evidence relating 
to the claims at issue. 
17. Petitioners have fa iled to meet their burden here by ignoring the relevant evidence 
in Holly's NOI explaining how Holly calculated the emissions that would be generated by the 
FCC Unit 25. Petitioners also provide no evidence contradicting Holly's certification that all of 
the numbers contained in the NOI were accurate. 
18. DAQ invited commenters, including Petitioners here, during the public comment 
period to provide technical ev idence of alternate coke burn rates that commenters argued would 
be more appropriate. Neither Petitioners nor other commenters responded to DA Q's request. 
[IR.0092 19, Response to Comments Memo ("The commenter makes general reference to the 
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' UOP yield estimates' and 'other more generic publications,' but provided no documents or 
primary data to support or detail to which estimate, if any, was used to derive the suggested 
range of coke burn estimates. Based on UDAQ's technical experience and expertise, the 6200 
lb/hr value is a fair and reasonable estimate of the quantity of coke burn in FCC Unit 25. The 
commenter has not provided any specific technical information to UDAQ that would suggest a 
higher value is more appropriate.") 
19. Failing to carry their burden of proof on this highly technical issue, Petitioners' 
claims fail. 
D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits 
20. Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is 
not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits 
for the independent reasons discussed below. 
21. The question of whether Holly and UDAQ correctly calculated the potential 
emissions for the FCC Unit 25 is a highly technical issue that requires this tribunal and any 
reviewing court to give deference to the agency because the agency, in its technical expertise, is 
in the best position to evaluate these issues. 
22 . Holly based its conclusion that the new FCC Unit 25 would burn coke at a rate of 
6200 lb/hr on empirical data it obtained from the FCC Unit 4 that was in current operation at the 
refinery. [IR008052.] UDAQ requested and reviewed Holly's calculation information and was 
satisfied that it justified the coke burn rate. [IR0092 I 9, Response to Comments Memo ("Based 
on UDAQ' s technical expertise and experience," UDAQ determined that "the 6200 lb/hr value is 
a fair and reasonable estimate of the quantity of coke burn in FCC Unit 25."); IR008052, 
November 7, 2013 letter (Holly's emission calculations for PTE of the FCC Unit 25).] 
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23. The 6200 lb/hr figure was a conservative estimate. The original calculations 
showed a rate of 5653.964 lb/hr, and the FCC Unit 4 is a larger unit than the new FCC Unit 25. 
[IR008052; see also Holly AO at IR009227-009229 (The FCC Unit 4 processes 8,880 barrels per 
day ("bpd") while the proposed FCC Unit 25 can only process 8,500 bpd).] 
24. Petitioners are incorrect in their assumption that because the rate is not included 
as a limit in the Holly AO that Holly will exceed the PM limit of 0.301b/l 000 lbs of coke burned. 
The FCC Unit 25 emissions will not exceed the PTE because there is a finite capacity limit on 
the FCC Unit 25 that acts as a physical limitation on the amount of PM that can be emitted. 
25. Even were this not the case, the refinery is limited to an overall PM10 emission 
cap of 47.5 tpy and 0.13 tpd for combustion sources. [See IR009219, Response to Comments 
Memo.] "If these limitations are not met, the refinery will be out of compliance until it remedies 
the problem with additional control equipment or redesign of the system until it meets these 
limits." [Id.] 
26. Petitioners have failed to point to any evidence in the record that undermines the 
reasonableness of UDAQ's reliance on the calculations Holly provided. 
27. Petitioners' only challenge to the PM cap that limits emissions from the FCC Unit 
25 is the contention that EPA generally disfavors source wide cap limits. This assertion is 
without merit. 
28. In the PM1o SIP that EPA approved, UDAQ specifically noted that due to the 
significant variability of emission sources at a refinery, emission caps are appropriate. [See 
IR07768, PM10 SIP language attached to Holly Comment letter as Exhibit I, (because "there was 
significant variability from day to day and from year to year ... the refineries were allowed 
maximum never-to-be exceeded daily limits of PM10, SO2, NOx based on the apparent 
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variability").] This is true even though EPA generally disfavors source wide caps. In this case, 
EPA recognized an exception to the general approach in approving such caps in the PM 10 SIP. 
29. In light of the highly technical nature of this issue, UDAQ must be afforded the 
greatest degree of deference in its conclusions regarding the evidence in the record supporting 
the FCC Unit 25 ' s PTE calculations. See Utah Code§ 19-1-301.5(14). Lacking any evidence 
that would undermine UDAQ's conclusions, 16 Petitioners' challenge to the PM emission 
calculations fail. 
IX . Hollv is in Compliance with Title V. 
I. Petitioners next argue that the Holly AO may not be issued if Holly is not in 
compliance with Title V of the Clean Air Act. Petitioners make three distinct arguments related 
to this claim: (I) Holly's Title V application is not complete because the AO and Source Plan 
review lack certain Title V requirements; (2) Holly has not adequately supplemented its Title V 
application; and (3) not all applicable parts of Subpart Ja are included in the Holly AO in 
violation of Title V regulations. [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 46-51.] For the reasons stated 
below, these arguments should be rejected . 
16 For the first time in their Reply Brief, Petitioners appear to suggest that that the Holly AO is 
purportedly deficient because the Director's use of PM 10 modeling as a surrogate for PM2_5 
modeling was invalid. Specifically, Petitioners assert that the FCC Unit 25 must contain a 
separate PM2.s limit to ensure its emissions will not contribute to a NAAQS violation. 
[Petitioners' Reply Brief at 42.] Even were it permissible to raise a new argument in a Reply 
Brief, Petitioners never raised any concerns about this alleged surrogate policy in their comment 
letters; thus the issue is not preserved. Moreover, Holly is now subject to a source wide emission 
cap in the PM2.s SIP that will limit its PM2_5 emissions. [Utah PM2_5 SIP, January 8, 2014, p. 21 
(setting a source wide PM25 limit of 47.6 tons per rolling 12-month period).] UDAQ was 
reasonable in determining that its regulation of Holly's PM2_5 sources in the PM2_5 SIP would 
limit Holly' s emissions and that a separate limit in the Holly AO was unnecessary. 
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A. Findings of Fact 
2. Holly's predecessor-in-interest received a letter from UDAQ in 1995 that stated 
Holly's operating permit application was administratively complete, w hich provides Hol ly with 
an application shield from Title V enforcement action. [IR007725, Letter from UDAQ to the 
Phillips 66 Company, Holly's predecessor in interest (stating that "the Operating Permit 
application for Phillips Refinery (application #4 7) has been reviewed and determined to be 
complete in accordance with Utah Administrative Code (UAC) R307-15-5(1 )(b)," that "the 
above site is shie lded from enforcement action for operating without a permit until a permit is 
issued," and that additional information would be requested if needed).] 
3 . UDAQ recognized that Holly had a Title V application shie ld letter in its response 
to Petitioners' comments regarding Title V. [IR009 l 75, Response to Comments Memo (Holly 
submitted at UDAQ's request "a July 29, 1995 letter from UDAQ indicating that a complete 
Title V Permit application had been received [and it] has been included in the record."); 
1R0091 84, Response to Comments Memo ("ln any event ... Holly Refinery is operating under an 
application shield ... [t]he Title V application is currently pending.").] 
4. UDAQ also recognized that Petitioners pointed to no statute or regulation that 
would preclude Holly from receiving an approval order without first obtaining a final Title V 
permit. [IR009 184, Response to Comments Memo ("UDAQ does agree that Holly Refinery is a 
major source and is thus bound by R307-4 l 5, but the commenter has not referenced regulations 
that prevent a major source without a Title V permit from obtaining an AO, nor is UDAQ aware 
of such a regulation.").] 
5. UDAQ determined that Holly was still subject to all applicable federal regulations 
regardless of whether Holly was in receipt of a final Title V permit. [IR008571, Source Plan 
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Review ("Title V of the Clean Air Act of 1990 applies to Holly Refinery as a major source. The 
absence of a Title V permit does not negate the requirements of Holly Refinery, it is still subject 
to all AO conditions and federal regulations that would be included in the Title V permit.").] 
6. In connection with its independent review of the Holly AO, the EPA submitted 
two separate comment letters to UDAQ but did not raise any comments regarding non-
compliance with Title V or otherwise exercise EPA's broad oversight or enforcement discretion 
over the final Holly AO for any real or perceived failure regarding the same. [See IR00400 I , 
EPA First Comment Letter; IR007840-7841 , EPA Second Comment Letter.] 
B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation 
7. Petitioners did raise a Title V issue during the comment period that focused on the 
allegation that Holly was illegally operating without a Title V permit. [See IR007860-7861, 
Petitioners' Second Comment Letter ("Holly Refinery is illegally operating and will continue to 
do so until it receives a valid Title V permit.").] 
8 . However, this is a much different claim than what Petitioners advocate in their 
briefing on the merits- that somehow Holly's approval order and suppo1ting documentation 
turned into a Title V application that is insufficient, leaving Holly in violation of Title V of the 
Clean Air Act. 
9. This new argument was also not raised by Petitioners in their RAA even though 
the source plan review signature page they rely upon in the briefing was available for Petitioners 
to review. [See 1R007834-7835 (attached to Holly' s Second Comment Letter).] 
10. The relief requested in the RAA was simply that the Director must issue a Title V 
permit for Holly prior to authorizing the expansion project-not that Holly' s Title V application 
was incomplete or insufficient. [See RAA at 38.] 
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11. To the extent Petitioners' arguments extend beyond their initial contention that 
Holly is allegedly illegally operating without a valid Title V permit, such arguments have not 
been adequately preserved and should be dismissed on this basis. 
C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof 
12. The question of whether Holly is in compliance with Title V and whether UDAQ 
properly interpreted the Title V statute and rules to allow UDAQ to issue the Holly AO presents 
a mixed question of law and fact. The questions regarding interpretation of the Title V rules and 
regulations are questions of law. The application of that law to this specific case presents a 
mixed question of fact and law that must be reviewed under a reasonableness standard. 
13. Petitioners are required to marshal all of the relevant evidence on this issue to 
allow this tribunal to adequately evaluate whether there is substantial evidence in the record to 
support UDAQ's decision to issue the Holly AO. 
14. Petitioners have failed to satisfy their burden of proof for this claim. In fact, 
Petitioners' fail to reference the only p iece of record evidence related to Title V compliance: 
UDAQ's letter to Hol ly's predecessor expressly stating that the refinery is in compliance with 
Title V. [See IR007725.] 
15. Petitioners also fail to identify any final determination on Holly' s pending Title V 
application that would restrict UDAQ's ability to issue Holly its approval order. 
16. Lacking this evidence, Petitioners cannot satisfy their burden of proof and their 
claims regarding Title V must fail. 
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D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits 
17. Even if Petitioners had carried the ir burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is 
not properly applied to this c laim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits 
for the independent reasons discussed below . 
18. Petitioners argue that before the Director may issue Holly an approval order, he 
must purportedly determine whether Holly is in compliance with Title V. See Utah Admin. 
Code R307-401-8(l)(b)(x) (an approval order may only be issued if"the proposed installation 
will meet the applicable requirements of ... all other provisions of R307"); [see also Petitioners' 
Opening Br. at 4 7]. 
19. Petitioners asse1t that Holly is in violation of Title V because its Title V 
application is not complete and it has v iolated its duty to supplement its application "as 
necessary to address any requirements that become applicable to the source." Utah Admin. Code 
R307-415-5b. In support of this assertion, Petitioners re ly on the fact that, as part of Holly's 
approval order application, Holly s igned an optional signature page allowing the information in 
the Source Plan Review to be included in Holly's pending operating permit application. [See 
IR007836, SPR signature page.] Because this s ignature page signifies that the AO application is 
an update to Holly's Title V application but lacks certain Title V requirements, Petitioners argue 
that Holly's Title V application is legally deficient. 
20. Petitioners s imilarly argue that by omitting the Subpart Ja requirements in the 
Holly AO, Holly a lso has violated the application requirements under T itle V. On these bases, 
Petitioners asse1t that UDAQ may not issue an approval order to Holly while it is in vio lation of 
the Title V permit application requirements. 
2 1. These arguments fai I for four reasons . 
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22. First, any arguments related to Title V compliance or the sufficiency of Holly's 
Title V application is outside of this tribunal's jurisdiction. The Executive Director of DEQ has 
made clear that an ALJ'sjurisdiction is limited to the administrative record before him or her and 
the particular permit under review. [See Emery Order (limiting ALJ's jurisdiction to the record 
before her and prohibiting consideration of an NOl application that could be granted or denied at 
some point in the future.).] Any other permits or applications for permits that Holly may have 
submitted-all of which involve separate administrative records-are beyond the scope of these 
proceedings. Id. More important, Petitioners do not point to any final Title V permit decision 
that could be reviewed by this tribunal even if it had jurisdiction to do so. 
23. Second, even if I had jurisdiction, it is clear from this record that Petitioners have 
not presented any evidence or authority that renders invalid the application shield letter issued to 
Holly's predecessor-in-interest. [See IR007725.] This shield remains in place until the 
permitting authority takes action on the entire Title V permit application, which it appears has 
not yet occurred. See 42 U .S.C. § 7661 c( d) ("if a pa1t 70 source submits a timely and complete 
application for permit issuance (including for renewal), the source's failure to have a part 70 
permit is not a violation of this part until the permitting authority takes final action on the permit 
application"); see also 40 C.F.R. § 70.7(6) (same); see also Utah Admin. Code. R307-415-
5a(3)(e) (same). This means every approval order that Holly has received is an update to its Title 
V permit application. The Holly AO is no exception and does not independently give rise to a 
cause of action under Title V's separate rules or regulations. 
24. Third, even ifJ had jurisdiction, this argument fails as a matter of law: Nothing in 
the Title V statute or applicable regulations contains any time period for supplementation of the 
Title V application. See Utah Admin. Code R307-415-5b. That Holly continues to provide 
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information to EPA and UDAQ regarding NSPS compliance (which is a Title V requirement) 
effectively evidences that Holly's Title V permit application is being updated on an ongoing 
basis. [See IR004 I 38-59, Exhibit 7 to Petitioners' first comment letter (containing a compliance 
repo11, sent to the EPA and UDAQ, including compliance demonstration for NSPS 
requirements).] Thus, Petitioners' reliance on the signature page as evidence of an incomplete 
Title V application is without merit. 
25. Fourth, even if I had jurisdiction, Petitioners' argument that UDAQ's failure to 
recite the entire Subpart Ja regulation in the Holly AO violates Title Vis incorrect. [Petitioners' 
Br. at I 0-11.] As previously explained, UDAQ is not required to recite the entire 43-page 
Subpart Ja regulation in the Holly AO. In any event, the record demonstrates that Subpart Ja 
does apply and that Holly is in compliance with all federal requirements. [See JR007725.] 
26. For all of these reasons, Petitioners' claims regarding Title V fail on the merits 
and should be dismissed with prejudice. 
X . The Record Supports the Use of the NEI Emission Factors in Holly's Emission 
Calculations. 
I. Petitioners next argue that the Director erred when he authorized the use of the 
NEI emission factors to calculate PM emissions from certain of Holly's heaters and boilers. 
[Petitioners' Opening Brief at 51-58.] For the reasons discussed below, this argument should be 
rejected. 
A. Findings of Fact 
2. Holly submitted to UDAQ two independent expert reports explaining why the 
NET emission factors were more accurate and better predictors of emissions than the AP-42 
emission factors-namely, because of the newer dilution testing methodology that was used to 
develop the NEI emission factors. [IR007238-58, First G len England Report ("England I " ) 
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(explaining why the NEI emission factors more accurately predict PM2.s emissions from gas 
fired heaters and boilers); 1R008024-44, Second Glen England Report ("England Il") (same).] 
3. Because the NEJ emission factors were untested at the Holly refinery, UDAQ 
imposed stack testing requirements to verify the accuracy of the emission factor calculations. 
[1R009215-16, Response to Comments Memo (explaining that UDAQ imposed stack testing 
requirements to verify the accuracy of the NEI emission factors, reviewed the Glen England 
Reports and maintained the original conclusion that use of the NEJ emission factors was 
appropriate); IR009217, Response to Comments Memo (explaining that Holly was subject to a 
stringent emission limit for its heaters and boilers that matched the NEI emission factor 
calculations and that Holly is subject to stack testing requirements to verify compliance).] 
4. UDAQ also imposed an emission limit of0.00051 lb/MMBtu in Section 11.B.7.a.2 
of the Holly AO. [IR009248, Holly AO.] 
5. UDAQ only imposed this limit on Holly's NSPS heaters and boilers. [IR008558-
59, Source Plan Review (explaining use ofNEI emission factors for NSPS sources); 1R009218, 
Response to Comments Memo (explaining use ofNEI emission factors for NSPS sources).] 
6. Presumably at the request of Mark Hall, a commenter on the draft Holly AO, EPA 
staff members sent emails to an undisclosed Gmail account discussing the accuracy of the NEJ 
emission factors and the ability of EPA to approve new emission factors generally. [JR008911-
8922; JR009043.] Neither the attachments to these emails nor the complete emails were 
included with the comments. [Id.] 
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B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation 
7. Petitioners preserved some aspects of their argument regarding their challenge to 
the NEI emission factors in accordance with 19-1-301.5( 4) by raising the issue during the pub I ic 
comment period. [See IR008584-8595, Mark Hall Second Comment Letter.] 
8. Petitioners did not, however, preserve the argument that§ 7430 of the Clean Air 
Act precluded the use of the NEI emission factors. 
9. Section 7430 of the Clean Air Act was not cited anywhere in the comments 
submitted during the public comment period but was reasonably ascertainable because it was 
codified in the U.S. Code during the public comment period. 
10. Petitioners did not raise this substantive argument until their briefing on their 
request for a stay in this proceeding . 
11. Accordingly, any arguments relating to § 7430 of the Clean Air Act are 
unpreserved and should be dismissed. 
12 . In their Reply Brief, Petitioners, argued for the first time that the § 7430 claim 
was made in response to additional information submitted to UDAQ after the close of the public 
comment period and was therefore not barred by the preservation rules found in Utah Code 
Section 19-1-30 I .5( 4 ). Petitioners asserted than any prohibition to their ability to address 
information submitted after the close of the public comment period would be a violation of their 
due process rights. 
13 . Petitioners' due process argument relating to their ability to assert the § 7430 
claim was not briefed until the Reply. Issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are rejected 
in appellate contexts. See e.g. , Coleman ex rel. Schefski v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, ~ 9, I 7 P.3d 
I 122 (refusing to consider matters raised for the first time in the reply brief). Accordingly, this 
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tribunal will not entertain Petitioners' due process arguments briefed for the first time in their 
Reply Brief. 
14. Additionally, even if such an argument were properly before this tribunal, the 
only information Holly submitted after the close of the public comment period relating to the 
NEI emission factors was the second Glen England Report, in which Mr. England expanded on 
his prior report (submitted before the public comment period) explaining why the NE! emission 
factors were the most representative factor for determining emissions from Holly's new heaters 
and boilers. [See IR008024-44.] 
15. Petitioners' § 7430 argument is not directed at this second Glen England report 
and does not address any of the technical findings contained therein. Instead, as Petitioners 
admit, the § 7430 argument is purely a legal argument relating to whether UDAQ could use 
emission factors other than the AP-42 factors, officially approved by EPA. 
16. Therefore, in light of the fact that the§ 7430 argument has nothing to do with the 
Glen England Report and is a purely legal argument that was reasonably ascertainable during the 
public comment period, the claim has not been adequately preserved, and no due process rights 
have been infringed. 
C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof 
17. Even if Petitioners' claims had all been adequately preserved, they have failed to 
meet their burden of proof. 
18. Petitioners' claim that UDAQ erred in relying on the NEI emission factors to 
calculate the PTE for Holly's NSPS heaters and boilers presents a mixed question of law and 
fact. Whether UDAQ is legally authorized to use an emission factor other than AP-42 is a 
question of law and UDAQ has been given discretion to interpret this law, requiring the 
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application of a clearly erroneous standard ofreview. The question of whether UDAQ was 
reasonable in accepting the NEI emission factor data is a highly technical mixed question of law 
and fact that is reviewed for reasonableness. 
19. Although Petitioners reference, in a footnote, the Glen England Reports, they do 
not analyze any of the information contained in those reports. Instead, Petitioners focus on a 
paper that Glen England published in 2004, wh ich discusses genera lly the NEI emission factors 
as well as several emails from EPA staff discussing the adequacy of the NE! emission factors. 
20. Petitioners also focus their argument on the assertion that UDAQ is prohibited by 
Section 7430 of the Clean Air Act from using any emission factors not specifically approved by 
EPA. 
21. Petitioners have failed to adequately marshal all of the relevant evidence for this 
highly complicated issue. Accordingly, they have not satisfied their burden of proof to challenge 
Holly's use of and UDAQ's acceptance of the NEI emission factors. 
• D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits 
• 
• 
• 
22. Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is 
not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits 
for the independent reasons discussed below . 
23. Petitioners advance multiple arguments as to why the use of the NEI emission 
factors to calculate emissions from Holly' s heater and boilers was improper. Each of these 
arguments fai ls for the reasons discussed in detail below . 
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i. There is No Legal Requirement that UDAO use AP-42 Emission 
Factors 
24. Petitioners argue that the law mandates UDAQ use AP-42 emission factors to 
calculate PM emissions from Holly's NSPS heaters and boilers. This argument fails for three 
reasons. 
25. First, nothing in Utah's minor source permitting regulations and nothing in the 
federal PSD/NSR regulations requires the use of AP-42 emission factors. In fact, those 
regulations do not mention the AP-42 factors at all. 
26. While EPA has identified the AP-42 factors as one method of estimating potential 
emissions under the PSD/NSR program, the AP-42 factors are not the only authorized method. 
EPA also has sanctioned numerous other methods, including "emissions from technical 
literature." [EPA New Source Review Workshop Manual, Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration and Nonattainment Area Permitting, draft dated October 1990 ("EPA 
Puzzlebook"). The NEI emission factors are "emissions from technical literature" that Holly 
used to calculate potential PM2.5 emissions from its gas fired heaters and boilers. 
27. Moreover, the AP-42 factors themselves caution that they are not to be 
mechanically applied, but may be superseded by more specific or appropriate technical 
information. As EPA has advised: 
Before simply applying AP-42 emission factors to predict emissions from new or 
proposed sources, or to make other source-specific emission assessments, the user 
should review the latest literature and technology to be aware of circumstances 
that might cause such sources to exhibit emission characteristics different from 
those of other, typical existing sources. Care should be taken to assure that the 
subject source type and design, controls, and raw material input are those of the 
source(s) analyzed to produce the emission factor. This fact shou ld be 
considered, as well as the age of the information and the user's knowledge of 
technology advances. 
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EPA, Introduction to AP-42, 4 (Jan. 1995), available at www.epa.gov/ttnchie1/ap42/c00s00.pdf. 
In this fashion, EPA delegates to the relevant permitting authority discretion to determine how to 
calculate emission rates. 
28. Second, Petitioners' argument that the NSPS regulations mandate the use of AP-
42 is also misplaced because the NSPS program is entirely separate from the PSD program and 
regulations from one program cannot dictate action in the other. See, e.g, Envtl. Defense v. Duke 
Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 577 (2007) (recognizing the definitions of "modification" under the 
PSD and NSPS programs are distinct and the "PSD regulations on 'modification' simply cannot 
be taken to track the Agency's regulatory definition under the NSPS"). 
29. Finally, Petitioners' argument that 42 U.S.C. § 7430 prohibits the use of the NEI 
emission factors because EPA has not specifically approved such factors also fails. 
30. The plain language of this statute contradicts Petitioners ' argument because 
Section 7430 applies only to emission factors used "to estimate the quantity of emissions of 
carbon monoxide, volatile organic compounds, and oxides of nitrogen from sources of such air 
pollutions."17 42 U.S.C. § 7430 (emphasis added). The statute says nothing about the use of 
emission factors to estimate the quantity of PM2.s and PM10-the only emissions for which Holly 
used NEI factors to estimate emissions from its heaters and boilers . 
31. In any event, Section 7430 does not dictate that UDAQ use any specific emission 
factors in a permitting proceed ing, but requires EPA to update emission factors, saying nothing 
17 Consistent with the plain language of the statute, EPA has repeatedly explained that this 
provision applies only to "the emission factors used to estimate emissions of volatile organic 
compounds (VOC), carbon monoxide (CO), and oxides of nitrogen (NOx) from area and mobile 
sources," not to emission factors for PM2.s and PM10• 67 Fed. Reg. 56289 (Sept. 3, 2002); 62 
Fed. Reg. 45802 (Aug. 29, 1997) . 
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about when such factors must be used. UDAQ retains discretion to decide which emission 
factors are appropriate, in its expert technical opinion. 
32. As EPA has explained in evaluating the use of emission factors generated under 
Section 7430: 
These procedures are not a means for individual facilities to obtain EPA approval 
of a site-specific emission factor or to determine the appropriateness of applying a 
published EPA factor to a specific facility. EPA does not approve site-specific 
factors or judge the appropriateness of its factors for specific facilities. The 
responsibility for such decisions continues to be that of the State or local 
regulating authority, as well as the facility operators themselves. 
EPA' s published emission factors are intended to provide an affordable method of 
estimating emissions where no better data are available. They are best used to 
characterize the total emissions loading of a large geographic area containing 
many individual facilities. Therefore, these factors attempt to represent a typical 
or average facility or process in a given industry. EPA recognizes that other 
methods of obtaining emissions estimates may be more accurate than industry-
average emission factors, and encourages the use of better methods whenever the 
source and/or the State or local regulating authority is able to support those 
methods. 
Public Participation Procedures for EPA Emission Estimation Guidance Materials, at 2 (May 
1997) (second and third emphasis added). 18 
33. EPA has specifically recognized that state permitting authorities may use other 
methods without obtaining approval under§ 7430, so long as the permitting authority "is able to 
support these methods." Id. 
34. UDAQ had substantial evidence in the record to support its decision to use the 
NEI emission factors as set forth in section ii. below. 
18 Available at http://tinyurl.com/EPA-guidance. 
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35. Petitioners have fai led to establish any valid legal basis mandating the use of AP-
42 emission factors for estimating PTE for permitting purposes. Therefore this claim fa ils on the 
merits. 
ii. It Was Reasonable for UDAO to Accept Ho/Iv's Use ofthe NE/ 
Emission Factors 
36. UDAQ did not abuse its discretion by fo llowing EPA' s instruction and looking to 
alternative methods of calculating emissions in this case. As noted above, the determination of 
which emission factors to use fa lls squarely within the discretion of UDAQ. That determination 
is entitled to substantial deference, particularly given its technical nature. See, e.g., Utah Code 
§ 19-1-301.5(13)(b); accord In re: N Mich. Univ. Ripley Heating Plant, PSD Appeal No. 08-02, 
at 53 (EAB Feb. 18, 2009) ("[Q]uestions pertaining to the appropriate pollutant emissions rates 
and other inputs to air quality models raise scientific and technical concerns that generally are 
best left to the specialized expertise and reasoned judgment of the permitting authority."); In re: 
Newmont Nev. Energy Inv., LLC, TS Power Plant, 12 E.A.D. 429, 444 (EAB 2005) ("[W]e 
accord broad deference to permitting authorities with respect to issues requiring the exercise of 
technical judgment and expertise."); Utah Dep 't of Adm in. Servs. v. Pub. Serv. Comm 'n, 658 
P.2d 601,610 (Utah 1983) ("[A] court shou ld afford great deference to the technical expertise or 
more extensive experience of the responsible agency."). 
37. Before explaining why UDAQ's acceptance of the NEI emissions factors is 
reasonable, suppo1ted by substantial evidence, and does not constitute an abuse of discretion, it is 
necessary to provide some brief background regarding PM and emission factors generally. 
38. Particulate matter (PM) is comprised of a complex mixture of extremely small 
particles and liquid droplets. [Utah PM2_5 State Implementation P lan, adopted December 4, 2013 
("2013 SIP"), § I. I .] PM1o is particulate matter with an aerodynamic diameter of 10 microns or 
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less. 40 C.F.R. § 51.50. PM2.5 is particulate matter with an aerodynamic diameter of 2.5 
microns or less. Id. 
39. There are two types of PM emissions: primary and secondary. The type on which 
Petitioners focus in their challenge, primary PM, is comprised of particles that are directly 
emitted from a source as a solid or liquid ("filterable PM") or vapor that immediately condenses 
after discharge to form solid or liquid PM ("condensable PM"). See 40 C.F.R. § 51.50. 
According to EPA's AP-42 emission factors, condensable PM accounts for 75% of PM 
emissions from the type of natural gas combustion sources at issue here. [ See AP-42 
Compilation of Air Pollutant Emission Factors (1998); see also England II at IR008029.] 
40. An emission factor attempts to estimate the quantity of a pollutant released into 
the atmosphere with an activity associated with the release of that pollutant. 47 Fed. Reg. 
52723-01, 52724 (Oct. 14, 2009). EPA's AP-42 emission factors were "initially developed for 
emission inventory purposes only"-i.e., to assist national, regional, state, and local regulatory 
authorities with making air quality management decisions and developing emission control 
strategies. Id. at 52723, 52725. Since then, however, EPA has recognized the AP-42 emission 
factors have been "used for many other air pollution control activities for which they were not 
designed," including permitting and enforcement. Id. 
4 l. Various testing methods have been developed for calculating primary PM2.s 
emissions (both filterable and condensable). The AP-42 factors on which Petitioners rely were 
originally developed almost twenty years ago using a "stack test impinger method," which draws 
a gas sample through a heated filter and then a series of iced "impingers." [England I at 
IR007240.] As explained in the England Reports, the problem with this method is that cooling 
the sample with chilled water causes emissions- and particularly SO2 emissions- to condense 
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and particulate out as "pseudo-particulate" matter. Although the gas emissions would not 
condense to form particulate matter under normal operating conditions, the AP-42 factors 
nevertheless measure this pseudo-particulate matter as primary PM2.5. [England II at IR008027-
8029; England I at IR007240, 1R007242.] 
42. EPA has recognized this same problem with the stack test impinger method. EPA 
has observed, for example, that "sulfur dioxide (S02) gas (a typical component of emissions 
from several types of stationary sources) can be absorbed partially in the impinger solutions and 
can react chemically to form sulfuric acid. This sulfuric acid 'artifact ' is not related to the 
primary emission of [ condensable paiticulate matter] from the source, but may be counted 
erroneously as [condensable particulate matter]." 75 Fed. Reg. 80,118, 80,121 (Dec. 21 , 2010). 
EPA also has acknowledged "that S0 2 in particular, and perhaps other gaseous compounds, can 
react with the collecting liquids used in the [stack test impinger] method to form materials 
(artifacts) that would not otherwise be solid or liquid or would not condense upon exiting the 
stack." 72 Fed. Reg. 20,586, 20,653 (Apr. 25, 2007) . 
43. The Glen England Reports explain that this problem is particularly acute for gas-
fired sources. EPA developed its test methods for sources such as coal-fired boilers, which emit 
PM concentrations at much higher levels than gas-fired sources, and EPA has never evaluated 
the performance of these methods for gas-fired sources. [England II at IR008029, IR008034.] 
These measurement errors caused by the hot filter/iced impinger methods "are so significant 
when applied to gas-fired boilers and heaters ... that they partially or completely obscure the true 
emission level." 19 [England II at IR008029.] 
19 In addition to being based on flawed test methods which measure artifacts that do not actually 
constitute pa,ticulate matter, the relevant AP-42 PM2.5 factors are based on limited data. The 
AP-42 PM2.s factors are based on only 11 tests of four emissions units for condensable 
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44. The NEJ factors, by contrast, were developed using a newer "di lution method." 
Unlike the old stack test methods, dilution-based testing does not create artificial pseudo-
particulate matter because the gas sample is cooled with filtered air, similar to what happens to 
emissions in the course of actual operations. According to the England Reports, this results in 
much more representative and accurate PM2_5 measurements. [England lJ at IR008027, 
IR008030-8032; England I at IR00724 I.] 
45. EPA has recognized the benefits of this newer testing method, observing "that a 
dilution sampling method for measuring direct PM2_5 eliminates essentially all artifact formation 
and provides the most accurate emissions quantification." 72 Fed. Reg. 20,586, 20,653 (Apr. 25, 
2007) (emphasis added). In fact, EPA has expressly identified certain applications "where 
dilution sampling provides advantages over the standard test methods," and actively 
"encourage(dl sources that encounter these situations to request that the regulatory authority ... 
use this method to approve the use of dilution sampling as an alternative to the test method 
specified for determining compliance." 75 Fed. Reg.80118-01, 80132 (emphasis added). 
46. In this case, EPA raised no objection to use of the NEI emission factors during the 
public comment period.20 [See Response to Comments at 43 (noting that "during the public 
comment period, EPA did not object to the use of [the NEI] emission factors").] Nor has EPA 
particulate matter (which forms the majority of PM2_5 emissions). [England II at IR008039.] 
These tests were not performed by EPA, but by contractors on behalf of individual facilities or 
industry trade associations. [England II at 1R008035.] Moreover, the measurement uncertainty 
of the AP-42 PM2.s factors for gas-fired sources is greater than the average estimate of emissions. 
[England II at 4.] The England Reports describe these and a number of other flaws with the AP-
42 PM2.s factors that are not reiterated in detail here. [See England II at 3.] 
20 While EPA did ask for more information as to the basis for the reduction of PM10 and PM2.s 
potential-to-emit numbers in Holly's second netting analysis, [ see IR007840-7841 ], UDAQ 
addressed this inquiry in its Response to Comments, explaining that the calculations were "based 
on the 2006 EPA-published National Emissions Inventory (NEI) Information." [IR009176] 
Subsequent to this direct identification of the use ofNEI emission factors, EPA has raised no 
further questions concerning the netting analysis or otherwise challenged Holly' s AO. 
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challenged the issuance of the AO. EPA also has raised no objection to UDAQ's recent 
authorization of the NEI factors for purposes of calculating PM2_5 under UDAQ's PM2_5 State 
Implementation Plan. [See Utah SIP § I.X.H.11 (k)(i), dated January 8, 2014 ("SLP Pa11 H") at 
60.] 
47. In arguing that UDAQ must use the AP-42 emission factors, Petitioners do not 
defend the accuracy of the AP-42 factors on a technical basis. Nor do they address any of the 
criticisms, expressed by both EPA and the England Reports, about the inaccuracies of the stack 
test impinger methods on which the AP-42 factors are based. 
48. The fact that AP-42 factors have been used in the past does not mean that UDAQ 
must continue to rely on those same factors for the Holly AO. UDAQ's determinations-
including the " technical" and "scientific" questions such as what emission factors are to be 
used-are to be made on the basis of the evidence provided to UDAQ and placed in the 
administrative record in a particular permitting action. Utah Code § 19-1-301.5(13)(6 ). Holly 
provided UDAQ with data regarding the flaws in the AP-42 PM2_5 factors and outlining the 
superior accuracy of the NEI PM2_5 factors. UDAQ evaluated this evidence and "determined that 
the NEI emission factors can be used." [IR.009216, Response to Comments Memo.] Prior use of 
the AP-42 PM2.s factors does not undermine this conclusion.21 
21 Petitioners' claim that the May 2011 RT! International Emission Estimation Protocol for 
Petroleum Refineries endorses the use of the AP-42 emission factors and does not identify the 
NE! PM2.5 data. [See lR008661 , attachment F to Mark Hall Second Comment Letter.] However, 
the purpose of the protocol was not to identify the absolute level of PM2_5 emissions from each 
refinery, but to require the tested refineries to use the same emissions factor so that their relative 
emissions could be compared. In responding to comments on the protocol, EPA explained that 
" it is important that default emission factors are consistent between different reporters so we can 
properly compare the results." [Summary of Comments and Responses, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-
0682 (Feb. 2, 2011), Appx. V of Holly' s Opposition to Motion for Stay, also available at 
www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HO-OAR-20 I 0-0682-0028.] In any event, the 
protocol itself states that the "emission factors in AP-42 are the recommended default emission 
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49. Based on the substantial evidence in the record providing techn ical support for 
UDAQ's decision to accept use of the NEJ emission factors and the emission calculations based 
on those factors, and given the lack of contradictory technical evidence, Petitioners cannot meet 
their burden to demonstrate that UDAQ acted unreasonably. 
iii. The NE/ PMu Emission Factors are Based 011 Sound Technical 
Data and Petitioners' Reference to Other Information Does Not 
Undermine the Data. 
50. The majority of the technical data supporting the NEI emission factors is found 
in the England Repo1ts, which state that " [t]he NE! PM2.5 emission factors were derived by 
EPA staff from data contained in GE EER's comprehensive test reports published from 2002-
2004," along with "detailed supporting test data." [England 11 at IR008032.] 
51. This testing program " included extensive quality assurance measures," and more 
comprehensive data than is provided in the compliance tests used to developed the AP-42 
factors. [England II at IR008034-8035 .] These results have been subject to peer review and 
have been corroborated by other independent scientific studies. [England JI at IR008032.] The 
NEI test data is also quantitatively superior when it comes to condensable particulate matter 
emissions, which form the majority of PM2.s emissions: the AP-42 factors were based on 1 I test 
runs of four units, while the NEI factors were based on 20 test runs of six units. [England II at 
IR008039, IR00804 l.] 
52. The cautionary statements regarding the NEI emission factors upon which 
Petitioners re ly "do not suggest in any way that those factors are insufficiently supported by data 
or should not be used." [England II at IR008033.] The AP-42 PM emission factors are 
accompanied by similar language explaining that the emission factors are based on limited data 
factors," not that the AP-42 factors are the on ly permissible emission factors. [IR008715 
(emphasis added).] 
100 
ADJ011635 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
and may not be accurate. [England 11 at IR008029-8030.] Such cautionary language is generally 
found in all instances where emission factors are used. 
53. The boiler sampling data and performance guarantees from the John Zink 
Company are an incomplete compilation of data that is not explained, nor relatable to Holly' s gas 
fired heaters and boilers. The boiler standards were provided to UDAQ on a one-page sheet of 
test results, without the full test reports or any explanation as to the testing methodology or 
nature of the emissions sources. [See IR008586, Mark Hall Second Comment Letter.] 
Additionally, two of the four boilers did not burn natural gas during their tests and so are not 
analogous to the gas-fired sources at issue here. [England II at IR008030 n. l .] The emissions 
from the remaining two sources vary widely, resulting in "very low" confidence in the average. 
[England II at IR008040.] Accordingly, this data does not undermine use of the NEI emission 
factors. 
54. The Zink guarantees were similarly provided without context or explanation. 
Without the testing data, it is impossible to verify that these factors were not based on the same 
flawed test methods as the AP-42 factors. Moreover, the Zink guarantees are not emission 
factors or estimates, but rather guarantees provided by a commercial manufacturer that emissions 
will not exceed a cettain level. Equipment manufacturers have an incentive to guarantee 
emissions that are conservatively high so that the commercial risk associated with failing to meet 
the guarantee is low. [England II at IR008034 ("If PM guarantees are not met during 
performance tests on a new unit, tens or hundreds of millions of dollars in customer payments 
may be at stake.").] 
55. In weighing the evidence in the record, as this tribunal must do in accordance 
with Utah Code Section 19-1-30 1.5, it is c lear that the use of the NEI emission factors is 
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supported by the majority of sound scientific evidence in the record and UDAQ was therefore 
reasonable in its acceptance of the NEI factors. 
iv. UDAO Was Reasonable in its Reliance on Enforceable Emissions 
Limits in the Ho/Iv AO in Determining the Potential to Emit for 
Hollv's Heaters and Boilers. 
56. Petitioners argue that emission limits on Holly's heaters and boilers cannot be 
used to limit the facility's potential to emit and so UDAQ erred in its determination that Holly's 
project was minor for PM2.s- This tribunal disagrees. 
57. The AO imposes an enforceable limit on PM2_5 emissions from each of the 
emissions units for which the NEI emission factors were used in an amount equal to the NEI 
emission factors. [1R009248, Holly AO (providing that "[t]he emissions of PM 10 from the 
following NSPS Boilers and heaters shall not exceed 0.00051 lb/MMBtu").] 
58. The methodology used in this case to determine whether the proposed 
modification was "major" for PSD/NSR purposes was a comparison of the refinery's potential to 
emit after the expansion project versus its baseline actual emissions before the expansion. See 40 
C.F.R. § 52.21 (a)(2)(iv)(d). [See also IR008560, Source Plan Review (noting that Holly has 
used the potential to emit methodology to determine the projected increases from the expansion 
project).] Under this method, the estimated potential emissions are compared to the baseline 
emissions; if the difference between the two exceeds a certain quantity, the modification is 
deemed "major" for that pollutant. 
59. "Potential to emit" is defined as 
the maximum capacity of a stationary source to emit a pollutant under its physical 
and operational design. Any physical or operational limitation on the capacity of 
the source to emit a pollutant, including air pollution control equipment and 
restrictions on hours of operation or on the type or amount of material combusted, 
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stored, or processed, shall be treated as part of its design if the limitation or the 
effect it would have on emissions isfederally enforceable. 22 
40 C.F.R. § 52.2 1(b)(4) (emphasis added); Utah Admin. Code R307-I0l-2 (same definition).23 
60. The emissions limit imposed on the NSPS boilers and heaters is an enforceable 
limitation in the Holly AO. [See IR009218, Response to Comments Memo (" If the stack testing 
indicates that Holly Refinery cannot comply with these emission factors, it would be out of 
compliance with its AO .... ")]; see also 67 Fed. Reg. 80, 186, 80,190-91 (Dec. 31, 2002) 
(explaining when an emissions limitation is enforceable). Accordingly, the potential to emit of 
these emissions units was properly limited to 0.00051 lb/MMBtu - the same level as established 
by the NEI emission factors. 
61. UDAQ was reasonab le in relying on this limiting factor in its determination that 
Holly's project would only be a minor modification for PM. 
62. Ultimately, none of Petitioners' arguments challenging Holly's use of the NEI 
emission factors undermines ' UDAQ's reasonable decision to accept Holly's emission 
calculations based on those factors. Petitioners' arguments on this claim all fail on the merits 
and should be dismissed with prejudice . 
XI. The Emission Reductions From the Decommissioning of the Propane Pit Flare 
Were Properly Included in Holly's Netting Analysis. 
22 The term "federally" in this definition is interpreted as meaning "practically enforceab le" by a 
federal, state, or local entity. 67 Fed. Reg. 80,186, 80, 191 (Dec. 31, 2002). [See also 
Memorandum from John S. Seitz re: Release ofinterim Policy on Federal Enforceability of 
Limitations on Potential to Emit, at 3 (Jan. 22, 1996).] 
23 Petitioners suggest that the NSPS regulations provide a definition for calculating "potential to 
emit." This is incorrect. The NSPS rules nowhere use the concept of "potential to emit" to 
determine whether a modification has taken place. Instead, the NSPS definition of modification 
is based on whether there has been a change in the hourly emissions rate, while the PSD 
regulations are based on total annual emissions. See Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. at 577-78 . 
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I. Petitioners final argument is that Holly inaccurately calculated the emission 
reductions from its decommissioning of the propane pit flare and should not have included such 
emissions in its netting analysis. [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 60-61]. For the reasons stated 
below, this final argument should be rejected. 
A. Findings of Fact 
2. The emission reductions that Holly claimed from its decommissioning of the 
propane pit flare came from actual emission inventory information submitted to UDAQ in 2008 
and 2009 and were not re-calculated specifically for purposes of this project. [IR0092 l 8, 
Response to Comments Memo ("flare emissions came from the UDAQ inventory record for 
repo1ted actual emissions from 2008-2009 based on 259 MMBtu/hr and actual throughput 
data").] 
3. The historic modifications to the propane pit flare to bring it into compliance with 
NSPS did not affect the baseline calculations or the AP-42 emission factor calculations. 
[IR007337, Revised NOi ("Compliance with NSPS affects neither the AP-42 emission factor 
calculation, which is based on the amount of propane used, nor the baseline calculations.").] 
4. None of Holly's modifications to the Propane Pit Flare affected overall emissions. 
Therefore Holly was free to take credit for the emission reductions when the flare was 
decommissioned. [IR009 l 82, Response to Comments Memo ("Because compliance with 40 
CFR 60 Subpaits A & J did not affect emissions, reductions from the removal of this propane pit 
flare are creditable reductions.").] 
5. In connection with its independent review of the Holly AO, EPA submitted two 
separate comment letters to UDAQ. [See IR004001, EPA First Comment Letter; IR007840-
7841 , EPA Second Comment Letter.] While the Second Comment Letter requested more 
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information regarding (a) "the basis for the estimate of emissions reduced by conve1ting from 
gas fired to electric motors for the compressors" [IR007840] and (b) the netting calculations 
relating to the new benzene saturation unit #23 and applying a boiler #5 NOx limit [IR007841], 
the EPA raised no concerns about the netting issues raised by Petitioners in their final argument 
on appeal. Moreover, EPA 's request for supplemental information on this issue was satisfied in 
UDAQ's response to comments. 
B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation 
6. Petitioners preserved this argument in accordance with 19-1-301.5( 4) by raising 
this issue during the public comment period. [See IR007857 Petitioners ' Second Comment 
Letter.] 
• C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
7. The issue of whether Holly accurately estimated reduction of PM emissions from 
the removal of its propane pit flare presents highly technical factual questions. It also presents 
legal questions about what data may be used for reduction purposes in a netting analysis . 
Accordingly, this issue is a mixed question of law and fact and UDAQ's decision to include the 
emission reductions in the netting analysis will be analyzed under a reasonableness standard. 
8 . Petitioners failed to marshal all of the evidence pe1taining to this issue- namely 
the 2008 and 2009 emission inventory data. Petitioners merely question the final calculations 
without presenting any conflicting evidence or analyzing the evidence in the record. 
9 . Accordingly, Petitioners have not met their burden of proof on this c laim and it 
fails on that basis. 
D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits 
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10. Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is 
not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits 
for the independent reasons discussed below. 
11. Petitioners argue that the propane pit flare emissions were overestimated based on 
Holly's use of AP-42 emission factors. Petitioners contend the emission reduction must be 
overestimated because based on the calculated reduction, the propane pit flare would have been 
burning every day of the year. 
12. Petitioners submit no evidence in support of this contention. Specifically, 
Petitioners do not address the fact that the emission reduction was based on the 2008 and 2009 
historic emission inventory data that Holly submitted to UDAQ as required by Utah Admin. 
Code R307-150. 
13. Part of this calculation involved the use of AP-42 emission factors to calculate the 
emissions from the flares because emission factors are necessary where emissions are generated 
from an open flame. [See IR007337, Revised NOT, ("Baseline emissions for the flare at the 
propane pit were calculated based on the AP-42 emission factors for flares.").] 
14. For purposes of netting, the regulations expressly provide that the historical 
inventory information may be used as a baseline for calculating emissions increases and 
decreases. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(6)(48)(ii). 
15. That Holly used NEI emission factors to calculate emissions from its heaters and 
boilers is irrelevant to the question of whether the flare emissions were properly calculated with 
AP-42 factors . Petitioners have pointed to no statute or regulation that would require Holly or 
UDAQ to re-calculate historic inventory information every time new emission factors are 
developed. 
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16. Petitioners ' claim that there is no evidence in the record to support these historic 
emission calculations also fails because all parties, including Petitioners, agreed to exclude the 
emission inventory calculations from the record given the volume of those files. [See Holly's 
Surreply at 28; see also UDAQ's Surreply at 33.] If Petitioners thought there was an error in the 
calculations, the information could have been made available to them for their review. 
Petitioners may not now argue, without having asked to review the calculations, that the lack of 
such evidence supports their claim . 
17. Petitioners have failed to present any evidence that would undermine the 
significant deference afforded to UDAQ in its review of highly technical emission calculations 
and review of netting analyses. Moreover, Petitioners have presented no technical evidence that 
undermines the accuracy of the historical inventory information. Accordingly, Petitioners' 
challenge to the propane pit flare emission calculations fails on the merits and should be 
dismissed with prejudice. 
CONCLUSION AND PROPOSED ORDER 
I. Based on the foregoing, Petitioners have not met their burden to demonstrate that 
UDAQ erred in issuing the Holly AO. 
2. Further based on the foregoing and having satisfied my charge to undertake a 
pe1mit review adjudicative proceeding in connection with this matter in accordance with Utah 
law, I recommend that the Executive Director deny Petitioners' Request for Agency Action and 
affirm UDAQ's issuance of the Holly AO . 
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DATED this 1 Ith day of March, 2015. 
BRET F. RANDALL 
Administrative Law Judge 
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APPENDIX A 
Table of Waived Claims Petitioners Raised in T heir RAA But Failed to Br ief on the Merits 
RAAPage Description of Waived Claim Claim# in 
Number Briefs • 
27-29 "The AO Does Not Adequately Address Co Emissions and CO 8 
BACT" 
29-30 "The Director Failed to Respond to Public Comments as Required by 9 
Law" 
• 43-44 "It is Impossible to Verify the Facility's SO2 Potential to Emit" 17 
47-48 "The BACT for the South Flare is Inadequate" 20 
50 "The AO Does Not Comply with the Federally Enforceable PM 10 24 
SIP" 
51 "There is No Adequate Basis in the Record for the AO as the Record 25 
Does Not Reflect Independent Analysis of the Assertions and 
Calculations Made in the NOi" 
51-52 "There is Insufficient Information and Analysis in the Record to 26 • Support the AO" 
53 "The Netting Analysis is Insufficient and Does Not Support the 28 
Finding that the Expansion Project is a Minor Modification" 
53-55 "The Holl y Refining NOi is Incomplete for its Failure to address 29 
Hydrogen Sulfide, Total Reduced Sulfur and Sulfuric Acid Aerosal 
as Required NSR-Regulated Pollutants" 
55-57 "The AO is Not Based on PM Emissions During Emission 30 
Characterization, Project Related Emission Increases, Netting and 
Net Increase Calculations and in the Requ ired BACT • Determinations; the Refinery Onsite Road Network is an Emission 
Unit Not Listed in the AO Approved Installations and Holly 
Refining Plans to Increase Site-Road-Related PM, PM 10 & PM2.5 
Emissions Through a Physical Change or Change in the Method of 
Operation of this Emission Unit" 
59-60 "Table 3-4 and 3-5 NO2 Reference [is incorrect]" 32 • 
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60-61 "Facility Configuration and Operations in Compliance with Holly 33 
Refining's Notice oflntent" 
61-62 "Holly Refining' s NOI Contains Significant Errors on the Matter of 34 
the Specific Start of the Contemporaneous Period" 
62-63 "The AO is Based on an Jrnproper Characterization of the 35 
Contemporaneous Period" 
63-65 "The AO is Un lawful Because the Director Failed to Require and 36 
Base his Permitting Analysis on the Necessary Process Flow 
Diagrams and New Source Review Forms" 
• 65-67 "The Evaluation and Characterization of Contemporaneous Emission 37 Increases is Inadequate" 
67-69 "The Section 2.3.1 "Fuel Gas" Process Support Group Analysis and 38 
Related Section 3 Emission Tables Do Not Show an Adequate 40 
C.F .R. §52.21 (b )(3)(i)(b) Determination of Contemporaneous 
• Creditable Emission Increases and Decreases" 
69-70 "The Section 2.3.2 Disclosure of Cooling Tower Changes Fails to 39 
Provide Sufficient Jnformation to Determine Contemporaneous 
Creditable Emission Increases from Non-Modified Po1tions of 
Existing Cooling Towers" 
• 70 "The Section 2.3.3 Disclosure Concerning Flares Does Not Provide 40 
Sufficient Information to Determine Contemporaneous Creditable 
Emission Increases at Non-Modified Flare Emission Units" 
70-71 "The Section 2.3 .6 Discussion of Wastewater Treatment and the 41 
• Refinery Wastewater Sewer System Does Not Provide Sufficient Information to Determine Contemporaneous Creditable Emission 
Increases" 
74-75 "Holly Refining's Section 3 Emission Increase and Net Emission 43 
Increase Tables Contain Erroneous Specification of Volatile Organic 
• Compound and Hazardous Air Pollutant Emissions from Cooling Tower #I 1" 
76-77 "VOC Emissions and Waxy Crude Handling, Transfer and Storage" 45 
78 "Holly Refining Erroneously Claimed VOC Emission Reduction 46 
from Removal of a Floating Roof' 
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• 
79-81 "The Director Fails to Enforce Notice of Intent and Compliance 48 
Report Certification by Holly Refining" 
• 
81 "Condition ll.B.1.b in the AO is Too Vague to be Enforceable" 49 
81 "The AO Production Rates During Compliance Stack Tests Are 50 
Insufficient" 
81-82 "The AO Fails to Contain a Section Addressing the Regulatory 51 
Status, Method of Emission Control and Monitoring-Inspection-
Recordkeeping-Reporting Requirements for Tank Sources of VOC 
and HAP" 
83-84 "The AO Fails to Enforce Specific Requirements of the July, 2008 53 
EPA Consent Decree Covering PM Emission Limitations for FCCU 
Unit 4 and Fails to Require Sufficient Monitoring Necessary to 
Assure Compliance with PM Emission Requirements from FCCU 
Units 5 and 25" 
84-86 "The AO Fai ls to Provide a Best Available Control Technology 54 
Emission Limitation for PM, PM 10 or PM2.5 to Control Emissions • from FCC Unit 4" 
86-87 "Setting NOx Emission Limitations for 4FCCU and 25FCCU 55 
Catalyst Regenerator Exhaust Must be Explained and Justified on the 
Record to Eliminate Error and Ambiguity" 
• 87-88 "The AO Omits Oxygen Corrections for NOx and SO2 Emission 56 
Limitations that are Stack Flue Gas Concentration Limits" 
91-93 "The Record Does Not Include Maximum Potential to Emit for Short 59 
Term SO2 Emissions from the FCC Unit 25 Wet Scrubber Exhaust 
Vent Compliance Detennination Point that are Associated with • Sulfur Recovery Unit/SRU Incinerator Outages" 
93-94 "The AO Fails to Contain Oxygen Monitoring and Wet Scrubber Outlet 60 
Volumetric Flow Rate Determination at FCC Units 4 & 25 Wet 
Scrubber Controlled Vent Stacks" 
• 95-96 "The Director Eliminated a Previously Established PM Limits for 62 
FCC Unit 4 Without Replacing Such a Limit with a Revised BACT 
Determination" 
96-97 "Holly Refining Has Not Demonstrated that the 15% Opacity Limit 63 
for 25 FCCU Constitutes a BACT Visible Emission Limitation" 
• 
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• 
97-98 "The Director Must Regulate the FCC 34" Flue Gas Bypass" 65 
• 98-99 "Nothing Provided by Holly Refining's Final Revised Notice of 66 
Intent Justifies the Claimed 98% Control Efficiency Claimed for 
VOC, HAP and CO Destruction Efficiency from the Open Air 
Flares" 
• 
99-100 "The Record Fails to Address All Parts of the Existing and Proposed 67 
Flare Gas System and Fai led to Carry Out a "Top Down" Best 
Available Control Technology Analysis" 
I 00-1 02 "The AO May Not Dismiss Flare Gas Recovery Systems as a BACT 68 
Requirement Without Considering Prevailing Industry Practice in 
Favor of Such Systems at Larger Refineries" 
104-105 "Flare Opacity Limitation is Not a BACT Limitation" 71 
106-107 "The AO Fai ls to Adequately Address the SRU Incinerator" 73 
• 
107 "The AO Fails to Adequately Address the Controlled Refinery 74 
Process Wastewater Sewers" 
I 07-108 "Neither the Approval Order Nor Holly Refining's Final Revised 75 
Notice oflntent Contain Any Limitation on Cooling Tower Water 
Total Dissolved Solids" 
• 108-109 "The AO Fai ls to Incorporate a VOC BACT Determination and Fails 76 
to Address EPA Consent Decree Requirements for LOAR Programs 
at Ho lly Refining's Facility" 
I 09-110 "Condition II.B. l.d Should Require Continuous Total Sulfur 77 
• 
Analyzer" 
111-112 "The Director Must Address the Heater/Boiler NOx CEM 79 
Requirement" 
115 "Utah Physicians Reserves the Right to Respond to Any Argument 81 
• 
Data and/or Analys is Which Was Not Available at the Beginning of 
the Public Comment Period" 
• 
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BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 
DIVISION OF WATER QUALITY 
In the Matter of: 
Approval Order No. DAQE-AN101230041-13 
Holly Refining & Marketing Company-
Woods Cross, LLC 
Heavy Crude Processing Project 
Project No. N10123-0041 
ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
RECOMMENDED ORDER ON THE MERITS 
Date: March 31, 2015 
On March 11, 2015, the administrative law judge issued a Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Recommended Order on the Merits (proposed dispositive action) in the above 
referenced Division of Air Quality permit review adjudicative proceeding, conducted in 
accordance with Utah Code Ann. §19-1-301.5 and Utah Admin. Coder. 305-7. When an 
administrative law judge submits a proposed dispositive action, I may adopt, adopt with 
modifications, or reject the proposed dispositive action; or return the proposed dispositive 
action to the administrative law judge for further action as required. Utah Code Ann.§ 19-1-
301.5(13)(a). I am required to uphold all factual, technical, and scientific agency determinations 
that are supported by substantial evidence taken from the record as a whole. Utah Code Ann.§ 
19-1-301.5(13)(b ). 
Having reviewed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order on 
the Merits and the accompanying record, I am satisfied that the factual, technical, and scientific 
agency determinations are supported by substantial evidence taken from the record as a 
whole . 
WHEREFORE, I adopt the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Lqw, and Recommended Order 
on the Merits. For the reasons stated therein, I affirm the Division of Air Quality's decision to 
issue the approval order described above and I order the dismissal with prejudice of each of the 
Petitioners' arguments. 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Judicial review of this final order may be sought in the Utah Court of Appeals in 
accordance with Sections 63G-4-401, 63G-4-403, and 63G-4-405 of the Utah Code Ann. and the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure by filing a proper petition within thirty days after the date of 
this order. 
DATED this3l_ day of7/knc4 , 2015. 
AMANDA SMITH 
Executive Director 
Utah Department of Environmental Quality 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31st day of March 2015, I served the foregoing 
ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDED ORDER 
ON THE MERITS via email on the following: 
Administrative Proceedings Record Officer degapro@utah.gov 
Joro Walker 
Charles R. Dubuc, Jr. 
WESTERN RESOURCE ADVOCATES 
joro.walker@westernresources.org 
rob.dubuc@westernresources.org 
Christian C. Stephens 
Marina V. Thomas 
ASSISTANT UTAH ATTORNEYS GENERAL 
cstephens@utah.gov 
marinathomas@utah.gov 
Steven J. Christiansen 
David Reyman 
Megan Houdeshel 
Cheylynn Hayman 
PARR BROWN GEE &LOVELESS, P.C. 
185 S. State Street, Suite 800 Salt 
Lake City, UT 84111 
schristiansen@parrbrown.com 
dreymann@parrbrown.com 
mhoudeshel@parrbrown.com 
chayman@parrbrown.com 
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Shane R. Bekkemellom, 
Administrative Legal Secretary 
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FACT SHEET: New Source Review (NSR) 
What is New Source Review? 
New Source Review (NSR) is a Clean Air Act program that requires industrial facilities 
to install modern pollution control equipment when they are built or when making a 
change that increases emissions significantly. The program accomplishes this when 
owners or operators obtain permits limiting air emissions before they begin construction . 
For that reason, NSR is commonly referred to as the "preconstruction air permitting 
program." 
The purpose of the NSR program is to protect public health and the environment, even as 
new industrial facilities are built and existing facilities expand. Specifically, its purpose 
is to ensure that air quality: 
• does not worsen where the air is currently unhealthy to breathe (i.e. nonattainment 
areas) 
• is not significantly degraded where the air is currently clean (i.e. attainment areas) 
What are permits? 
Permits are enforceable legal documents that an industrial facility, or stationary source, 
must comply with. Permits may place restrictions on: 
• What construction is allowed 
• What air emission limits must be met 
• How the source can be operated 
To assure that sources comply with a permit's emission limits, a permit almost always 
contains monitoring, recordkeeping, and repo1ting requirements. 
What pollutants are regulated under the NSR program? 
The NSR program applies to regulated NSR pollutants. In the PSD program, the 
regulated NSR pollutants include the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) 
pollutants and some other pollutants including sulfuric acid mist, hydrogen sulfide, etc . 
In nonattainment NSR, the regulated NSR pollutants are only the NAAQS pollutants. 
EPA sets NAAQS for six principal pollutants, which are commonly called "criteria" 
pollutants and include: ozone, carbon monoxide, particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, lead, 
and nitrogen oxide. The NAAQS are set at levels that protect human health and the 
environment. 
For each criteria pollutant, every area of the United States has been designated as one of 
the fo llowing categories: 
• Attainment: air quality is equal to or better than the level of the NAAQS; these 
areas must maintain clean air 
• Unclassifiable: there are no data on air quality for the area; the area is treated as 
attainment 
• Nonattainment: air quality is worse than the level of the NAAQS; these areas 
must take actions to improve air quality and attain the NAAQS within a certain 
period of time 
What are the types of NSR permitting programs and what do they require? 
There are three types ofNSR permitting programs, each with a different set of 
requirements. A facility may have to meet one or more of these sets of permitting 
reg u irements. 
1. Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program applies to a new major 
source or a source making a major modification in an attainment area. The 
program requirements include: 
• Installation of the Best Available Control Technology (BACT) 
o Emission limitation based on the maximum degree of emission 
reduction (considering energy, environmental, and economic 
impacts) achievable through application of production processes 
and available methods, systems, and techniques 
• An Air Quality Analysis 
o Assesses existing air quality and predicts through modeling the 
ambient concentrations that will result from the proposed project 
and future growth associated with the project 
• An Additional Impacts Analysis 
o Assesses the impacts of air, ground, and water pollution on soi ls, 
vegetation and visibility caused by any increase in emissions of 
any regulated pollutant from the source or modification under 
review 
• Public Involvement 
o Opportunities include public comment period, hearings, appeals, 
etc. during the permit issuance process. 
2. Nonattainment NSR program applies to a new major source or a source making 
a major modification in a nonattainment area. The program requirements include: 
• Installation of the Lowest Achievable Emission Rate (LAER) 
o The rate of emissions that reflects: (I) the most stringent emission 
limitation included in the implementation plan of any state for a 
similar source unless the facility owner or operator demonstrates 
such limitations are not achievable; or (2) the most stringent 
emissions limitation achieved in practice, whichever is more 
stringent. 
• Emission Offsets 
o To avoid increases in emissions, proposed emissions increases 
from new or modified facilities are balanced by equivalent or 
greater reductions from existing sources. 
• Public Involvement 
o Opportunities include public comment period, hearings, appeals, 
etc. during the permit issuance process. 
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3. Minor NSR program applies to a new minor source and/or a minor modification 
at both major and minor sources, in both attainment and nonattainment areas . 
Minor NSR may apply to criteria pollutants as well as other pollutants depending 
on the state. The program requirements include: 
• New sources or modifications at existing sources must comply with any 
emissions control measures required by the state. 
• The program must not interfere with attainment or maintenance of the 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards or the control strategies of a State 
Implementation Plan (SIP) or Tribal Implementation P lan (TIP). 
o An implementation plan is a set of programs and regulations 
developed by the appropriate regulatory agency in order to assure 
that the NAAQS are attained and maintained. 
Who issues the permits? 
Usually NSR permits are issued by state or local air pollution control agencies. State, 
tribal and local air pollution control agencies may have developed their own NSR permit 
programs, as part of their State Implementation Plans (SIP) or Tribal Implementation 
Plans (TIP), that are approved by EPA or they may be delegated the authority to issue 
permits on behalf of EPA. If a state or a tribe chooses not to develop a SIP or a TIP and 
also not seek delegation of the federal NSR programs,, EPA wou ld implement the 
programs and issue the NSR permit, as we do for the PSD program in Indian country. 
What sources are regulated under NSR? 
The NSR permitting program applies to both: major and minor stationary sources. 
I . Major sources are facilities that have the potential to emit pollutants in amounts 
equal to or greater than the corresponding major source threshold levels. These 
threshold levels vary by pollutant and/or source category. Major sources must 
comply with specific emission limits; which are general ly more stringent in 
nonattainment areas. 
2. Minor sources are facilities that have the potential to emit pollutants in amounts 
less than the corresponding major source thresholds. 
Synthetic minor sources are facilities that have the potential to emit pollutants at 
or above the major source threshold level, but voluntarily accept enforceable 
limits to keep their emissions below the major source thresholds and avoid the 
major NSR requirements . 
Where can I find additional information about NSR? 
EPA's NSR Web site: http://www.epa.gov/nsr/ 
The NSR Web site provides links to regulations, publications and state permitting 
contacts pertaining to New Source Review 
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Utah Division of Air Quality 
New Source Review Section Company ___ ______ _ 
Site/Source ________ _ 
Form 19 Date 
------------
Natural Gas Boilers and Liquid Heaters 
Boiler Information 
Boiler Manufacturer: 
Model Number: I 3. Serial Number: 
Boiler Rating: (106 Btu per Hour) 
Operating Schedule: hours per day days per week weeks per year 
Use: D steam: psig D hot water D other hot liquid: 
Fuels: D Natural Gas D LPG D Butane D Methanol 
D Process Gas - H2S content in process gas grain/1 00cu.ft. 
D Fuel Oil - specify grade: __ D Other, specify: 
Sulfur content % by weight Days per year during which unit is oil f ired: 
Backup □ Diesel D Natural Gas Fuel D LPG D Butane D Methanol 
D Other 
Is unit used to incinerate waste gas liquid stream? Dyes D no 
(Submit drawing of method of waste stream introduction to burners) 
Gas Burner Information 
Gas Burner Manufacturer: 
No. of Burners: 11. Minimum rating per burner: cu. ft/hr 
12. Average Load: % 13. Maximum rating per burner: cu. ft/hr 
14. Performance Guarantee (ppm dry corrected to 3% Oxygen): 
NOx: CO: Hydrocarbons: 
15. Gas burner mode of control: D Manual D Automatic on-off 
D Automatic hi-low D Automatic full modulation 
Oil Burner Information 
16. Oil burner manufacturer: 
17. Model: number of burners: Size number: 
18 . Minimum rating per burner: gal/hr I 19. Maximum rating per burner: gal/hr 
Page 1 of 3 
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Form 11 - Natural Gas Boiler and Liquid Heater 
(Continued) 
Modifications for Emissions Reduction 
20. Type of modification: D Low NOx Burner 
D Oxygen Trim 
D Flue Gas Recirculation (FGR) 
o Other (specify) 
For Low-NOx Burners 
21. Burner Type: o Staged air o Staged fuel D Internal flue gas recirculation 
D Ceramic D Other (specify): 
22. Manufacturer and Model Number: 
23. Rating: 106 BTU/HR J 24. Combustion air blower horsepower: 
For Flue Gas Recirculation (FGR) 
25. Type: D Induced o Forced Recirculation fan horsepower: 
26. FGR capacity at full load: scfm %FGR 
27. FGR gas temperature or load at which FGR commences: OF %load 
28. Where is recirculation flue gas reintroduced? 
For Oxygen Trim Systems 
29. Manufacturer and Model Number: 
30. Recorder: o yes D no Describe: 
Stack or Vent Data 
31. Inside stack diameter or dimensions 32. Gas exit temperature: OF 
Stack height above the ground 
Stack height above the building 
33. Stack serves: D this equipment only, D other equipment (submit type and rating of all other equipment 
exhausted throuQh this stack or vent) 
34. Stack flow rate: acfm Vertically restricted? o Yes D No 
Emissions Calculations (PTE) 
35. Calculated emissions for this device 
PM10 Lbs/hr Tons/yr PM2.s Lbs/hr Tons/yr 
NOx Lbs/hr Tons/yr SOx Lbs/hr Tons/yr 
co Lbs/hr Tons/yr voe Lbs/hr Tons/yr 
CO2 Tons/yr CH4 Tons/yr 
N2O Tons/yr 
HAPs Lbs/hr (speciate) Tons/yr (speciate) 
Submit calculations as an appendix. If other pollutants are emitted, include the emissions in the appendix. 
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Instructions Form 19 - Natural Gas Boiler and Liquid Heater 
This application form is applicable to natural gas-fired boilers and liquid heaters. Boiler(s) rated for a total of less than five 
• million Btu per hr and fueled by natural gas and one million Btu per hour and fired by fuel oil numbers 1-6 are exempt from filing 
a Notice of Intent to construct. See Source Category Exemptions R307-401-10 (1) and (2). 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
NOTE: 1. Submit this form in conjunction with Form 1 and Form 2. 
2. Call the Division of Air Quality (DAO) at (801) 536-4000 if you have problems or questions in filling out this form. 
Ask to speak with a New Source Review engineer. We will be glad to help! 
3. Attach specification sheets for all burners, equipment and modifications to boiler . 
1. Company name of manufacturer of boiler (specifically the pressure vessel or shell). 
2. Manufacturer's model number. 
3. Specific identification, serial, number of the boiler. 
4. The maximum heat input for which the boiler is rated. Give the value in million British thermal units per hour. 
5. The operating schedule for which you want to be permitted. The air quality impact will be evaluated according to this 
schedule. Note: The approval order will limit operating hours to what you request. 
6. Mark the box indicating the purpose of the boiler. 
7. Mark all fuels that you wish to be approved to use, also list the backup fuel to be used if any. 
8. If a waste stream is burned, answer yes and submit drawings, etc. to characterize the method. 
9. Company name of manufacturer of gas burners. If the boiler is a packaged boiler, list the manufacturer of the boiler. 
10. How many gas burners will be installed in the boiler? 
11 . Minimum gas flow rate at which each burner can operate (in cubic feet per hour) 
12. The average load at which you plan to operate each burner, compared to the maximum burner rating. 
13. Maximum gas flow rate at which each burner can operate (in cubic feet per hour) 
14. List the maximum concentration which the manufacturer guarantees the burners will produce in parts per million of 
Nitrogen Oxides (NOx), Carbon Monoxide (CO), and Total Hydrocarbons. If the percentage of Non-methane 
hydrocarbons is known, please provide that information. 
15. Indicate the method used to control the flame for the burners. 
16. Company name of manufacturer of oil burners. If the boiler is a packaged boiler, and has duel fuel capability, list the 
manufacturer of the boiler. 
17. Manufacturer's model, number (quantity), and size of oil burners to be installed in the boiler. 
18. Minimum oil flow rate at which each burner can operate (in gallons per hour) . 
19. Maximum oil flow rate at which each burner can operate (in gallons per hour). 
20. Indicate the type of emissions reduction strategy(ies) used in the proposed boiler. 
21. Indicate the low-NOx strategy used in the burner design. 
22. Company name of manufacturer of the burners. Manufacturer's model number for the burners. 
23. The heat input rating of each burner in million British thermal units per hour. 
24. In a forced draft design, the horsepower of the fan motor used. 
25. Method for delivering the flue gas to the combustion zone. Forced draft indicates the presence of a fan. Give the fan 
horsepower if so equipped. 
26. The amount of flue gas which can be recirculated, in standard cubic feet per minute. And the percentage of the flue 
gas that can be recirculated at full load. 
27. Generally, flue gas recirculation systems start up at a given load or temperature. Give that specification. 
28. Where in relation to the burner/combustion zone is the flue gas reintroduced to the boiler? 
29. Name of the manufacturer and the model number of the oxygen trim system. 
30. Is there a data recorder? If so, describe it: What is recorded? How is it read? 
31. Give the inside diameter or the dimensions of the stack. List the stack height above the ground and above the 
building in which it is located, describe if the gas flow is vertically restricted. This information will be used in modeling 
the impact of emissions on the ambient air. 
32. Give the expected gas exit temperature at the end of the stack. Also to be used in modeling. 
33. Indicate if other equipment is also vented to this stack. If other equipment is served by the stack, provide the flow 
rates, operating parameters, fuel and combustion information that can be used to characterize the total emissions 
from the stack. 
34. Give the gas flow rate out of the stack in actual cubic feet per minute (acfm). 
35. Supply calculations for all criteria pollutants, greenhouse gases and HAPs. Use AP42 or Manufacturers' data to 
complete your calculations. 
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Air Emissions Boiler-Natural Gas 
Boiler Emissions - Natural Gas 
Date: 0-00-00 
Company Name: Test 
Facility Name: test 
Equipment Name: Admin E Boiler 
Enter Maximum Heat Rate, (Btu/hr or Btuh) . . . .. . ... .. . . . 90000000 
Gas Consumption per Hour (cubic feet per hour) 90000 
Calculated using a 1000 Btu/cu ft heating value for natural gas and 100% boiler load. 
Enter Number Hours Operated per Year. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400 
The calculated emissions will be : 
Emission Factors listed below are for Natural Gas Boilers ...... . 
Less Than 100 Million Btuh 
b C d 
Pollutant Emission Factor Emission Rate Emissions 
lbs/cu ft gas lbs/hr tons/yr 
c x cubic feet hour d x hours/2000 
Particulate Material - PM10 0.0000076 0.684 0.137 
Sulfur Dioxide - SO2 0.0000006 0.054 0.011 
Nitrogen Oxides - NOx 0.0001 9.000 1.800 
Volitile Organic Compounds - voe 0.0000055 0.495 0.099 
Carbon Monoxide - CO 0.000084 7.560 1.512 
Note: This calculation chooses the correct set of emission factors, from the table below, based on the 
boiler heat rate. The correct emission factor will automatically be choosen to match the 
maximum heat rate input. Each boiler must have it's own calculation, do not total the heat rates 
for the site and use the one number for emission calculations . 
Air Emissions Boiler-Natural Gas 
Boiler Emissions - Natural Gas 
Instructions 
These calculation sheets have been written using Microsoft Excel. 
Step 1 Fill in the name and identifying information. 
Enter the boiler heat output, in Btu/hour or Btuh, from the boiler name plate. Every boiler needs 
an emission calculaton sheet. 
Step 2 Enter the hours the boiler will be operated. 
Step 3 Once you have entered in all the values click anywhere on the sheet and the calculation will be 
done by the program. Remember the information is being used for permitting purposes, so be 
sure the numbers are right and realistic. 
Step 4 If this is the only piece of equipment you are done with the calculations. 
Save a copy by printing out the page. 
You now need to determine what type of permit you need ..... 
Step 5 If this is one of several emission points, download the Air Emission Summary page and enter the 
equipment name and emissions. 
Emission Factors - Natural Gas Less Than 100 Greater Than 100 Million Btuh Million Btuh Boilers (lb/cu ft gas) (lb/cu ft gas) 
Particulate Material - PM10 0.0000076 0.0000076 
Sulfur Dioxide - SO2 0.0000006 0.0000006 
Nitrogen Oxides - NOx 0.0001 0.00028 
Volitile Organic Compounds - voe 0.0000055 0.0000055 
Carbon Monoxide - CO 0.000084 0.000084 
Emission factors are from EPA AP 42, 1.4 Natural Gas Combustion, Emission Factors are for an 
uncontrolled boiler. Most newer boilers have smaller emission rates, if you have manufacturers 
emission rates you should use them. Please include the manufacturers literature as a reference 
for why you are using different factors. Emission factors used could become a permit condition, 
and the Division of Air Quality can ask for a test to confirm emissions. 
• 
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13.5 Industrial Flares 
13 .5. I General 
Flaring is a high-temperature oxidation process used to burn combustible components, mostly 
hydrocarbons, of waste gases from industrial operations. Natural gas, propane, ethylene, propylene, 
butadiene and butane constitute over 95 percent of the waste gases flared. In combustion, gaseous 
hydrocarbons react with atmospheric oxygen to form carbon dioxide (CO2) and water. In some waste 
gases, carbon monoxide (CO) is the major combustible component. Presented below, as an example, 
is the combustion reaction of propane . 
During a combustion reaction, several intermediate products are formed, and eventually, most 
are converted to CO2 and water. Some quantities of stable intermediate products such as carbon 
monoxide, hydrogen, and hydrocarbons will escape as emissions. 
Flares are used extensively to dispose of (I) purged and wasted products from refineries, 
(2) unrecoverable gases emerging with oil from oil wells, (3) vented gases from blast furnaces, 
(4) unused gases from coke ovens, and (5) gaseous wastes from chemical industries. Gases flared 
from refineries, petroleum production, chemical industries, and to some extent, from coke ovens, are 
composed largely of low molecular weight hydrocarbons with high heating value. Blast furnace flare 
gases are largely of inert species and CO, with low heating value. Flares are also used for burning 
waste gases generated by sewage digesters, coal gasification, rocket engine testing, nuclear power 
plants with sodium/water heat exchangers, heavy water plants, and ammonia fertilizer plants . 
There are two types of flares, e levated and ground flares. Elevated flares, the more common 
type, have larger capacities than ground flares. In elevated flares, a waste gas stream is fed through a 
stack anywhere from l O to over l 00 meters tall and is com busted at the tip of the stack. The flame is 
exposed to atmospheric disturbances such as wind and precipitation. In ground flares, combustion 
takes place at ground level. Ground flares vary in complexity, and they may consist either of 
conventional flare burners discharging horizontally with no enclosures or of multiple burners in 
refractory-lined steel enclosures. 
The typical flare system consists of (1) a gas collection header and piping for collecting gases 
from processing units, (2) a knockout drum (disentrainment drum) to remove and store condensables 
and entrained liquids, (3) a proprietary seal, water seal, or purge gas supply to prevent flash-back, 
( 4) a single- or multiple-burner unit and a flare stack, (5) gas pilots and an ignitor to ignite the mixture 
of waste gas and a ir, and, if required, (6) a provision for external momentum force (steam injection or 
forced air) for smokeless flaring. Natural gas, fuel gas, inert gas, or nitrogen can be used as purge 
gas. Figure 13.5-1 is a diagram of a typical steam-assisted elevated smokeless flare system. 
Complete combustion requires sufficient combustion air and proper mixing of air and waste 
gas. Smoking may result from combustion, depending upon waste gas components and the quantity 
and distribution of combustion air. Waste gases containing methane, hydrogen, CO, and ammonia 
usually burn without smoke. Waste gases containing heavy hydrocarbons such as paraffins above 
methane, olefins, and aromatics, cause smoke. An external momentum force, such as steam injection 
or blowing air, is used for efficient air/waste gas mixing and turbulence, which promotes smokeless 
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BURNER TIP 
ASSIST _ ___ ,_ _ _ _ ____ 
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DRAIN 
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,_ ____ ____ _ ___ __ PILOT GAS 
WATER SEAL 
DISENTRA1NMENT DRUM 
Figure 13.5-1. Diagram of a typical steam-assisted smokeless elevated flare. 
flaring of heavy hydrocarbon waste gas. Other external forces may be used for this purpose, including . 
water spray, high velocity vortex action, or natural gas. External momentum force is rarely required in 
ground flares. 
Steam injection is accomplished either by nozzles on an external ring around the top of the 
flare tip or by a single nozzle located concentrically within the tip. At installations where waste gas 
flow varies, both are used. The internal nozzle provides steam at low waste gas flow rates, and the 
external jets are used with large waste gas flow rates. Several other special-purpose flare tips are 
commercially available, one of which is for injecting both steam and air. Typical steam usage ratio 
varies from 7: 1 to 2: I, by weight. 
Waste gases to be flared must have a fuel value of at least 7500 to 9300 kilojoules per cubic 
meter kJ/m3 (200 to 250 British thermal units per cubic foot [Btu/ft3]) for complete combustion; 
otherwise fuel must be added. Flares providing supplemental fue l to waste gas are known as fired, or 
endothermic, fl ares. In some cases, even flaring waste gases having the necessary heat content 
will also require supplemental heat. If fue l-bound nitrogen is present, flaring ammonia with a heating 
value of 13,600 kJ/m3 (365 Btu/ft3) w ill require higher heat to minimize nitrogen oxides (NOx) 
formation. 
At many locations, flares normally used to dispose of low-volume continuous emissions are 
designed to handle large quantities of waste gases that may be intermittently generated during plant 
emergencies. Flare gas volumes can vary from a few cubic meters per hour during regular operations 
up to several thousand cubic meters per hour during major upsets. Flow rates at a refinery could be 
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from 45 to 90 kilograms per hour (kg/hr) (I 00 - 200 pounds per hour [lb/hr]) for relief valve leakage 
but could reach a full plant emergency rate of 700 megagrams per hour (Mg/hr) (750 tons/hr). Normal 
process blowdowns may release 450 to 900 kg/hr (1000 - 2000 lb/hr), and unit maintenance or minor 
failures may release 25 to 35 Mg/hr (27 - 39 tons/hr). A 40 molecular weight gas typically of 
0.012 cubic nanometers per second (nm3/s) (25 standard cubic feet per minute [scfm]) may rise to as 
high as 115 nm3/s (241,000 scfm). The required flare turndown ratio for this typical case is over 
15,000 to I. 
Many flare systems have 2 flares, in parallel or in series. In the former, I flare can be shut 
down for maintenance while the other serves the system. In systems of flares in series, I flare, usually 
a low-level ground flare, is intended to handle regular gas volumes, and the other, an elevated flare, to 
handle excess gas flows from emergencies. 
13.5.2 Emissions 
Noise and heat are the most apparent undesirable effects of flare operation. Flares are usually 
located away from populated areas or are sufficiently isolated, thus minimizing their effects on 
populations. 
Emissions from flaring include carbon particles (soot), unburned hydrocarbons, CO, and other 
partially burned and altered hydrocarbons. Also emitted are NOx and, if sulfur-containing material 
such as hydrogen sulfide or mercaptans is flared, sulfur dioxide (SO2). The quantities of hydrocarbon 
emissions generated relate to the degree of combustion. The degree of combustion depends largely on 
the rate and extent of fuel-air mixing and on the flame temperatures achieved and maintained. 
Properly operated flares achieve at least 98 percent combustion efficiency in the flare plume, meaning 
that hydrocarbon and CO em missions amount to less than 2 percent of hydrocarbons in the gas stream. 
The tendency of a fuel to smoke or make soot is influenced by fuel characteristics and by the 
amount and distribution of oxygen in the combustion zone. For complete combustion, at least the 
stoichiometric amount of oxygen must be provided in the combustion zone. The theoretical amount of 
oxygen required increases with the molecular weight of the gas burned. The oxygen supplied as air 
ranges from 9.6 units of air per unit of methane to 38.3 units of air per unit of pentane, by volume. 
Air is supplied to the flame as primary air and secondary air. Primary air is mixed with the gas before 
combustion, whereas secondary air is drawn into the flame. For smokeless combustion, sufficient 
primary air must be supplied, this varying from about 20 percent of stoichiometric air for a paraffin to 
about 30 percent for an olefin. If the amount of primary air is insufficient, the gases entering the base 
of the flame are preheated by the combustion zone, and larger hydrocarbon molecules crack to form 
hydrogen, unsaturated hydrocarbons, and carbon. The carbon particles may escape fut1her combustion 
and cool down to form soot or smoke. Olefins and other unsaturated hydrocarbons may polymerize to 
form larger molecules which crack, in turn forming more carbon. 
The fuel characteristics influencing soot formation include the carbon-to-hydrogen (C-to-H) 
ratio and the molecular structure of the gases to be burned. All hydrocarbons above methane, i. e., 
those with a C-to-H ratio of greater than 0.33, tend to soot. Branched chain paraffins smoke more 
readily than corresponding normal isomers. The more highly branched the paraffin, the greater the 
tendency to smoke. Unsaturated hydrocarbons tend more toward soot formation than do saturated 
ones. Soot is eliminated by adding steam or air; hence, most industrial flares are steam-assisted and 
some are air-assisted. Flare gas composition is a critical factor in determining the amount of steam 
necessary. 
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Since flares do not lend themselves to conventional emission testing techniques, only a few 
attempts have been made to characterize flare emissions. Recent EPA tests using propylene as flare 
gas indicated that efficiencies of 98 percent can be achieved when burning an offgas with at least 
11 ,200 kJ/m3 (300 Btu/ft\ The tests conducted on steam-assisted flares at velocities as low as 
39.6 meters per minute (m/min) (130 ft/min) to 1140 m/min (3750 ft/min), and on air-assisted flares at 
velocities of 180 m/min (6 I 7 ft/min) to 3960 m/min (13,087 ft/min) indicated that variations in 
incoming gas flow rates have no effect on the combustion efficiency. Flare gases with less than 
16,770 kJ/m3 ( 450 Btu/ft3) do not smoke. 
Table 13.5-1 presents flare emission factors, and Table 13.5-2 presents emission composition 
data obtained from the EPA tests. 1 Crude propylene was used as flare gas during the tests. Methane 
was a major fraction of hydrocarbons in the flare emissions, and acetylene was the dominant 
intermediate hydrocarbon species. Many other reports on flares indicate that acetylene is always 
formed as a stable intermediate product. The acetylene formed in the combustion reactions mar react 
further with hydrocarbon radicals to form polyacetylenes followed by polycyclic hydrocarbons. 
In flaring waste gases containing no nitrogen compounds, NO is formed either by the fixation 
of atmospheric nitrogen (N) with oxygen (0) or by the reaction between the hydrocarbon radicals 
present in the combustion products and atmospheric nitrogen, by way of the intermediate stages, HCN, 
CN, and OCN.2 Sulfur compounds contained in a flare gas stream are converted to SO2 when burned. 
The amount of SO2 emitted depends directly on the quantity of sulfur in the flared gases. 
Table 13.5-1 (English Units). EMISSION FACTORS FOR FLARE OPERA TIONSa 
EMISSION FACTOR RATING: B 
Emission Factor 
Component (lb/106 Btu) 
Total hydrocarbonsb 0.14 
Carbon monoxide 0.37 
Nitrogen oxides 0.068 
Soof 0 - 274 
a Reference I. Based on tests using crude propylene containing 80% propylene and 20% propane. 
b Measured as methane equivalent. 
c Soot in concentration values: nonsmoking flares, 0 micrograms per liter (µg/L); lightly smoking 
flares, 40 µg/L; average smoking flares, 177 µg/L; and heavily smoking flares, 274 µg/L. 
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Table 13.5-2. HYDROCARBON COMPOSITION OF FLARE EMISSION3 
Volume% 
Composition Average I Range 
Methane 55 14 - 83 
Ethane/Ethy lene 8 1 - 14 
Acetylene 5 0.3 - 23 
Propane 7 0 - 16 
Propylene 25 1 - 65 
a Reference 1. The composition presented is an average of a number of test results obtained under the 
following sets of test conditions: steam-assisted flare using high-Btu-content feed; steam-assisted 
using low-Btu-content feed; air-assisted flare using high-Btu-content feed; and air-ass isted flare using 
low-Btu-content feed. In all tests, "waste" gas was a synthetic gas consisting of a mixture of 
propylene and propane. 
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